FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-050
Wednesday
13 March 1996

Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-050 | CONTENTS | *13 March 1996*

NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

INTER-EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

CE: Council of Europe Rejects Yeltsin's Stand on Chechnya *[AFP]* 1

ALBANIA

Albania: Party Officials on State Department Report *[GAZETA SHQIPTARE 9 Mar]* 2
Albania: Socialists Praise U.S. State Department Report *[ZERI I POPULLIT 9 Mar]* 2
Albania: State Department, EBRD Reports Assessed *[KOHA JONE 9 Mar]* 3
Albania: Helsinki Committee on Prison Violence in Greece *[ATA]* 4
Albania: Parties Issue Statement on Election Bill *[ZERI I POPULLIT 31 Jan]* 5
Albania: Court Examines Complaint Against Election Law *[ATA]* 5
Albania: Intelligence Chief Proposes 'Changes' *[KOHA JONE 8 Mar]* 6
Albania: Court Rules Out Arrest of Ex-Sigurimi Chief *[ATA]* 6
Albania: Reporter Found Guilty for Article on Bombing *[ATA]* 7
Albania: Reporters Condemn Raid on TRIBUNA DEMOKRATIKE *[ATA]* 7
Albania: Christian Democrat Rules Out Coalition With PS *[ATA]* 7
Albania: Rightist League Not To Field Joint Candidates *[GAZETA SHQIPTARE 8 Mar]* 8

BULGARIA

Bulgaria: Lukanov Attacks Interior Ministry at Plenum *[24 CHASA 11 Mar]* 9
Bulgaria: Differences Within SDS Over Primaries *[TRUD 11 Mar]* 9

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Commentary on U.S. Human Rights Report *[LIDOVE NOVINY 8 Mar]* 10
Czech Republic: Weekly: Klaus Balkan Trip Heralds Shift to East *[CESKY TYDENIK 8-11 Mar]* ... 11
Czech Republic: Havel Addresses Czech Parliament *[Prague Radio]* 12
Czech Republic: Holan Opposes Army Cooperation With Russia *[HOSPODARSKE NOVINY 11 Mar]* 13
Czech Republic: Holan Views Army Concept, Tenders *[LIDOVE NOVINY 11 Mar]* 14
Czech Republic: MNS Chairman Denies Split Within Party *[DENNI TELEGRAF 11 Mar]* 14

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Schenk Meets With Czech Counterpart *[NARODNA OBRODA 9 Mar]* 15
Slovakia: Party Officials View HZDS Document *[NARODNA OBRODA 12 Mar]* 15
Slovakia: Keltosova Proposal on Diplomats Viewed *[NARODNA OBRODA 9 Mar]* 16
Slovakia: Keltosova Said Unsuitable as UN Envoy *[NARODNA OBRODA 9 Mar]* 17
Slovakia: Meciar Addresses HZDS Rally 7 Mar *[SME 8 Mar]* 17
Slovakia: Amendments to Penal Code Detailed *[SME 9 Mar]* 18

HUNGARY

Hungary: Horn Views Economy, Relations, NATO *[Vienna KURIER 12 Mar]* 19
Hungary: Keleti Comments on Cooperation With Israel *[NEPSZAVA 12 Mar]* 19
Hungary: Horn Criticizes Smallholders Party Program *[NEPSZAVA 12 Mar]* 20
Hungary: Predecessors, Experts Comment on Medgyessy *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 27 Feb]* 21

Hungary: Privatization Minister Urges Unity in MSZP [*MAGYAR HIRLAP 9 Mar*] 22
Hungary: National Charter Charges 'Politicization' of Media [*DEMOKRATA 25 Jan*] 23

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: NATO Troops on Alert in Sarajevo District [*AFP*] 24
B-H: IFOR Notes Arson, Destruction in Sarajevo [*Sarajevo Radio*] 24
B-H: Ilidzans Blame Bildt for Loss of Property [*Sarajevo Radio*] 24
B-H: Problems Cited in Ilidza Over Uniforms [*AFP*] 24
B-H: Tensions in Kulen Vakuf 'Somewhat Abated' [*Sarajevo Radio*] 25
B-H: Bosnian Army Blocks Routes to Bugojno [*TANJUG*] 25
B-H: NATO Warns of Croat-Bosniak 'Tension' [*AFP*] 26
B-H: Croat Moves Against Bosnian Muslims Cited [*LJILJAN 6-13 Mar*] 26
B-H: Commentary Says Croats To Divide State [*OSLOBODJENJE 7 Mar*] 27
B-H: Presidency Discusses International Position [*Sarajevo Radio*] 28
B-H: Economic Agreement Signed With Croatia [*Sarajevo Radio*] 28
B-H: Izetbegovic Explains Outcome of Rome Summit [*Sarajevo Radio*] 29
B-H: Sarajevo Mayor Tenders Resignation [*Sarajevo Radio*] 29
B-H: Kupusovic Calls Sarajevo Canton 'Suicide' [*AFP*] 30
B-H: Karadzic, Krajisnik Meet Russian Officials [*Banja Luka Radio*] 30
B-H: Kasagic Meets International Police Group [*Banja Luka TV*] 30
B-H: Kasagic Says Serb Republic Less Isolationist [*TANJUG*] 31
B-H: Serb, FRY Delegations Hold Economic Talks [*TANJUG*] 31
B-H: Serb Republic-FRY Economic Zone Proposed [*SRNA*] 31
B-H: Serb Republic Regulates Trade With FRY [*Banja Luka TV*] 32
B-H: Serb Officials on Trade With FRY [*Banja Luka Radio*] 32
B-H: FRY Businessmen End Visit to Serb Republic [*Belgrade TV*] 33
B-H: Judge Details Case Against Serb Army General [*Sarajevo TV*] 33
B-H: Serb Major General Jovo Maric Dies [*SRNA*] 33
B-H: Committee Issues War Casualty Figures [*NOVA BOSNA 9 Mar*] 34
B-H: Witnesses Describe Visegrad 'Carnage' [*London THE GUARDIAN 11 Mar*] 34
B-H: 'No New Guidelines' on War Criminals [*AFP*] 37
B-H: U.S. 'Fear' of Bosnian 'Terrorists' Noted [*LJILJAN 6-13 Mar*] 38
B-H: U.S. Attitude Toward Iran's Presence Viewed [*DNEVNI AVAZ 5 Mar*] 39

CROATIA

Croatia: Simonovic Hails FRY FM's Visit to Zagreb [*TANJUG*] 41
Croatia: Granic's 'Discontent' After Talks Assessed [*Sarajevo Radio*] 41
Croatia: Zagreb-Belgrade Air, Road Traffic To Resume [*AFP*] 42
Croatia: Tudjman Receives U.S. Delegation [*Zagreb Radio*] 42
Croatia: Tudjman Receives Belgium's Derycke [*Zagreb Radio*] 43
Croatia: FM Granic Meets Belgian Counterpart [*Zagreb Radio*] 43
Croatia: Tudjman Reshuffles Top Military Officers [*Zagreb Radio*] 43
Croatia: Policemen Turned Back in Sarajevo Suburb [*Zagreb TV*] 44
Croatia: SK Refugee Union Head Condemns Croatian Laws [*Beli Manastir Radio*] 44
Croatia: Details of Charges Against Alleged Spy [*Zagreb TV*] 46

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

FYROM: Frckovski on Relations With Neighbors [*Skopje Radio*] 47
FYROM: Cokrevski Receives UNPREDEP Head [*Skopje Radio*] 47
FYROM: Albanian Teachers Day Ceremony in Tetovo [*NOVA MAKEDONIJA 12 Mar*] 47

POLAND

Poland: Suspected Spy for 'Western' Country Arrested [*Warsaw TV*] 49

Poland: Daily Praises U.S. Actions in Taiwan Strait *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 12 Mar]* 49
Poland: Ministry Denies Government Violated Embargo on Iraq *[Warsaw Radio]* 49
Poland: URM Inspectors Examine Kaliningrad Corridor Issue *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 12 Mar]* 49
Poland: Daily Reports on Primakov Statement on Security *[TRYBUNA 13 Mar]* 50
Poland: Deputy Foreign Minister Previews Primakov Visit *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 13 Mar]* 50
Poland: Kwasniewski Visit to Minsk Not Confirmed *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 13 Mar]* 51
Poland: Security Office on Prospects of Joining NATO, EU *[Warsaw Radio]* 51
Poland: Ministry To Set Up Body for Integration With NATO *[POLSKA ZBROJNA 12 Mar]* 51
Poland: Comment on Withdrawal From Sejm of Walesa Draft Laws *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 12 Mar]* 52
Poland: Papal Nuncio, Kwasniewski Concordat Talks Optimistic *[Warsaw Radio]* 53
Poland: Jaruzelski Tours U.S. With Lectures on Martial Law *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 12 Mar]* 53
Poland: Ministry Justifies Aircraft Deal With Czechs *[POLSKA ZBROJNA 11 Mar]* 53
Poland: Cabinet Committee on Repatriation Issues, Demography *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 7 Mar]* 54

ROMANIA

Romania: Funar Criticizes U.S. Envoy, Hungarians *[JURNALUL NATIONAL 1 Mar]* 56
Romania: Daily Criticizes U.S. Envoy's Speech *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 6 Mar]* 57
Romania: Hungarians Offended by New Plaque in Cluj *[ADEVARUL 2 Mar]* 58
Romania: PDSR Accused of Planning Electoral Fraud *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 6 Mar]* 58
Romania: PUR Rules Out Alliance With Extremists *[JURNALUL NATIONAL 2 Mar]* 59
Romania: Subway Strikers Ignore Deadline *[Bucharest Radio]* 59
Romania: Cabinet Decides To Dismiss Subway Strikers *[Bucharest Radio]* 59
Romania: Bucharest Subway Employees Continue Strike *[Bucharest Radio]* 60
Romania: Vacaroiu: Subway Workers Ready To Work *[Bucharest Radio]* 60

SLOVENIA

Slovenia: 19,000 Refugees From Bosnia Ordered To Leave *[TANJUG]* 62
Slovenia: Shortage of Capital May Devalue Vouchers *[MLADINA 27 Feb]* 62
Slovenia: Trade With Russia Increases *[DELO 5 Mar]* 63

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: Milosevic Discusses Issues With U.S. Team *[TANJUG]* 64
FRY: Agani Raises Kosovo Secession Issue in Belgrade *[ATA]* 64
FRY: Takeover of Studio B by Belgrade Government *[NIN 23 Feb]* 64

Serbia

Serbia: Daily Interviews Radical Party Leader *[NASA BORBA 7 Mar]* 70

Montenegro

Montenegro: Daily Views Privatization Process *[DELO 5 Mar]* 72

CE: Council of Europe Rejects Yeltsin's Stand on Chechnya

AU1203215096 Paris AFP in English
2138 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Strasbourg, March 12 (AFP)—The Council of Europe's parliamentary body warned Tuesday [12 March] that Moscow's human rights record in Chechnya was not only a domestic issue, rebuffing comments by Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Council parliamentary speaker Leni Fischer was responding to Yeltsin's call to Moscow's deputies to the Strasbourg body to resist all attempts at interference in Moscow's internal affairs.

"Chechnya is not a domestic issue because Chechnya has never subscribed to the treaty which established the Russian Federation," she said. "Human rights are never a domestic issue."

Earlier Tuesday Yeltsin urged Moscow's 12 deputies to the Council "to block all attempts to put pressure on Russia, to get involved in internal affairs or to apply two weights, two measures."

He also told them to use their position "to more efficiently defend the rights of Russian-speaking peoples of the Baltic states and the former Soviet Union."

On February 28 Russia officially joined the Council of Europe, which is the widest organization bringing together all European democracies. The vote allowing Moscow to join was fiercely contested because of Chechnya.

Fischer played down however the significance of Yeltsin's comments, saying they were made "in the middle of a presidential election campaign." Yeltsin is runnning for re-election in June.

Albania: Party Officials on State Department Report

AU1203210196 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 9 Mar 96 p 3

[Interviews with representatives of political parties by Elio Elini; place and date not given: "Fair Criticism From the United States"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—The Albanian opposition yesterday "offered" its political approval to the most recent report by the U.S. State Department. Only Democratic Party [PD] General Secretary Tritan Shehu expressed his objections, even though he claimed that the PD had viewed the report as "something positive." However, regarding as all the problematic issues in the report, such as the dependency of the judiciary on the executive branch, the activities of the National Intelligence Service in investigating certain journalists and other people under arrest, and the restrictions on press freedom, the opposition leaders yesterday took the view that once again "Albanian political reality has been revealed."

Tritan Shehu (PD)

[Shehu] The PD considers this report very positive because it starts with an appreciation of the achievements of democracy in Albania and states that democracy is developing on the right path in this country. At the same time, it has certain criticisms, just as it does in relation to other countries with several years of consolidated democracy. However, it seems to me that accurate information is lacking over some small but persistent problems that this report raises. In all the cases mentioned in the report, the information has been given to the Americans by Albanian sources, specifically the Albanian Helsinki Committee. This means that at certain points, the United States does not express its own opinions but those of others.

Luan Hajdaraga (Socialist Party)

[Hajdaraga] The report accurately records the human rights situation in Albania. This report contains objective descriptions of the real situations in different countries of the world, in order to make them aware of errors ands shortcomings that require remedy. This year's report describes a worse situation than one year ago. It is up to the Albanian Government to take measures to correct its mistakes as soon as possible.

Skender Gjinushi (Social Democratic Party)

[Gjinushi] This report proves that the main problems raised by the opposition are genuine ones. They show that the policies of the present government rely on violence done to the courts, the control of elections, and other anticonstitutional activities that this government can never correct.

Sabri Godo (Republican Party)

[Godo] We are in this case dealing with an official statement of the opinions of the U.S. Government. Because our country rightly sets great store by relations with the United States, whose support is of indisputable importance for Albania, we must analyze and bear in mind such reports with the utmost attention.

Neritan Ceka (Democratic Alliance)

[Ceka] It is a very realistic report, which shows that the parliament must urgently take measures for the courts, because they have become sinks of bribery. It shows that the radio and television must be purged of the criminals of the Red press and must show respect for the opposition. However, above all, the ShIK must be put right; in this report, it has assumed a form identical to the former Sigurimi.

Albania: Socialists Praise U.S. State Department Report

AU1103183096 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 9 Mar 96 p 3

[Editorial: "Anti-American Attack of the Progovernment Press"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The U.S. State Department's report on human rights in Albania has naturally caused concern in Tirana's highest official circles. This report, although an annual one, constitutes the U.S. Government's harshest and most serious criticism of the policies of the members of our government, appearing as it does on the threshold of new parliamentary elections. In comparison with all the reports published in previous years, this report includes criticisms of almost every aspect of the system of government established when the Democratic Party's [PD] assumed power on 22 March 1992. Anybody who looks into this report can himself easily draw conclusions about the systematic violations of basic human rights in our country. What is striking about the occasion of the publication of this particular report is the unprecedented and Neanderthal attack that the country's most progovernment newspaper that bears the name ALBANIA has mounted against the United States, its institutions and even President Clinton itself.

An editorial published yesterday, entitled "The Seriousness of the U.S. Presence in Albania," expresses attitudes that have not been encountered in the Albanian

Government press in recent years. Criticisms and insinuations are made against the United States, its institutions, and their representatives. The article openly expresses the irritation with which official circles in Tirana received this report. The newspaper ALBANIA cannot escape the truth that the criticisms of the U.S. State Department "show the U.S.'s deep and serious study of Albania." However, these words are mere mouthwash because ALBANIA's editorial continues with "gems" of political nonsense that not only show the anti-American prejudices of this newspaper's real bosses, but their contrariness when faced with ordinary democratic principles.

ALBANIA directly attacks official U.S. representatives in Albania, who are advised with ridiculous pomposity "to sometimes change the cafes and restaurants where they trade information with their 'people' because this would raise the seriousness of their arguments about violations of human rights in Albania." Such an attack on the official representatives of the United States in Tirana not only shows lack of respect and morality in relations with them but suggests a lack of confidence in these relations on the part of the Albanian state. It shows the level of relations between Berisha's administration and that of the United States. If we bear in mind that such a thing is happening only six months after the Albanian president's visit to Washington, this puts this visit in a different light to that in which it was portrayed by official propaganda. The United States has supported and still supports Albanian democracy and not the Democratic Party or Berisha, as this propaganda has claimed. This is the first conclusion to emerge from a reading of the U.S. State Department report and the attack on it in the Albanian progovernment press. It could not have been otherwise since Berisha, as soon as he returned from America, ordered the dismissal of Brozi and acted in opposition to the statement of the U.S. Statement Department about the independence of the courts in Albania that was issued at the time. By this step, Berisha seemed to be saying to the world's greatest democracy—"Say what you like, but I do as I like."

There is a surprising and provocative lack of seriousness in ALBANIA's article, evident in its attempt to separate the State Department's report from the stand taken by the pinnacle of the U.S. state pyramid represented by President Clinton. In drawing a parallel with the supposedly different stands taken by Mr. Clinton and the U.S. Administration toward recent events in Croatia, the newspaper seeks to persuade the public that the U.S. State Department and Mr. Clinton are not one and the same thing. This demonstrates not only the low level of political culture of the article's authors, but also the high-handedness of those who inspired the penning of this cheap example of diversionary tactics.

It is an interesting fact that the PD's newspaper RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE of yesterday did not devote a single line to the most recent report of the U.S. State Department. This is not because this paper lacked space or does not have "analysts" for such a task but because the current state bosses are interested in making such insinuations in a so-called independent newspaper such as ALBANIA, in order to hide the panic that has seized them and to save themselves from public condemnation at home and abroad. This shows a lack of responsible and serious reflection on the criticisms made, which are intended to improve the standards of democracy in Albania.

Whatever the attitude of our officials to the State Department report and its extremely serious criticisms may be, the ALBANIA article issues outright calls for heads to roll in order to "gag" public opinion at home and abroad over what is happening in Albania. ALBANIA does not hesitate to head the list of scapegoats with the name of Mr. Blerim Cela, about whom it writes—"A whim of Blerim Cela to put a journalist on trial put Albania on the list of countries with human rights violations." Of course, it is not ALBANIA's business to lay down standards of human rights in Albania and the world. However, the mention of Blerim Cela's name is doubtless linked to the incontrovertible truth that he was the first inquisitor to take to the free Albanian press and the opposition press in general. His name is connected with the Nano case, the nastiest measure carried out since 22 March [1992] supposedly in the name of democracy. The Albanian state's attitude toward the leader of the opposition is treated with great seriousness in the most recent report of the U.S. State Department because it is an indicator and expression of the level of individual rights and freedoms in Albania.

Albania: State Department, EBRD Reports Assessed

AU1103184396 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 9 Mar 96 p 4

[Article by Emin Barci: "The United States and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Make Trouble for the Albanian State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] American democracy, through its government, has shown Berisha's government how it has been backsliding on its promised path. The Americans first list the state's violations of human rights. The State Department's report stresses that "the main abuses include beating citizens by security forces, excessively protracted detention in prison on remand, poor prison conditions, repeated restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press, restrictions on the right of assembly and association, and discrimination and violence against women." The report underlines that "the effectiveness of the police in the struggle against crime has increased, but cases of abuses on the part of the police have persisted."

However, the U.S.'s remarks on the work of the National Intelligence Service [ShIK] are much more serious. "There are continual complaints that the ShIK has exceeded its authorities, mainly by detaining opposition politicians and journalists. Some members of the secret service have committed serious violations of human rights," the report states. "It is difficult to judge how seriously police officials follow up cases of mistreatment." In any democracy, it is the judiciary that establishes justice between the state and its citizens and among citizens themselves. The Americans share the sorry view of those Albanians not in the government that the judiciary is in the hands of the political branch, i.e. the Democratic Party [PD] and Berisha. While making such a commotion about the Law on Human Rights and Freedoms that has been approved, Berisha thinks that the Albanians will think they are protected, but the enforcement of this and every other law is in the hands of the judiciary. The Americans reach the conclusion that the Albanian judiciary is under the thumb of the political wing. As an example of the subjugation of the judiciary to politics, the Americans cite the Brozi case. "The dismissal of the chairman of the Court of Cassation in September seems to have been unconstitutional and politically motivated," Washington concludes.

In their report, the Americans do not hesitate to touch raw nerves. "The Supreme Council of Justice headed by President Berisha appoints and dismisses all other judges. The assumption of such wide powers by the Supreme Council of Justice subjects the courts to the direct control of the executive branch."

Yet why has Berisha made such a great sacrifice in destroying the first independent judiciary in Albania? Perhaps we can find this question answered in the State Department's report in connection with the case of Fatos Nano, who is, as the report stresses, a former prime minister, the current chairman of the Socialist Party, and a potential presidential candidate. It was precisely over the Nano case that Berisha made changes in the offices of the prosecutor and the investigator and in the court.

On the same day that the U.S. report on Albania was published, far from the eyes and ears of journalists, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] was reading its report on the Albanian economy last year. While the president was advertising foreign investment as one of the greatest achievements under his rule, specialists are saying that "much remains to be done for foreign investment in connection with problems in the fields of property and legislation." The EBRD report emphasizes that Albania has high earnings from emigration. However, the prime minister himself admitted in a television interview a short time ago that the government had not done anything at all for the legal emigration of Albanians. Moreover, it is the same government of the former communist President Berisha that prevents those Albanians who wish to emigrate at the risk of their own lives.

Berisha has found a way for the official press to describe failures as successes. ATA does not call the rise in the prices of wheat by 45 percent and of leeks by 133 percent an increase in the cost of living, but a rise in the prices for farmers selling their produce. The analyses of the U.S. State Department and of the EBRD lend credence to the opposition's criticisms of the PD and are also an electoral platform that could carry the country in the direction of the Western democracies.

Albania: Helsinki Committee on Prison Violence in Greece

AU1303120596 Tirana ATA in English
1306 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Tirana, March 12 (ATA)—The Albanian Helsinki Committee issued a statement urging that the Albanian prisoners be not subject to maltreatment in the Greek prisons.

The committee urged the Greek authorities and all competent organs to stop every discrimination against those convicted in Greek prisons.

Hundreds of Albanian prisoners revolted in protest against maltreatment and pressed for relief from overcrowding, the statement said.

According to the statement, on several occasions, they have suffered severe injuries due to Greek police arbitrary acts. [passage omitted]

The statement says that the Albanian Committee will also try to contact the Greek Helsinki Committee to see what they can do together.

According to Puto, the request of the Albanian Helsinki Committee to visit Greek prisons has been rejected and that the Albanian Helsinki Committee's efforts will continue.

Albania: Parties Issue Statement on Election Bill

96P20332A Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 31 Jan 96 p 3

["Text" of 30 January Statement of Twelve Political Parties on the Draft Elections Law]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Agrarian Party, the Democratic Alliance Party, the National Front [Balli Kombetar] Party, the Democratic Unity Party, the Union for Human Rights Party, the Democratic Rightwing Party, the Christian-Democratic Party, the Legalitet Movement Party, the Republican Party, the Socialist Party, the Social-Democratic Party, and the National Unity Party are aware of the contents of the draft law "On Some Changes in Law No. 7556, of 2 April 1992, on Elections to the People's Assembly," which was presented recently by the Democratic Party parliamentary group.

With deep anxiety, they state that:

1. The denial of the constitutional right of the legislative initiative of the deputies representing the recommendation of the roundtable of the 13 parties is a constitutional violation and a sign of a lack of appreciation of the spirit of cooperation among the parties on the most important issues of the construction of a democratic system.

2. The criteria for the formation of the election commissions are completely unacceptable. With the proclamation of the election campaign, the concept of incumbent and opposition no longer exists and all subjects are considered equal. Therefore, there is no juridical basis for separating the commissions on the incumbent-opposition basis. The right to participate at the voting center commission and at the electoral zone commission in the monitoring of one's own votes cannot be taken away from any candidate or any party. The draft law openly places the voting process and the handling of the votes under the control of the party in power. This is a most flagrant violation of a free vote.

3. An addition has been made to Article 80 of the existing law which limits the mandate of the deputies and of parliament so that it will cease four years after its [the parliament's] first session. This is in conflict with the Main Constitutional Provisions [Law No. 7491 of 29 April 1991] which state that this mandate continues until the new parliament convenes. The creation of an institutional vacuum presents a danger.

4. The new draft has completely changed the essence of the existing law, and therefore, the elections system. By changing it, for all practical purposes, into a majority system, in opposition to the will of the political parties, the draft law limits political representation in the future parliament.

5. The criteria for financing the campaign and television time prejudice the elections by openly favoring the winners in the legislature which is ending. In this way, competition under equal conditions is eliminated.

6. Not permitting Albanian citizens who live outside the borders of the Republic of Albania to be candidates is in contradiction with constitutional provisions on the right to be elected.

Because of all these things and other technical defects, our parties consider that free, honest and equal elections in Albania are seriously endangered and we are asking the Democratic Party parliamentary group, once again, to reflect on this matter.

Through their deputies, the parliamentary parties of this roundtable will fight to block the approval of this draft law. The parties have decided to meet to continue this roundtable on the protection of free elections on Saturday, 3 February 1996, at 1000.

1. The Albanian Agrarian Party
2. The Democratic Alliance Party
3. The National Front [Balli Kombetar] Party
4. The Democratic Unity Party
5. The Union for Human Rights Party
6. The Democratic Rightwing Party
7. The Christian Democratic Party
8. The Legalitet Party
9. The Republican Party
10. The Social-Democratic Party
11. The Socialist Party
12. The National Unity Party

Tirana, 30 January 1996

Albania: Court Examines Complaint Against Election Law

AU1203151496 Tirana ATA in English 1911 GMT 11 Mar 96

[Report by Atlant Frasheri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, March 11 (ATA)—A judicial session was held today in the Constitutional Court at the request of the Socialist Party [PS] parliamentary group, signed by Namik Dokle, PS deputy chairman and chairman of PS parliamentary group.

The request presented in this court consisted of three points: Why was the Electoral Law of the 13 parties not accepted, on the removal of immunity of the deputies who fall under the Anti-Genocide Law after dissolution of the parliament and the right of the president for the division of the electoral zones.

The request asks that these three points be declared anticonstitutional.

After today's session, the judging panel decided to hold the final decision on this request of the PS parliamentary group in another session in the coming days.

Albania: Intelligence Chief Proposes 'Changes'

AU1203151796 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 8 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by Enton Abilekaj: "We Did Not Feed and Clothe Intelligence Agents"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Intelligence Service [ShIK] boss [kryeshiksi] has failed to account for his service's illegal surveillance of opposition politicians and violation of the rights of journalists.

Deputy Hajdari once again sought an interpellation with the officials of the institutions controlled by his commission. Once again, the interpellation prepared by Hajdari dealt more with the former Sigurimi than with the ShIK. For a long time it seemed that the interpellation was dealing with Kadri Hazbiu rather than Bashkim Gazidede. Socialist Deputy Metani intervened for this reason, and bandied accusations with Hajdari. ShIK boss Bashkim Gazidede, taking the effort to reply to the questions of the chairman of the Parliamentary Commission for Public Order, the ShIK, and Defense [Hajdari], spoke for a long time, more to remind deputies about the legislation that exists to govern his agency. He mentioned all the laws on the ShIK that the Albanian parliament has approved, which, he claimed, ensure civilian control over the organization. "Even the State Control Commission has the right to inspect the ShIK, and has indeed done so," the ShIK boss said, citing this as one of the "forms of civil control."

Talking about the purposes of the ShIK, Gazidede mentioned the existing laws, without guaranteeing that they are enforced. He did not deny the rumors of the ShIK's constant surveillance of opposition politicians and independent journalists. Mentioning the law, he skirted all the accusations, and did not exploit the opportunity given to him by Hajdari to deny what important international organizations have officially written. He did not even deny the report of the U.S. State Department about human rights in Albania, which states outright that ShIK agents have violated the rights of journalists in collaboration with the criminal police.

"There must be changes to the law," Gazidede said, talking about the purpose of the ShIK. He also advocated changes in the accountability and supervision of the ShIK. According to Gazidede, the purpose of the ShIK must be to defend the constitutional order and its institutions and to combat extremism and foreign espionage. If we remember the attitude of the current parliamentary majority, the forms of extremism that Gazidede mentioned must also include the opposition, which has been called a "red front" and deemed Enverist. Thus these changes, which the ShIK boss said will be introduced soon, will give this agency the right to inspect opposition politicians. These politicians claim that the ShIK is already doing such a thing illegally.

A large part of Gazidede's interpellation was devoted to food and clothing for ShIK-men. He mentioned a government decision about this matter, which he had had no chance to apply. "This is the only government decision about the ShIK that has not been implemented," said ShIK boss Gazidede.

Hajdari, who took the floor again after Gazidede, proposed and confirmed that an institution to coordinate work and analyze information will soon be created in order to improve the work of the ShIK and the Military Intelligence Service, etc. He asked Gazidede to eliminate the activities of the former Sigurimi. It was expected that during the interpellation a Democratic Party deputy would ask to know what the ShIK had done to prevent the bomb attack that claimed four Albanian lives, but this was not mentioned. Hajdari did not ask the ShIK boss even for the sake of form whether the agency under his direction is working to expose the criminals, and what its chances of success are. Everything was done to demonstrate, as Hajdari said, "how fast the reform has progressed."

Albania: Court Rules Out Arrest of Ex-Sigurimi Chief

AU1203153396 Tirana ATA in English 1119 GMT 10 Mar 96

[Report by Zhaneta Lazri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, March 10 (ATA)—Another name, that of the former chairman of the Interior Ministry Branch in Korce, Marash Kola, has been added to the list of persons responsible for the genocide exercised against thousands of Albanian citizens and their families during the communist regime.

The Tirana Court reconsidered the form of custody for this defendant and upheld the prison arrest, pronounced three days ago. The evidence obtained by numerous citizens and families as well as materials ensured by the prosecutor's bodies accuse Marash Kola of exercising genocide and crimes against mankind in complicity.

Kola, 65, is accused of proposing mass deportations of Albanian citizens for political reasons, violating the Constitution and laws in power during 1976-1984, when he was head of Interior Ministry Branch in Korce.

On March 3, the Tirana Court agreed to the request of the Prosecutor's Office to arrest Marash Kola and start legal proceeding on these charges.

In today's sitting to reconsider the form of arrest, the defendant asked that investigations be carried out under a milder form of custody.

Alongside claims to his old age and health state, Kola said he was innocent because he had been correct in his work and that every act had been carried out according to the laws in power.

Considering the defendant a social danger, the court decided that he be arrested.

Albania: Reporter Found Guilty for Article on Bombing

AU1303113996 Tirana ATA in English
1745 GMT 12 Mar 96

[Report by Zhaneta Lazri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, March 12 (ATA)—The trial for Ylli Polovina, defendant for an article published in POPULLI PO on November 30, 1995, under the title "Car Bomb in Skopje May Explode in Tirana Too," was held in the Tirana District Court today. Polovina was accused of making public calling for violent acts.

Prosecutor Arjan Sulstafa demanded that Polovina be declared innocent and be punished with his detention term.

Polovina asked his innocence and stressed that he has never wanted that such events as that of February 26 in Tirana ever happen in Albania (On this day a car bomb blasted killing four people and wounding some others).

The jury directed by Gjin Gjoni declared Ylli Polovina guilty and punished him with a 30,000 lek fine.

Albania: Reporters Condemn Raid on TRIBUNA DEMOKRATIKE

AU1303132196 Tirana ATA in English
1246 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, March 12 (ATA)—The newspaper TRIBUNA DEMOKRATIKE was taken away on Sunday [10 March] at the key press outlet in Tirana.

On the same day at night, a group of four attempted to plaster TRIBUNA DEMOKRATIKE newspaper office walls with anti-constitutional posters.

The reason for this raid is thought to be an article of this newspaper about one of the main leaders of the Socialist Party, deputy chairman Servet Pellumbi.

In this article, the newspaper reaffirms what Pellumbi has himself declared in an interview about his disputable past.

The Presidency of the Reporters' League met in Tirana on Monday [11 March]. It analysed the event and condemned the terrorist act. The league observes increasing pressure and attacks by the extreme left against the democratic right wing press. Raids of this kind had also been forewarned by one of the Alliance Party leaders, Neritan Ceka.

The network of the Sigurimi collaborators and leading structures of the red front have also lately attacked the newspapers ALBANIA and RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE. The reporters working in these newspapers have also been pressured upon.

The league has also observed that such attacks against the free press are becoming increasingly aggressive as the elections day approaches and that their source is the former secret police and the Enverists installed in the Socialist Party leadership.

The league calls on all democratic institutions, in and outside Albania, which are interested in the defence of the free speech, to exercise pressure on these vandal attacks by the extreme left.

Albania: Christian Democrat Rules Out Coalition With PS

AU1303125496 Tirana ATA in English
1130 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, March 12 (ATA)—Zef Bushati, leader of Christian Democratic Party [PKDSh], met yesterday with the leader of Social Democrat Party [PSD], Skender Gjinushi, to discuss the political situation and possible pre-electoral alliances.

Gjinushi has also presented Bushati with a resolution compiled by the Democratic Alliance Party [AD] and PSD which also determines the ways leading to the enlargement of the AD-PSD alliance with the Socialist Party [PS].

"The PSD-AD resolution does not suit the Christian democrats, Bushati told RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE last night. He stressed that PKDSh belongs to the center of the Albanian political spectrum and its messages belong to right of the center not pre-conceiving the left of the center."

Bushati has refused every alternative offered to his party for a pre-election coalition with the PS. Bushati considers the PSD-PS coalition recently declared by Gjinushi a deviation from the center to the left, providing the center with an unuseful colouring.

Bushati has also been backed by Vasil Melo, leader of the Union of Human Rights Party (a party defending the interests of the Greek minority in Albania). In his party congress and talks with Bushati, Melo has also expressed himself against the grouping of the political parties of the center to fight a certain political force.

Albania: Rightist League Not To Field Joint Candidates

AU1203185496 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 8 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by Elio Elini: "Rightist League in the 1996 Elections: 'Each on His Own'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—The Rightist League yesterday solved one of the knottiest of its political problems. After four hours of discussion, it decided unanimously that each of its members will field separate candidates in the 1996 elections, but with the political and organizational support of other league members. The league also decided to create a commission to reassess the candidates to be put forward in the elections and to deliver to the office of the president a petition calling for a referendum on the country's constitutional order.

Having been faced with an unpleasant fact following the approval of the new electoral law, the leaders of the league started strenuous efforts to find a formula for their salvation. It was only at their plenary meeting yesterday that they put forward two specific proposals: either to field joint candidates or for each party to go alone into the elections, while not competing for the same constituency against other members of the league. Victory went to the second proposal. The members of the league have preferred to follow the simplest route: A party that is a league member, in places where it believes it enjoys the greatest support, will be "removed" and will make way for another party of the league.

The petition for a referendum on the country's constitutional order, to decide between a republic and a monarchy, has so far been signed by 100,000 people and will be sent to the president of the republic within the next two days. The Rightist League will very soon create a commission that will give the green light to the candidates of its seven member parties.

Bulgaria: Lukanov Attacks Interior Ministry at Plenum

AU1303124296 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 11 Mar 96 pp 1, 3

[Article by Iva Petroni: "Lukanov: Interior Ministry Is Watching Politicians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] plenum on 10 March in Sofia, Andrey Lukanov is said to have warned the delegates that the police is reestablishing the old methods used by State Security. According to reports, Interior Minister Nachev demanded proof, but Lukanov ignored him. Nikolay Dobrev also spoke out strongly against the Interior Ministry. The chairman of the Parliamentary National Security Commission did not demand Nachev's resignation, but openly declared that all the plots against the BSP were prepared with the help of information provided by Interior Ministry officials.

Dobrev believes that corruption and intrigue have also reared their heads in the upper echelons in the Interior Ministry. The BSP is merging with the state, Andrey Lukanov alleged in his speech to the closed session of the BSP Supreme Council on the government's one-year term in office. He alleged that high party functionaries and persons in the executive had played a part in this merging process. The former prime minister promised to produce proof of his claims within a few days.

Chavdar Kyuranov, leader of the OSD [Alliance for Social Democracy], also observed a trend for state and party posts to merge, and had also noted individual instances of state posts being merged with business ones.

According to reports, Lukanov warned the meeting that if anyone wants to continue this merging process, he should convene a congress and conduct a policy review. He declared that "late Stalinism" is returning to Bulgaria.

Referring to Orion, Lukanov also reportedly spoke about "rogues inside the party who did not exist until recently, but who are now organizing intrigues." Democratic Left Parliamentary Group leader Krasimir Premyanov is said to have warned the prime minister's advisers that they should know their place, because he was fed up with the party having to carry the blame for their blunders.

The thesis proposed by Aleksandur Lilov was approved as a plenum resolution at 2300 last night. The BSP leadership instructed Videnov to make the necessary changes in the executive, if he considers that such changes are necessary.

The plenum defined the main priorities for the Socialist government: to reduce crime, stabilize the financial sector, step up cash and mass privatization, and improve its information policy.

Bulgaria: Differences Within SDS Over Primaries

AU1303122496 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 11 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Valeriya Veleva: "Plots Are Being Hatched To Discredit Ivan Kostov and Petur Stoyanov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] TRUD has learned from two independent sources that plots are being hatched within SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] circles to discredit Ivan Kostov by disclosing his "proparty" [pro-Communist Party] past and alleging financial misdoings in sponsoring the local elections in Montana in collaboration with Petur Stoyanov.

At the SDS headquarters on Rakovski Street in Sofia yesterday, an SDS deputy, who did not deny the reports, said that no consensus exists on the need for a primary vote to choose a presidential candidate. SDS Deputy Mikhail Mikhaylov declared that the candidate chosen by the SDS national conference would prevail in the battle with Zhelev. According to Mikhaylov, the president has no campaign organization in the country, and the presidential elections, inasmuch as the first past the post is the winner, must be fought by political means. However, the president's headquarters has let it be known that they are sure that Zhelev will win a second term in office with 53 percent of the vote. If this happens, "heads will roll in the SDS," a former member of the SDS leadership warned.

SDS Deputy President Nadezhda Mikhaylova said yesterday that 10 percent of the SDS electorate are expected to take part in the primary elections for an opposition presidential candidate. This would mean 250,000 voters, which would be a sufficiently representative sample to give a true picture of the mood prevailing among SDS voters.

However, according to People's Union leaders, only solid SDS supporters who they are strongly motivated either "for" or "against" Zhelev would take part in the primary ballot. According to them, there is a great danger that only 35,000-40,000 people will vote in the primary poll. Some recall that only 5,000-6,000 people took part in the primary for the Sofia mayoral elections, while Sofia represents one-eighth of the country's population.

Czech Republic: Commentary on U.S. Human Rights Report

AU1203135196 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 8 Mar 96 p 2

[Commentary by Eva Martinkova: "For Romanies and the Positively Screened People"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The U.S. Congress prepares a report on observance of human rights in the world every year. This document allegedly significantly affects bilateral relations between the U.S. Government and any given state. So, we have apparently nothing to look forward to. In addition to Guatemala, Indonesia, Cuba, Burma, and Turkey, the Czech Republic is becoming a target for criticism. Fortunately, in our case it is not a matter of political prisoners, freedom of expression, or torture. The Americans raise their eyebrows, for instance, over the fact that the women in the Czech Republic are not protected by law against sexual exploitation and are not sufficiently represented in public office. A shadow has been cast on the human rights record in the Czech Republic, according to the Americans, also by the unexplained death of Frantisek Kahanek, accused of the sadistic murder of a 10-year-old boy. Moreover, the report notes that the screening law violates human rights because it translates into discrimination in the workplace and prevents the person in question from being elected to representative bodies. The freedom of citizens is also limited, from the point of view of the U.S. experts, by the existence of the law prosecuting defamation of the head of state. The report expresses doubts over the law lifting the statute of limitations from the crimes of the communist regime, which, allegedly, introduces the principle of collective guilt.

So far, so good. The demands regarding the rights of women say more about the problems in the United States than our domestic situation, where no one, except for the communists and the Union of Women, is trying to force the weaker sex into politics. Taking justice into one's own hands, as in the case of Kahanek, is inadmissible. The suspects were brought before the court, however. It was a unique case, which did not receive a blessing from any of the authorities. To consider the screening law an instance of violating human rights merely shows a lack of knowledge of the local situation. To speak seriously about the vain attempts of Vaclav Benda to file charges against some protagonists of the communist regime as an attempt to introduce the principle of collective guilt is contrary to the actual state of affairs.

The authors of the report apparently did not follow the media, from which they draw material for their conclusions, closely enough. Otherwise, they would have learned about the thick line drawn under the past, which enables the State Security agents and other prominent figures of the former regime to rest at ease. Not even the U.S. Congress needs to protect them. Regarding the defamation of the head of the state, however, one has to agree with the objections by the Americans. It is a vestige of the past. The Americans failed to mention, however, that, since November 1989, no one has been prosecuted for this offense—although a fine to the thrower of rotten egg on the president's jacket would not do any harm.

More serious are the accusations raised in the passage dedicated to discrimination against Romanies. According to the report, the Romany minority of 200,000 suffers disproportionately from poverty, interethnic violence, analphabetism, and disease. Romanies are exposed to discrimination in employment, housing, education, and everyday life. Unemployment among Romanies is allegedly, according to information from Czech nongovernment sources, as high as 70 percent. The state television constantly broadcasts for the Romany minority in the Czech language and at a time when most people are asleep. The Romany leaders have recorded only marginal success so far in organizing their local communities. The report also states that some restaurants and other places across the Republic refused to serve Romanies in 1995 and posted signs banning them from entering their establishments. Moreover, Romanies remain a target of serious racial bias and violence, which the authorities are unable to suppress. At the same time, however, the report points out, the courts proceeded much more aggressively in 1995 than ever before in prosecuting attacks against the Romanies, and the government also immediately sharply condemned such offenses. It also points out the increased attention that the government of Prime Minister Klaus tries to pay to social problems of the Romany community.

The report describes as discriminatory the citizenship law, which left 24,000 people, practically all of them Romanies, without Czech citizenship. The authors of the report claim to have received information from nongovernment organizations. We have mentioned the fact that the nongovernment organizations frequently provide imprecise information several times in LIDOVE NOVINY. In the instance of Romanies without citizenship, it is, according to the ministry, a matter of several dozen people, several hundred at most. Even these people, however, have been helped by the recent amendment to the law on obtaining and losing Czech citizenship, according to which the condition of five years without a criminal record is eased for Slovak citizens.

The U.S. Congress report is imprecise, written from far away, at a desk, based on one-sided information, newspaper articles, which, as is well known, emphasize scandals. It draws on public opinion surveys and elicits strong racism from answers to the question of would you like to have Romany neighbors. The report speaks about analphabetism and disease but fails to mention that education and health care are just as accessible to Romanies as they are to all citizens, the first-class apartments provided to Romanies, and what was left of them in Chanov. It does not mention that it was solely the mutual intolerance of Romany leaders that causes the political organization of Romanies to disintegrate. It would be difficult, however, to argue against the report with a clear conscience so long as there is a sign banning entry to Romanies at even a single swimming pool or restaurant, so long as the skinheads are not punished for their aggressive exhibitions as racially motivated offenses, so long as even a single official complicates the residence application of even a single Romany. So long as we do not remove the 1 percent in which the U.S. report does not err regarding our relations toward the Romany minority, we will have a hard time disproving the 99 percent of untruths the report contains.

Czech Republic: Weekly: Klaus Balkan Trip Heralds Shift to East

AU1303120196 Prague CESKY TYDENIK in Czech 8-11 Mar 96 p 3

[Commentary by Michal Janata: "Is a Little Entente on the Horizon?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus's reception by Slobodan Milosevic, war criminal and Serb president, is one of the Czech Government's most scandalous diplomatic exploits of the past five years. This diplomatic zeal is surprising, even though the prime minister's earlier comments about the parity of the guilt of the two sides in the conflict—that is, of the attacked and the attacker—gave an inkling of his future accommodating attitude toward the postcommunist Serbs. The Czech state's diplomatic activity has a purely eastern dimension at the moment. Although the economic aspect of Klaus's visit is being stressed, this accommodating step toward the rump federal Yugoslavia has a political background. Could it be that some sort of new form of the interwar Little Entente is being delineated?

The Little Entente, which was originally oriented toward eradicating the potential threat from Hungary, failed and proved itself to be an altogether completely illusory pact after 1935 because of Yugoslavia's inclination, thanks to then Yugoslav Prime Minister Stojadinovic, toward the Berlin-Rome axis. The hopes invested in the 40-million strong treaty-bound entity proceeded from the erroneous premise that it would be possible by means of a pact involving, on the one hand, the two state units formed by the Paris peace treaty—Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—and, on the other, Romania to fill the vacuum created by the collapse of a strong stabilizing factor in Europe—the Hapsburg Monarchy.

Even the current Czech attempts at rapprochement with the fragment of Tito's former communist empire are not without geopolitical connotations. The circumstances involved, however, are completely different from in the case of the Little Entente. While the Little Entente was formed with special regard to the Central European interests of France and, therefore, of its ally Great Britain, the Yugoslav-Czech pact being traced out (apart from Serbia and Montenegro—that is, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]—the rapprochement attempts also concern Croatia) has another power in the background: Russia. However, since we are making historical parallels, let us recall the fact that, at the very time the Little Entente was beginning to collapse or, rather, narrow down to Romanian-Czechoslovak attempts at forming an alliance (Titulescu), the Soviet Union started very aggressively to enter into world politics (let us recall, in this context, the USSR's entry into the League of Nations in 1934). For Russia, as the successor state of the USSR, the years 1995-96 are also the beginning of the advance of its power-policy role in world politics. Russia, however, does not need to manifest its traditional Balkan interests too much. Why, then, would it not use its former vassals to promote its political and economic objectives in the former and current "rump" Yugoslavia? Or could it be that the prime minister went to federal Yugoslavia just because he wanted to make sure of visa-free vacations for Czech tourists in the future? The prime minister's gesture, magnanimously hinting at the FRY's early incorporation into the euro-atlantic structures—namely, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe—is certainly not without interest. Vaclav Klaus would like to play the role of a kind of arbiter in settling the Balkan situation. He assumes in his self-centered blindness that his gesture of recommendation and conservative mimicry can indeed facilitate the "normalization" of relations between Milosevic's Serbia and the economically important countries of Western Europe. If this gesture were to meet with a favorable response in the West, it would set a dangerous precedent for possible future conflicts in Europe. It would be de facto an invitation to other possible aggressors, and, for Russia especially, it would mean a major political victory.

While the Czech Government is not trying too hard to mend the gaps in relations with democratic Germany, it has rushed nimbly to "normalize" relations with a regime that has on its conscience the most dangerous conflict in continental Europe since World War II. The commercial motivation—seven trade agreements are to be signed—and the resumption of advantages for Czech tourists, for whom "Yugo" was once one of the goals of their plodding working existence, could not be what prompted Klaus to travel to the Balkans. An attempt to intensify the eastern orientation was behind the decision to meet with the nationalist communist Slobodan Milosevic. It is certainly not a coincidence: Czech-German alienation, diplomatic rapprochement with Russia, and a similar wooing of socialist Yugoslavia.

Not even the prime minister's meeting with the leader of the Serb opposition forces, Vuk Draskovic, could detract from the political obscurity of Klaus's visit. Draskovic merely recycled the stereotyped image of the Czech Republic as a model of postcommunist prosperity and political culture. This touched-up image serves as a trap for less quick-witted Western politicians and for no less obtuse opposition leaders with a socialist past in a country where a peaceful today is a warlike tomorrow. Despite all of the pro-Western camouflage, however, it is becoming ever clearer that our foreign political orientation is under the sway of the original etymology. That is, orientation is etymologically associated with the word "oriens"—east.

Czech Republic: Havel Addresses Czech Parliament

LD1203200696 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1404 GMT 12 Mar 96

[Annual address by Czech President Vaclav Havel to the Czech parliament—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dear Mr. Speaker, dear deputies, dear government:

[Passage omitted] I regard the forthcoming election as a very important test of our democracy. For the first time since the fall of communism, it will not be enough to use simple slogans. But not just that. A mere set of technical ideas of how to change things or how to do things better will not be enough, either. This election will be first and foremost, even though indirectly, about something else: how different people will answer the question of the very content and meaning of democracy, the question of its spirit, the question of why democracy is a meaningful form of social being and coexistence.

The question is not whether we want democracy or not, as was the case in the 1990 elections. Nor is the question that of which political parties are considered by the electorate to be the most trustworthy and most realistic guarantors of the overall transformation of the society that began after the fall of communism, as was the case in the 1992 elections. This transformation is already under way, and none of the more influential political parties intends to halt it. Individual parties differ merely in their views on how to continue this transformation, which aspects to stress, and how to balance the whole system so that it serves the population in the best possible way.

A discussion of these issues will inevitably be a discussion about the very character of the state—that is, the character of our democracy. It will be a discussion about the Czech question of the 20th century. [passage omitted]

Coordination and cooperation within the coalition are not particularly good, although political consensus, based on precisely defined and meticulously observed rules, is a vital prerequisite of every coalition government. Cooperation between the government coalition and the opposition, or at least its more important section, could also be better. For example, drawing on political consensus, some parliamentary tasks could be performed by the opposition, a practice quite common in other democracies.

No doubt, the way in which political parties understand democracy will be reflected also in another important issue—namely, how they will approach the issue of the Senate and the elections to it. Is the Senate going to be a mere clone of the Chamber of Deputies, based on the same strictly partisan principles and merely duplicating, in a mechanical sort of way, the chamber's proceedings? Or is it going to be an assembly of warriors fighting for their constituencies' exclusively local interests? Such developments would negate the purpose of the Senate as laid down by our Constitution, and the Senate would turn into a weird association of warring towns and villages, without a mandate or any real means to solve regional problems.

Or will the Senate resemble, to some extent at least, the vision I share with many others and have spoken about on many occasions? I have always believed that the Senate could make a significant contribution to the depth and breadth of our democracy—but only if it is an assembly of people whose professional, civic, and human authority have won them the complete trust of the citizens and who are not too limited by taking into account the interests of the party that put their names forward. Such people would bring with them new and fresh approaches into the legislative process and politics. [passage omitted]

I am convinced—and all of my trips around various continents confirm this yet again—that, in the world today, when our planet is covered for the first time in its history with a thin and yet global layer of one civilization, we are all carrying a certain degree of responsibility for the world as a whole, and we cannot lie about this responsibility, and we must not lie about it.

It is not only that the internal transformation of NATO and its expansion is a matter that concerns equally us, the whole of Europe, and, indirectly, the whole world. It is not only that the same thing is valid about the future development and expansion of the European Union. It is not only that the same thing is valid about reform of the United Nations and also about the future of many other regional and worldwide organizations. More is involved. In this altogether interlinked world, where one stockbroker in Singapore can bring down a large bank at the other end of the world the next day, and where the first shot fired in the former Yugoslavia can politically divide the United States by what it sets in motion, it can undermine the confidence of the European Union and polarize the relationship of the West, Russia, and the entire Islamic world, in this altogether interlinked world,. everything is truly connected with everything else [sentence as heard]. Every attack on the dignity of a human being or a nation anywhere on earth is an attack at mankind as a whole.

I do not believe one can beat this world by some kind of isolationism, whether it carries a nationalist flag or the flag of the delusion of neutrality. And less so can something like this be a solution for a small nation living in the very center of the exposed continent of Europe. It would be the same folly to hope for something like this as to think that the Czech Republic will save the world. No, we will not save the world, but we will not get out of our share of responsibility for its state.

The important thing is to find a form of our participation in the global thinking about global matters that is tasteful, matter-of-fact, and sober, and to do something to make the world better or at least to prevent its becoming all the time more dangerous.

We want to become a standard European democratic state. I naturally do not object to this in any way. However, I would mind if our efforts in this field prevent our seeing and drawing attention to various bad things wherever they take place, or from looking for our own solutions and from living creative lives. Why should our program be conformity [tuctovost], dullness, and unwillingness to be involved in anything other than what others are interested in? [passage omitted]

In the past, we went through a bitter experience of the limits of European democracy when its policy became that of concessions to evil, of accepting the idea of only looking after ourselves. This danger of another Munich is looming over Europe once again. To think about it, about its sources, forms, and consequences means to think about democracy as such. I think our modern history obliges us to do so. [passage omitted]

Dear deputies, one could perhaps say somewhat poetically that democracy is decency. And, because democracy is the Czech question of the 20th century, our program should be decency. I wish for all of us that it will also be the main winner in the forthcoming election.

Let me thank you for the work you have done and wish you every success in your public and private lives. Thank you for your attention. [applause]

Czech Republic: Holan Opposes Army Cooperation With Russia

AU1203152496 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 11 Mar 96 p 4

[Article by "(bak)": "V. Holan Is Opposed to the Army's Cooperation With Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—An alliance with a country that is unreliable and unstable is impossible. This statement was made by Defense Minister Vilem Holan on yesterday's edition of NOVA TV's 7 program in connection with the Army's attitude toward Russia. He added that, moreover, this is a country that is waging a war in Chechnya. The minister, in effect, highlighted the difficulties of cooperation with Russia by citing the problem of obtaining spare parts for Soviet-manufactured military aircraft. He also described this as one of the reasons for the exclusion of the modern MiG-29 fighter aircraft from our Army's ordnance. "We would be dependent on Russia for spare parts, on a country from whom it is a problem to get them now, in peace and under good circumstances," said the minister. He added that it would be necessary to modernize these aircraft, especially to modify their avionics so that they could operate in NATO states. Operating the MiG's was also very expensive; They cost about 350,000 korunas [Kc] per flight hour, whereas, the F-16, for example, costs only Kc150,000 and the MiG-21 just under Kc100,000.

Holan also stated, however, that it is necessary for NATO not only to strive for its enlargement, but also to develop good relations with Russia. At the same time, he acknowledged that it will not be easy to convince Russian politicians that the alliance's enlargement by the states of Central Europe will also bring greater stability to Russia. He used the example of the war in the former Yugoslavia to explain our need to join NATO.

Czech Republic: Holan Views Army Concept, Tenders

AU1203135296 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 11 Mar 96 p 3

[Interview with Czech Defense Minister Vilem Holan by Ondrej Neumann; place and date not given: "The Army Concept Only After the Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Neumann] At the beginning of January, the ministers rejected your concept for Army development. When should the new concept be ready, and how will it differ from the rejected one?

[Holan] Very intensive work is being done on the new concept. It will not differ essentially from the rejected one. It provided the initial input for the discussion and contained the basic course of action. A great deal has happened since then. We have, for example, drafted a concept for the Air Force, and work is under way on a concept for the ground forces and the other elements of the Army. This very extensive work is going well. The fact that talks will be held with NATO from April until November still has to be taken into account, and we would very much like the results of these talks to be incorporated into the concept. So, I think the overall concept is more likely to be discussed in the new government.

[Neumann] The results of several Army tenders were canceled recently. Have you adopted any measures to make sure that the mistakes are not repeated in the future?

[Holan] It is always necessary to see both sides in Army tenders. No doubt some things have to be improved in the Army's purchasing mechanism, and no doubt it is also necessary to raise the ethical standards of the businessmen who then all react by complaining about one another and dragging other things into it. We have taken certain practical steps in view of this. We have instituted superintendance of the tender procedure. We have altered the procedure in accordance with the information the suppliers submit so that the technical conditions are in one envelope, the price offered is in another one, and the envelopes are opened consecutively. I believe that, simply with the passing of time, this procedure will become clearer and will improve.

[Neumann] How is your current relationship with First Deputy Minister Petr Necas, who represents the Civic Democratic Party? At the beginning of January, the situation had come to such a head that the chairmen of your parties, Klaus and Lux, had to ward off the chance that either you or Necas would have to go.

[Holan] It is a working relationship. I think things are generally being exaggerated here. There are simply things that somehow need time to settle down.

Czech Republic: MNS Chairman Denies Split Within Party

AU1203142096 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 11 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by "(kch)": "Drimal Denies That There Is a Split Within His Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brno—Moravian National Party (MNS) Chairman Ivan Drimal resolutely denied yesterday that there is a split within his party. At the same time, he emphasized that the MNS is continuing to function and that its structures are not being changed.

He was reacting to a report about the establishment of a new pro-Moravian entity called "Movement for a Self-Governing Moravia and Silesia-Moravian National Union." Jan Smejkal has become the chairman of this entity, and its members will promote conservatism, democracy, self-government, and patriotism in its election program.

Drimal acknowledged yesterday that two of his parliamentary deputies, Jiri Bily and Petr Kavan, have also transferred to the aforementioned organization. However, they did not hold any posts in the MNS and, by their course of action, have thus taken up an offer "to obtain the scope to get themselves into some sort of positions." According to him, communication and cooperation with Kavan and Bily have been difficult recently, and, therefore, the MNS is no longer interested in them. At the same time, he emphasized that this is not a platform or faction within the framework of the MNS but the individual initiative of these two deputies and several other people.

Slovakia: Schenk Meets With Czech Counterpart

AU1203150696 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 9 Mar 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Ivan Horsky: "Coolness Does Not Bode Well for Above-Standard Czech-Slovak Relations; Jozef Zieleniec's and Juraj Schenk's News Conference"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—Jozef Zieleniec, minister of foreign affairs of the Czech Republic, paid a one-day visit to the Slovak Republic yesterday; in fact, his first official visit to Bratislava. It was delayed, incidentally, twice before for various reasons. [passage omitted]

The head of Czech diplomacy was received by Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. Josef Zieleniec stated that the talks, which lasted almost 60 minutes, included a brief reception during which no problems were discussed in detail. In contrast, the prime minister's office released a statement in which the talks were assessed as very significant in the area of bilateral relations.

[Slovak Foreign Minister] Juraj Schenk and Josef Zieleniec signed the Agreement Between the Governments of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic on Mutual Cooperation in the Sphere of State Surveillance Over the Safety of Nuclear Facilities.

In their introductory statements at a news conference following their talks, both chiefs of diplomacy, Josef Zieleniec and Juraj Schenk, noted the state of bilateral relations and potential for development. They also spoke about their very similar or identical views on important international problems.

In this context, Juraj Schenk observed that Prague and Bratislava had confirmed their unchanging positions on EU and NATO membership. They also exchanged views on their recent talks with Yevgeniy Primakov, the Russian foreign minister. They viewed favorably the upcoming Prague meeting of foreign ministers from central and eastern European countries with the head of U.S. diplomacy, Warren Christopher. This meeting will give new impetus to the process of the alliance's enlargement. They expect that Christopher will propose a new security arrangement for Europe.

Josef Zieleniec and Juraj Schenk also expressed the hope that the treaty on common borders would be ratified in the Czech Republic before the elections and that the drafting of additional treaties—for example, on the mutual provision of health care or on Slovak children in Czech foster homes—would soon be completed.

The only interesting moment at the news conference came when the Slovak minister, in assessing bilateral relations, expressed the hope that he would soon meet his guest in Prague. In response, Zieleniec laconically remarked that he is officially invited. [passage omitted]

And here is one more gem with which to close: NARODNA OBRODA learned from well-informed circles that J. Zieleniec, who is known as an avid pilot, flew the government plane himself from Prague to Bratislava and even landed the plane without problems.

Slovakia: Party Officials View HZDS Document

AU1303114596 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 12 Mar 96 pp 1-2

[Report by Zita Sujova on comments made by Eduard Kukan, chairman of the Democratic Union, and Frantisek Miklosko, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, on an internal foreign policy document of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Saturday, 9 March, NARODNA OBRODA published parts of a Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] internal document on the tasks of the movement in foreign policy. It was drafted in September 1995, and HZDS Deputy Chairman Olga Keltosova (proposed by the government for the post of permanent representative of the Slovak Republic to the United Nations) was given as the presenter. In this context, we asked Eduard Kukan and Frantisek Miklosko what they think about the document.

Democratic Union [DU] Deputy Chairman Eduard Kukan observed that a certain arrogant attitude on the part of the HZDS, as the main party of the government coalition—which the movement also uses in other spheres—can be detected in the document. He recalled the words of Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk, made at a meeting of Slovak ambassadors in Bratislava last spring, that the criterion for evaluating Slovak diplomatic representatives will be the results of their work, their qualifications, and their willingness to take initiative. The HZDS document calls, however, for the "appointment of new, even if less experienced, but reliable people with a pro-Slovak attitude," which contradicts official government policy, he said. Responding to the passage about needing "the help of our security structures, like the SIS, etc., to implement continuous control and to use stricter criteria in assessing the work of our embassies," Kukan said that it is "simply unheard of to put something like that on paper" and that "I believe it could not have happened even under the former regime." In response to a question on if, based on the content and quality of the document, one could infer the personal and expert qualifications of the presenter for being named ambassador to the United Nations, Kukan replied: "Yes, but ambassador of the

HZDS to the United Nations, not ambassador of the Slovak Republic."

Regarding the proposal to place embassies under the control of the Slovak Information Service, Frantisek Miklosko, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, said that, considering the communist slogan "We will not allow our republic to be subverted" that Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar used at the HZDS rally in the Sports Arena, this is another example of the direction this government team is taking—back to communism.

Frantisek Miklosko pointed out that only two people had said something similar before Meciar: Klement Gottwald and Gustav Husak.

Another issue: The claim that it is better to have less qualified people with pro-Slovak attitudes as ambassadors reminds Miklosko of the 1950's, "when absolutely unqualified people were appointed to posts in the justice sector and elsewhere just because they were dedicated and loyal to the regime."

According to him, it is quite clear today that pro-Slovak means pro-HZDS and, he emphasized, these people have no right to speak in the name of the entire nation.

Slovakia: Keltosova Proposal on Diplomats Viewed

AU1203144696 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 9 Mar 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Zita Sujova: "If Olga Keltosova Were Appointed Ambassador to the United Nations, Would She Be Controlled by the Slovak Information Service?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 20 February the Slovak Government announced its proposal that Olga Keltosova, minister of labor, social affairs, and family, be appointed ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the United Nations. The letter of appointment should be signed by Slovak President Michal Kovac; that is, the very man she asked to resign. She did so together with Ivan Lexa, then executive secretary of the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] (after the October 1994 elections), who later became director of the SIS [Slovak Information Service].

In connection with these personality interrelations, we note selected passages from an internal document of the movement entitled "The Main Tasks of the HZDS in Foreign Policy." The document was drafted in September 1995 based on the resolution of the HZDS Republic Presidium (RP) of 19 August 1995, and tabled at the HZDS RP by Olga Keltosova, deputy chairman in charge of foreign affairs and media policy. At the beginning, this 12-page text observes that so far, the problems of stabilizing the foreign relations of the Slovak Republic "have been either not dealt with satisfactorily or without strategic concept." In the part on representative offices abroad, the author notes that "with regard to numerous signals about staff incompetence at Slovak Embassies, which for various reasons advocate the interests of Slovakia and the government's positions either insufficiently or not at all, it is necessary to really focus on this issue. At the present stage in building Slovakia, this is of vital importance because we are seen and judged abroad mostly through these channels. Therefore, we believe that: 1) it is necessary to analyze the work of the Foreign Ministry as a whole and individual representative offices; 2) with the help of our security structures, like the SIS, continuous control should be implemented and stricter criteria used in assessing the work of our embassies; and 3) the results of these steps should be evaluted and extensive personnel changes at the Slovak Foreign Ministry implemented. It is precisely these representatives of the state, with contacts abroad, who pose a tremendous danger to the state if they do not work completely within the Foreign Ministry organization in the interests of the Republic."

Another passage states that one year of work at the Slovak Foreign Ministry is a traditional prerequisite for work abroad. "At present, however, this means that 90 percent of our people at the embassies are either of Czechoslovak orientation or are those who were placed there under the ministry of Messrs. Knazko, Moravcik, and Kukan. All of them are people with opposition orientation. This is not a problem in itself but, what could be worse, they question or even directly attack the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic." The solution of Olga Keltosova is: "I propose disregarding this principle at this pivotal time and appointing new, even if less experienced, but reliable people with a pro-Slovak attitude."

The author used the remaining pages to write down the strategic objectives and stances of the HZDS toward other states. The conclusion then declares that "regarding problems and obstacles in our diplomatic activities that try to create a true picture of the Slovak Republic, we must realize that there are international, and even domestic, forces that are not interested in the existence of a prosperous and democratic Slovakia." To be brief: Analyze the problem; find out who wants what; brief HZDS members and, subsequently, the public, on HZDS positions; expose those people, or groups and organizations, who work against the interests of Slovakia at home or abroad; and explain publicly HZDS positions at the international level.

Slovakia: Keltosova Said Unsuitable as UN Envoy

AU1203165296 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 9 Mar 96 p 9

[Commentary by Jan Fule: "If Olga Keltosova Does Not Become Permanent Representative, Is it a Loss for Diplomacy?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In his decision not to appoint Olga Keltosova as permanent representative to the United Nations, Michal Kovac used only one of many possible arguments. Yes, in certain circumstances, one would have to admit that it would be very difficult for a person who publicly expresses views contrary to the head of state to represent that state. In the final analysis, the nonappointment of Olga Keltosova simply illustrates the impasse reached by the government and the president of the Republic. There are areas where it is not possible to make decisions without mutual cooperation. Without consensus, Slovakia will not have a suitable representative at the United Nations. That is no insignificant matter.

The nonappointment of Keltosova says very little about her expert qualities. That is a criterion from which it is impossible to divert attention, by pointing out a person's background, for instance.

In September 1995, Keltosova drafted a document entitled "The Main Tasks of the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] in Foreign Policy," based on the resolution of the HZDS Republic Presidium (RP) of 19 August 1995. (Some parts are quoted on page one.) The quality of this document is catastrophic, especially if we consider the fact that the movement has its foreign minister, and it was drafted by a potential ambassador, deputy chair of the movement in charge of foreign affairs and media policy. Even if you disregard this, it still has the quality of a weak term paper.

More or less qualified debates about our foreign policy orientation have been frequently conducted in Slovakia. The government proposed Keltosova for the UN diplomatic post. Hence, it is of interest how she sees that country; for example: "A constant, albeit so far partially concealed economic decline is taking place in the United States, which is creating clear anxiety in U.S. ruling circles. This is evident in domestic policy as well as in the international arena. Clinton's hesitancy has exceeded tolerable limits—the consequences are particularly visible in the Balkans, and the question rises as to whether the United States is at all capable of political and military action, as the world hegemonic power that guarantees peace and a legal solution to problems in world policy." As with Boris Yeltsin recently, Bill Clinton does not have it easy in the HZDS. "The most important country for us here is certainly Russia (among the countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR—NARODNA OBRODA note), which will elect a president at the end of the year. It is obvious today that it will not be Yeltsin," Keltosova writes. Josef Zieleniec, head of Czech diplomacy, visited Slovakia yesterday. Who knows if he learned the following opinion from his Slovak counterpart: "Czech foreign policy can be characterized by extreme efforts to become integrated into the EU and NATO, regardless of historical ties with Slovakia or the states of the former CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation]."

This interesting document has also a summary. It states, among other things, that it is necessary "to expose and describe the people, or possibly groups and organizations, who work against the interests of Slovakia both at home and abroad." This occurred after "The Main Tasks of the HZDS in Foreign Policy" was published. The authors are exposed by their own words in the text.

Slovakia: Meciar Addresses HZDS Rally 7 Mar

AU1203191896 Bratislava SME in Slovak 8 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Igor Stupnan: "Prime Minister Tells Rally: Work Speaks for HZDS; Everything That Is Against the Nation for KDH"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "We have had enough of this; we will not allow the Republic to be subverted. For this reason the government will approve an amendment to the Penal Code tonight and will outlaw such activities," Vladimir Meciar, chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], told a rally of HZDS supporters yesterday. He put the founding of the movement into historical context by enumerating important events in Slovak history. Meciar stated that one thousand years ago, probably in March, Svatopluk [ruler of 9th century Great Moravian Empire] died; the Slovak state was founded in March [1939]; Ludovit Stur [19th century nationalist] started his struggle in March; and the HZDS was founded in March. Within one year, the HZDS had managed to establish a functional state structure. It enjoys the trust of the people and therein lies its strength. According to Meciar, "if those who swear would shut their mouths for three months, the koruna's exchange rate would go up." The prime minister also admitted errors that were made when "a big job was given to a little man." Regarding the territorial and administrative arrangements, the dispute is not over how many regions there will be, but how the territory of southern Slovakia should be divided. The Slovak-Hungarian treaty does not pose a threat to Slovaks and does not grant the right to autonomy. The situation would supposedly be worse if the parties making up the present opposition were in power. Enlargement of the government coalition is possible, according to what the prime minister said, but today, when Slovakia is the most dynamically developing country, the government will not change its position at the expense of the Association of Workers of Slovakia or the Slovak National Party. Prime Minister Meciar used the example of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] to illustrate the activity of the opposition: "[KDH Presidium member] Palko is the embodiment of hatred," he noted, adding that while work speaks for the HZDS, lies, slander, and everything that is against the nation speak for the KDH.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 9 March, in the "Monitor" column on page 7, reprints a report on the HZDS rally that originally appeared in the 8 March issue of the daily NOVY CAS. The report includes the following passage: "On the issue of the Party of the Democratic Left's [SDL] entry into the coalition, the prime minister said that the HZDS has not initiated any activity that would warrant the SDL's joining the coalition and he confirmed loyalty to his present coalition partners."]

Slovakia: Amendments to Penal Code Detailed

AU1203200196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 9 Mar 96 pp 1-2

[Article by "sp": "Vladimir Meciar's Cabinet Approved Amendment to Penal Code Thursday Night"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—A citizen of the Slovak Republic who, in collaboration with a foreign power or a foreign official, commits the criminal act of subverting the Republic, terrorism, or sabotage will be sentenced to a prison term of 12 to 15 years or meted out exceptional penalty [vynimocny trest], according to Article 91 of the Penal Code amendment approved by Vladimir Meciar's cabinet at an extraordinary meeting 7 March, held after the Bratislava rally of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. The information that the cabinet would discuss this piece of legislation was announced by the prime minister at the rally. According to the original agenda, the cabinet was to deal only with the bills on the State Housing Development Fund and on the increase of pensions in 1996, as well as changes to some regulations in social security.

Article 92 of the amendment reads that "he who organizes public rallies of citizens with the intention of undermining the constitutional system, territorial integrity, or defense capability of the Republic, or with the intention of destroying its independence, will be sentenced to a prison term of six months to three years or will pay a fine."

Article 98 addresses damage to the interests of the Republic. Under this article, a citizen of the Slovak Republic or a person without citizenship permanently resident on the territory of the Slovak Republic who deliberately spreads untrue information abroad damaging the interests of the Republic will be sentenced to a prison term of up to two years or will pay a fine.

Another aim of the amendment is to establish a legal framework for the protection of the interests of the state by criminal law in cases where the state acts as administrator of its own property. In this context, Article 127, Section A of the amendment addresses violations of financial discipline. Paragraph 1 of this article reads: "He who violates or does not fulfill an obligation laid down by law or contract toward the state, community, or the National Property Fund [FNM] of the Slovak Republic concerning the appropriation or use of resources from the state budget, a state fund, community budget, or the budget of the FNM of the Slovak Republic, or in conjunction with the transfer of state, community, or FNM of the Slovak Republic property toward other persons, and thereby causes substantial damage or gains substantial profits for himself or a third person will be sentenced to a prison term of six months to three years, or will be punished by a ban on operation or will pay a fine." The Penal Code amendment also reacts to criminal acts of thwarting bankruptcy or settlement proceedings.

[On the same day, on page 2, Bratislava SME in Slovak carries a 200-word TASR report on other items on the agenda of the 7 March "extraordinary" government meeting. The report notes that the government "discussed and approved a National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] bill on increasing pensions in 1996 and on changing some regulations in the sphere of social security" as well as a "NRSR bill on the State Housing Development Fund [SFRB]." The former provides for a 12 percent raise in old-age, disability, widow, orphan, and other pensions as of 1 June 1996, and the latter "addresses the principles of creating and using SFRB financial resources" and "the provision of long-term housing construction credits with a lower rate of interest for individuals and corporations." Both bills require approval by the NRSR.]

Hungary: Horn Views Economy, Relations, NATO

*AU1203200296 Vienna KURIER in German
12 Mar 96 p 4*

[Report on interview with Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn by Georg Berenyi in Budapest; date not given: "We Want To Create a Social Partnership According to the Austrian Example"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Exactly one year ago, substantial cuts were made in Hungary: The drastic reorganization caused a heavy shock in the nation and has been hotly debated until today. In an interview with KURIER, Prime Minister Gyula Horn struck the balance and said: ***—On assets:*** "The danger that the land will become impossible to finance has been warded off. We have managed to save and boost economic growth at the same time. The deficit in the state budget and the foreign debts are gradually decreasing." —***On negative consequences:*** "The real wages have decreased, and here we have to make corrections because we cannot permit that the existence of hundreds of thousands is endangered." ***—On the reaction abroad:*** "Understanding and recognition from all over the world have confirmed our conviction that we are on the right path. So far, we have managed to avoid a social explosion. We are striving for a national consensus, among other things, by creating a social partnership according to the Austrian example." ***—On the effects on Hungary's entry into the EU:*** "The reorganization of the state budget is the basic prerequisite for our entry into the EU. With good reason, Hungary is often considered as the leader in the region regarding reforms. We are also interested in our neighbors' entry into the EU, but we do not have to wait for them if they are not prepared for the same sacrifices that we are." —***On relations with neighboring states:*** "In some of our neighboring countries, one tries to abuse the nationality problems (key word: Hungarian minority in Slovakia—the editors) for domestic policy purposes. Nevertheless, cooperation in the economic sector is developing well. By 1999, a free trade zone with an increased market supply for foreigners could develop in the region." ***—On relations with NATO:*** "The close cooperation around the base of the Bosnian Contact Group in Hungary is strengthening our NATO partnership. However, it is not yet a security guarantee. By the way, the decision on our full membership only concerns us and NATO. I am proceeding on the assumption that the Russian leadership's point of view, which was presented last year—that is, that NATO admission is our sovereign decision—continues to be valid." ***—On the expectation placed on Austria:*** "The government in Vienna can help us with its experiences in preparing for the EU and support our admission. I am above all encouraged by Chancellor Vranitzky's readiness to help."

Hungary: Keleti Comments on Cooperation With Israel

*AU1303104196 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian
12 Mar 96 p 9*

[Interview with Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti by Rachel Adam in Jerusalem; date not given: "We Expect High-Ranking Strategic Experts From Israel"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti arrived on an official visit in Israel the day after the first bus explosion in Jerusalem and the kamikaze action in Ashkelon. He had the opportunity to receive first-hand information on the position of the Israeli leadership on halting terrorism. He also had the opportunity to examine the prospects of Hungarian-Israeli military cooperation. Gyorgy Keleti was interviewed by NEPSZAVA correspondent Rachel Adam on his experiences.*

[Adam] You held talks with Israeli Prime Minister and Defense Minister Shim'on Peres. Please sum up the essence of those talks.

[Keleti] The comprehensive information the Israeli prime minister gave me in the course of our meeting was very important. He said that Israel has no other choice but to make Yasir 'Arafat face the terrible situation and the need to halt terror. Israel does not want to break 'Arafat; Israel only wants to make it clear to him that he will fall victim to himself if he does not change his line. Israel does not ask 'Arafat to serve Israel's interests. Israel demands, however, that he uproot terrorism in the Palestinian territories under his authority and create normal conditions in Gaza, similar to the conditions prevailing in the Kingdom of Jordan. In the course of our talks, Peres repeatedly stressed that the State of Israel gave much help to the Palestinians, much more than all the Arab countries put together. I think that, despite the series of terrorist actions, the Israeli Government led by Peres is extremely consistent in its efforts to create a lasting peace in the Middle East. At the same time, however, Peres also firmly pointed out that the Israeli Government intends to use tough measures to put an end to the destruction caused by the unpredictable terrorist actions of fanatic forces, destruction involving innocent victims.

[Adam] What was the specific lesson of your visit?

[Keleti] We had the opportunity to see a special new trend in the development of Israeli military technology. The steady renewal of operational military technology and, in the case of electronic equipment, the ongoing development of their combat value play an important role in the Israeli military technology. All this refutes the concept that one can achieve qualitative improvement in military technology by purchasing newly developed products, not to mention whether or not it is possible to purchase the most modern machines on the international market and at what prices.

[Adam] Is it true that making use of this specific trend in the Israeli military technology is at the center of evaluating the opportunities of Hungarian-Israeli cooperation?

[Keleti] Yes. We agreed that the Israeli military industry would manufacture four different renewed prototypes of the T-55 tank. At a later stage, after testing them under Hungarian conditions and after a parliamentary decision on the matter, we would decide on the further fate of the deal.

[Adam] What about the plans to modernize the MiG-21 combat aircraft?

[Keleti] It is true that, prior to my visit, reports on this appeared in the Hungarian press. This time, however, we did not come to an official agreement on this matter. We must examine the possibilities carefully because they already signed an agreement on renewing 100 combat aircraft in the Central European region.

[Adam] What other opportunities for military cooperation are there between our two countries?

[Keleti] I proposed to make up a list of the heads of Israeli military industry enterprises, both private and state-owned. These people should visit Hungary in the first half of 1996 because we can demonstrate to them our possibilities of location. This would then lead to joint manufacturing, renewal, and joint enterprise forms. It is certain that we will not transport the aforementioned T-55 tanks to Israel; obviously, Israel would send parts of the manufactured installations here. We could use local manpower to install these systems.

I also see great opportunities in jointly appearing on a third market. They promised to send a delegation of high-ranking strategic experts to Hungary before May this year at the invitation of the Hungarian Defense Ministry. This could be the beginning. I see improved opportunities for implementing such plans, given the outstanding creativity and readiness of the Israeli military industry.

[Adam] So, you are optimistic regarding future cooperation.

[Keleti] Yes, because serious opportunities are now opening, after the empty declarations of previous years. I told Mr. Peres that, after thorough professional preparatory work, we might be able to sign a joint cooperation plan as early as the second half of this year, and we would invite the highest-ranking leader of the Israeli Defense Ministry to visit Hungary on the occasion.

Hungary: Horn Criticizes Smallholders Party Program

AU1203181196 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 12 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Ildiko Horvath: "The Smallholders' Program Was a Subject of Debate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A sharp debate arose between Prime Minister Gyula Horn and representatives of the opposition parties in Parliament on 11 March because Horn criticized the program of the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP]. As is known, FKGP Chairman Jozsef Torgyan handed the two-volume program over to Horn on the opening day of this year's session, saying that he should use its ideas to form a correct program.

At Parliament's 11 March session, before the agenda, in accordance with his previous promise, Horn expressed his opinion on the FKGP's two-volume program. To start with, he noted that, all in all, the study reinforces the correctness of the governmental goals and ways, but he did not specify any of the stages. As to its genre, the program is a political pamphlet, a continuation of Torgyan's before-the-agenda speeches. The FKGP promises a superprofessional government, and the program's author has prophetic qualities, for example, he predicted that the government coalition would split up by the end of 1995.

The program says that the economic problems have to be solved similarly to cutting the Gordian knot. Horn quoted as a "gem" the fact that the Smallholders want to make the catching up and overtaking effect [as published] of the world's more developed areas part of the national program. An avalanche rolling uphill is also part of the program.

Although the Smallholders did not want to include emotional elements in the program, the document calls the deputies illiterate and the experts charlatans. The Smallholders can see large-scale home building at places where there is stone, wood, water, and labor.

The program's second volume focuses on the economy. In this, the FKGP, just like the current government, makes economic stability, improvement of the current account, suppression of the illegal economy, and inflow of working capital its goals. Horn asked why Torgyan protested when the government made its efforts for the same goals. Horn finally noted that the program makes no mention of means, condition system, or sources, and its style indicates infallibility, and infallible people cause the irreparable damages. Ivan Szabo, parliamentary leader of the Hungarian Democratic People's Party, called it astounding that the prime minister criticized another party's program in Parliament. Torgyan said that the prime minister should be included in a book of records because for 10 minutes he talked nonsense about an allegedly nonexistent party program. According to him, Horn took half sentences out of the document and he did not understand any of the material. Torgyan objected to the slandering of a 100-year-old party which has more in its little finger than the whole Hungarian Socialist Party and the prime minister have together. Gyorgy Giczy (of the Christian Democratic People's Party) objected to the fact that the prime minister treated the FKGP's program in a special way while he did not speak about his own program. As he said, in the country's current situation, the government's activities rather than the program of an opposition party should be dealt with.

In his reply, Horn emphasized that he expressed his views in Parliament partly because the FKGP had asked him to do so and because the FKGP spoke about its program as a governmental alternative.

Hungary: Predecessors, Experts Comment on Medgyessy

96CH0072B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 27 Feb 96 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed report: "Peter Medgyessy Will Be the Finance Minister; Horn Claims He Established No Conditions"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

Good Decision According to the Predecessors

"I, personally, regard the choice as excellent, because Medgyessy knows the ins and outs of the trade and his knowledge in the fields of financial policymaking and state administration is broad," former Finance Minister Laszlo Bekesi (MSZP) [Hungarian Socialist Party] told this newspaper. To Bekesi's knowledge, Medgyessy believes in the same dual economic policy that Bokros and he represented at the helm of the Finance Ministry.

An expert with experience will occupy the finance minister's chair according to Bekesi, but he also stressed that the problem with previous finance ministers had not been a lack of preparedness, but instead the milieu in which they had to work. Medgyessy's effectiveness will not be determined by his intentions, but rather by his choice as to whether he becomes a lone fighter, and whether the prime minister supports him only temporarily or consistently in the uncomfortable transformation. Bekesi also said that negotiations with international financial organizations will not be disturbed by the change in the person of the finance minister, because "these negotiations hinge on the kind of government we have, and not on the person who occupies the finance minister's chair."

Mihaly Kupa, the second finance minister of the Antall government, worked with Peter Medgyessy in 1987, as head of the Finance Ministry tax reform secretariat. Responding to an inquiry by this newspaper, Kupa said that, among the names mentioned as possible successors to Lajos Bokros, Peter Medgyessy was the only professional, because he has experience not only in state administration but also in the private sphere, and besides, he also has good negotiating skills and is prepared to compromise. Kupa believes that Medgyessy is not going to confront certain strata of society as sharply as his predecessor. It is the primary function of finance ministers to guard the country's financial stability, but this nominee is also likely to seek other growth opportunities, Kupa said.

"It would be a waste of time to dispute Medgyessy's professional preparedness," former Finance Minister Ivan Szabo (MDF) [Hungarian Democratic Forum] told this newspaper, "but his potential latitude is going to be determined by the fact that he has to work in the framework of a coalition government." Szabo nevertheless hopes that the new finance minister is not going to commit himself to pursue fiscal policies only, that he is not going to be "doctrinaire" like Bokros, and that his policies are going to be supported to a greater extent by impact analyses than those of Bokros. Ivan Szabo expressed regrets over the fact that in looking for a finance minister the prime minister was unable to step outside the leading elite that had prevailed before the system change.

"Peter Medgyessy has experience in serving as finance minister, because ten years ago he succeeded me at the head of the Finance Ministry," according to former Finance Minister Istvan Hetenyi, presently a chief counsellor at the Ministry. Hetenyi added that in those days he recommended Medgyessy to be his successor. Medgyessy is clearly a good choice, because he is familiar with state finances, and not in the least, he is also well known in the international world of finance, Hetenyi said.

Experts About the Nominee

Medgyessy's nomination represents a step back, according to political scientist Laszlo Keri. "I do not know why Horn believes that Medgyessy's good contacts in the foreign capital markets provide security," he said. Keri is convinced that Medgyessy's appointment is going to delay implementation of the restrictive economic policy which Bokros initiated a year ago. "If that happens, we are going to have to pay a higher price later. This process of one step forward, one step backward has been going on ever since 1985," Keri said.

In contrast, Istvan Stumpf, a political analyst at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, believes that Medgyessy is a good choice. Medgyessy has very good relations with the most important socialist leaders, and is able to manage conflicts much easier than Bokros. Stumpf believes that Medgyessy has no choice but to continue on the path of reforms, because doing so is required by the OECD and the IMF. Both of these organizations are expected to make key decisions regrading Hungary in March.

Economist Laszlo Csaba, the scientific advisor of Kopint-Datorg Corporation, believes that Medgyessy is a good team player and a good manager who knows how to work with others. In Csaba's view: Medgyessy, the former deputy prime minister, may be credited for the opening the external economy and liberalizing the economy. In his view, Medgyessy is committed to reform the state household, but he is also willing to compromise. Medgyessy is going to continue economic stabilization, but in a different form, according to Laszlo Csaba.

Hungary: Privatization Minister Urges Unity in MSZP

AU1203182796 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 9 Mar 96 p 8

[Interview with Hungarian Privatization Minister Tamas Suchman by Dezso Pinter; place and date not given: "I Have No Reason To Be Disappointed"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Pinter] Several local organizations [of the Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP] nominated you for membership in the executive committee. Are you preparing for a bigger role in party politics?

[Suchman] If the opportunity arises, I will be happy to be considered. I do not like to criticize from the outside, it is probably better to change things from within. We are more than half way into the election cycle, and it is more than advisable to pay more attention to the political assessment of our actions and decisions. Looking at the country's constantly changing political map, what is at stake today is whether Hungarian society rather than the MSZP will win or lose in 1998. We still have the possibility to shape politics.

[Pinter] How are you doing in the MSZP?

[Suchman] Fine. I do not have any enemies or adversaries in the party or in the parliamentary group. I learned quite a bit from Rezso Nyers, I respect Ivan Vitanyi, and I highly appreciate Laszlo Bekesi's professional knowledge. I always try to help the internal groups maintain contact. I believe that the country needs a more united MSZP and Socialist parliamentary group than what we have today because dissent forces us to make decisions that are to society's detriment. We have achieved obvious results in the economy, in legislation, and in establishing society's inner peace, but we all have a lot of tension inside. There are many frustrated MSZP members who have different ideas on governing and who believed that it would be easier to implement dreams. I do not condemn people who are constantly trying the limits of political tolerance. I accept the quiet revolts because the necessary unity is achieved by the time decisions affecting public affairs are made. Governmental responsibility will not force the delegates of the MSZP's March congress into a complacent silence. I expect many criticisms to be voiced and that the desired changes will not try to shake the government's power. I might seem a bit cynical when I say that everyone should have thought about it after the 1994 elections if we should at all govern when capitalism has to be built and it is necessary to bring incredibly painful measures to put the budget in order. As no one doubted in 1994 that we had to take on a governmental role, we are now left with just one task—namely, to perform.

[Pinter] How great is the distance between the party's leading bodies and the government?

[Suchman] At the moment, it is still too big.

[Pinter] Do these bodies repudiate the government's measures?

[Suchman] Sometimes they criticize it in a way instead of which they should make alternative suggestions for the solution. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Do you expect the congress to take note of society's indications more emphatically than the Miskolc congress?

[Suchman] I am convinced that it will. The burdens have continued to increase since then and the delegates will be coming to the congress with this type of messages.

[Pinter] No further! Is this what the messages will say?

[Suchman] No. Everyone knows that changes are needed. However, society alone cannot pay for the reform processes. I find it desirable to divide the burdens into three—between the individual, the state, and the economy. It is impossible for the individual to always carry the burden. I also say this as a minister.

[Pinter] Then whose line prevails in the government?

[Suchman] Necessity's.

[Pinter] What is the name of necessity?

[Suchman] Necessity does not have a name. The finance minister of the day is responsible for recognizing the economic necessities, but the whole government's united attitude has to prevail in the solution. In certain situations, quick decisions have to be made, but these also have to be controlled afterwards. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] In your view, to what extent do citizens look differently on the current government's privatization policy than they did with the previous government?

[Suchman] It would be a waste of time to deceive myself, so I say that they do not look on it any differently. It still has to be proved that the result of privatization is a significant contribution to the change of the country's economic structure and modernization. It has to be—or should be—proved almost daily that Hungarian assets are at last sold at their value. Society should also be made to believe that privatization encourages further capital inflow, and this money creates new workplaces and infrastructure. [passage omitted]

Hungary: National Charter Charges 'Politicization' of Media

96CH0072A Budapest DEMOKRATA in Hungarian 25 Jan 96 p 7

[Statement issued on behalf of the National Charter: "Protesting the Abolition of the Institutional Background of the Freedom of the Press"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On behalf of the Hungarian intelligentsia we wish to protest the increased politicization of the press and the mass media. Mass media with national circulation have been under the control of a narrow stratum of groups of Budapest journalists since the beginning of the 1980's; this stratum has been capable of preserving, moreover, increasing its power over the media without hindrance since the disappearance of the party state. The financing of, and control over the press by its owners has, in recent years, increasingly shifted to Budapest-based banks and enterprises owned by these banks; intertwined with left-wing liberal groups of journalists and their media intelligentsia in the background—espousing the same political value system as that espoused by the banks and their enterprises—they acquired a growing monopoly of molding political public opinion. Only UJ MAGYARORSZAG may still be regarded as a national, conservative daily newspaper with a right-wing political orientation; in an advertising market controlled by the banks this newspaper is, in essence, being boycotted, even though its paid circulation does not lag behind that of MAGYAR HIRLAP, the "flagship" of the left-wing media empire, whose 1994 advertising revenues amounted to eight times as much as those of UJ MAGYARORSZAG. As a result of this situation, UJ MAGYARORSZAG is experiencing increasing difficulties in paying its printing bills, and since banks controlling the media empire also acquire more and more forcefully ownership positions in large printing presses, the future of newspapers advocating a national, conservative, or right-wing value system is becoming hopeless. Thus, UJ MAGYARORSZAG, the last one of these newspapers, is in its final days, because its printing press has been bought by Postabank, a bank that controls the media empire and intends to discontinue printing that newspaper. On behalf of the Hungarian intelligentsia, we protest the abolition of the free press and the balanced information provided to society and request that the people and governments of western democracies intervene to counter this abridgement of the newly established Hungarian democracy. We are forwarding copies of this statement to the editorial offices of large newspapers respected throughout the world, in addition to Hungarian newspapers, and also to the embassies of western states in Hungary, hoping that the people and governments of westerns democracies will stand up for Hungarian democracy, just as they did when they protested the suppression of the 1956 popular uprising in Hungary.

On behalf of the National Charter: Editor in Chief Andras Bencsik, Poet Iren Kiss, Editor Lajos Peter Kovacs, Prof. Dr. Bela Pokol, Deputy Editor in Chief Agnes Sesztak, Editor Tunde Vajda.

The Democratic Youth Forum [IDF; MDF—Hungarian Democratic Forum—youth organization] also registers its protest

The National Board of the IDF views the attempted economic strangulation of UJ MAGYARORSZAG, and attempts to change MAGYAR NEMZET's political orientation with anxious concern and fear. The IDF condemns actions encouraging the disappearance of these two newspapers, both of which express the views of the opposition, and regards as unacceptable the fact that obvious political goals are being disguised as economic endeavors.

B-H: NATO Troops on Alert in Sarajevo District

*AU1303102596 Paris AFP in English
0948 GMT 13 Mar 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 13 (AFP)—NATO troops were on a "state of alert" in a volatile Serb-held Sarajevo neighbourhood Wednesday [13 March], Alliance officials said, amid fears of a repeat of arson attacks that recently hit another Serb-held area.

Patrols of crack Italian and French troops have been stepped up in the city centre district of Grbavica, a spokesman for the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) said.

"We have indications that something is being planned. Grbavica is the last district to go, it is full of hardliners but we are prepared. The troops are on a state of alert," an IFOR official who requested anonymity said.

"The patrols have been increased," IFOR spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Pernod said. "There will be joint patrols of the Italian Garribaldi division and a French scout platoon. At any time of the day you will have 200 soldiers patrolling in and around the neighbourhood. We have also reserves that will be ready to act if necessary."

Grbavica is the last Serb-held part of Sarajevo and is due to revert to government control in a week's time.

Ilidza, the previous Serb-held area to change hands, was hit by a wave of arson attacks in the run-up to the switch of authority Tuesday, wrecking large areas of the suburb.

The Grbavica neighbourhood, which juts into the city proper, was contested throughout the city's siege. For that reason, IFOR officials said, all precautions were being taken to prevent it going in flames.

Grbavica is a major fire hazard with tightly packed apartment blocks many already partially destroyed in fighting.

Some fires have already been set in recent weeks. Serb inhabitants from the area have largely left as part of the Serb exodus from the city suburbs ahead of their transfer to government control.

Only a handful of people remain, many of them elderly. The Serb authorities for the area have also packed up and gone leaving a few police officers in charge. Aid agencies have warned of gangs of thugs threatening those wanting to stay in their homes and risking their lives by setting fires in neighbouring apartments.

B-H: IFOR Notes Arson, Destruction in Sarajevo

*LD1103193096 Sarajevo Radio Hajat
in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 11 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Admiral Leighton Smith, the IFOR [Implementation Force] commander, and Michael Steiner, deputy high representative responsible for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, were today invited by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency to report on the takeover of Sarajevo suburbs by the legitimate authorities of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In the light of the frequent incidence of arson and general destruction of residential buildings and utilities, and of frequent threats and harassment of the local population by Pale Serbs, the Presidency appealed to the international forces to step up police and military patrols in Ilidza and Grbavica. At the same time, IFOR and the international police were asked to provide protection for the firefighting brigades trying to extinguish the fires. The fire brigades will be put on maximum alert.

B-H: Ilidzans Blame Bildt for Loss of Property

*AU1203200796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina
Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 12 Mar 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A meeting of Ilidza citizens organized by the Ilidzans' Association was held this afternoon. Azra Stipovic-Dubini has the details:

[Stipovic-Dubini] Today's meeting of Ilidza citizens that was meant to be a sort of protest to Carl Bildt and the entire international community for doing nothing to protect factories and private property in Ilidza failed to rally a large number of citizens. One of the reasons is probably the somewhat euphoric return of the Ilidza people to their homes after four years of being expellees in their own city. However, one should hope that messages from this meeting will reach the right address and have full effect. [passage omitted]

B-H: Problems Cited in Ilidza Over Uniforms

*AU1203182196 Paris AFP in English
1756 GMT 12 Mar 96*

[Report by Jacques Charmelot]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 12 (AFP)—Bosnia's Muslim-Croat federation took control Tuesday [12 March] of the battered Sarajevo suburb of Ilidza, hit by a spate of arson attacks by departing Serbs in recent days.

A convoy of federation police cars drove into the suburb late Tuesday morning to be greeted by dozens of civilians from the city who arrived earlier, who clapped and cheered.

The federation forces, dressed in green uniforms and peaked caps, made straight for the Ilidza district police station with its smashed windows and blackened walls.

The day before, rebel Serb policemen who relinquished control of the area on Monday tried to burn down the building. They departed in dramatic style, firing guns into the air and detonating hand grenades as arsonists set light to buildings and apartments.

A light snow gradually covered the evidence of the destruction Tuesday though burnt timbers still littered the streets, and roofless and fire-damaged houses were evident everywhere.

Ilidza is the fourth of five districts ringing Sarajevo held by the Serbs through the war that have been handed over to the federation in a phased programme over the past fortnight. The fifth, Grbavica, an inner city frontline neighbourhood, is due to revert next week.

The transfer of Ilidza also opens up a key access route between the city and Muslim-controled territory to the west and south. Serb control of the city's suburbs was used to impose a blockade on the capital for some three and a half years.

Alexandre Ivanko, spokesman for the UN police force monitoring the handover said the transition was "relatively smooth by Balkan standards." However, he reported problems with the inclusion of Croat police into the federation force.

Under arrangements agreed before the transfer, 13 Croat officers were to have been part of the police deployed in the district. Reflecting the ethnic composition of the area before the war, 51 Muslims and 23 Serbs made up the numbers.

Ivanko said that it had been agreed at a senior level that nine of the 13 Croats could wear the blue uniforms of the Bosnian Croat authorities rather than the green of the Muslim-dominated federation.

"Upon arriving in Ilidza they were told to change to change their uniforms to the (green ones). They refused and were subsequently intimidated by the federation police into leaving the area," Ivanko said. He said the UN police commissioner considered the incident "an extemely serious breach of an agreement reached with the federation." Tensions between the Muslim and Croat camps in the federation have been on the increase in recent weeks over disagreements on how to implement accords reached in Bosnia's Dayton peace agreement.

Many of those who had gathered to greet the federation forces Tuesday morning were expelled from their homes in Ilidza by the Serbs at the start of Bosnia's conflict and spent the war in Sarajevo besieged by their former neighbours.

"I'm the happiest person in the world," said Ramiza Kahvedzic, 45, a Muslim woman expelled from the district in 1992 by Serb gunmen. "I saw my apartment. There are no window frames but I will move in as soon as possible," she said adding that she and her family wished to escape the tiny basement flat where they have lived throughout the war.

B-H: Tensions in Kulen Vakuf 'Somewhat Abated'

AU1303085196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 12 Mar 96

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic in Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Following today's meeting in Kulen Vakuf, the southernmost local community of Bihac, which was attended by the representatives of IFOR [Implementation Force], the international police, and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] of so-called Herzeg-Bosnia, as well as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Bihac public security station, tensions about this town and its integration into the central Bihac Municipality, as well as the Una-Sana canton, have somewhat abated. It was agreed that control should be jointly taken by the Bihac public security station and the HVO, whose patrols will not carry weapons in the town. Reinforced supervision will be taken on by IFOR and the international police, but the HVO will still not leave the city, that is, the larger part of it at the left side of the Una river. It will remain in its base.

However, the solution on the return of Kulen Vakuf has again been postponed. This time it has been transferred to republican and federal authorities in Sarajevo. Therefore, the return of more than 7,000 Vakuf people from their exile in Bihac will again be condemned to waiting and somebody's good will.

Let us also say that the IFOR members were today somewhat more tolerant following their very tough stand yesterday that the representatives of the Bihac public security station must withdraw from the town and that the existing situation in Kulen Vakuf must be frozen, or they will start combat operations. They said so, forgetting the obligations that they have been assigned by the Dayton and Rome agreements, that is, the meeting held on 22 February. [passage omitted]

B-H: Bosnian Army Blocks Routes to Bugojno

LD1203234196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2304 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 12 Mar (TANJUG)—This evening, the Muslim army blocked all access routes to Bugojno and is not allowing Croat Defense Council [HVO] vehicles to pass through the town, Croatian radio has reported.

Brigadier Drago Dragicevic, HVO commander for the Vitez area, says that members of the Muslim army are stopping all Croat vehicles and asking the drivers for passes without any explanation, which is contrary to any agreement between the HVO and Muslim army.

General Sakib Mahmuljin, commander of the 3d corps of the Muslim army, in whose area of responsibility Bugojno is, said that "somebody in Bugojno is acting unlawfully."

Meanwhile, as Muslim radio Sarajevo reported earlier, the HVO military police has blocked all access routes to Gornji Vakuf from Bugojno and Prozor.

B-H: NATO Warns of Croat-Bosniak 'Tension'

*AU1203191396 Paris AFP in English
1902 GMT 12 Mar 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 12 (AFP) - NATO warned Tuesday [12 March] of growing tension between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, the two communities making up the federation which controls of half the former Yugoslav country.

The problems, a NATO official said, have arisen in central Bosnia in areas where Muslims and Croats fought a bitter 12-month war that ended in early 1994.

"Tensions, if not constant, are rippling backwards and forwards up the valleys (in central Bosnia) as they used to do (in) 1992, 1993," said Brigadier Andrew Cumming, a spokesman for the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia.

Cumming said Muslim and Croat police checkpoints were springing up in the Lasva Valley area but also around the towns of Jajce, Vitez, and Kiseljak.

"It is the same areas that began to behave like this in late 1992 that sparked off the fighting between the Muslims and the Croats in 1993. It is very much the fault line between traditional Bosnian (Muslim) home ground and the (Bosnia Croat) areas," Cumming said.

U.S. diplomatic pressure put a stop to the Muslim-Croat fighting in 1994 and then brought Bosnia's Muslims and Croats together in the federation. The alliance is one of the two cornerstone entities of the post-war Bosnia. The Bosnian Serb republic is the other.

Concern over the tensions, Cumming said, had prompted the commander of NATO's peace Implementation Force (IFOR) Admiral Leighton Smith to meet recently with the two senior officials in the federation, a Croat and a Muslim.

"He has read the riot act to them and pointed out their responsibility for the well-being of the federation," Cumming said. "It is an area he is deeply concerned about and which he hopes he has inspired the president of the federation (Ejup Ganic) and the vice president (Kresimir Zubak) to get a grip of."

B-H: Croat Moves Against Bosnian Muslims Cited

*AU1203091296 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian
6-13 Mar 96 p 8*

[Article by Aziz Handzic: "The Croatian List of Bosnian Officers To Be Killed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Special groups of the Bosnian Croat extreme wing have already defined the targets for their terrorist attacks. The extreme wing consists of the members of the former special units "Apostoli," "Maturice," and "Kaznjenicka Bojna" (whose commander is Mladen Naletilic Tuta) as well as extremists from other Croatian Defense Council units. If it comes to terrorist attacks, this will not be the first time that official—in this case Croatian—structures in "Herzeg-Bosnia" and Croatia use extremists for the achievement of radical political aims, and disassociate themselves from them once they are achieved by calling them "extremist groups out of control."

Assassination Attempts on a List

There are allegedly lists of people to be killed. Going down the lists, the Croatian extremists will allegedly make attempts on the lives of Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina officers and prominent Muslims, because of the war crimes they allegedly committed against Croats during the conflict. That there is such a list was disclosed by mistake by a high-level Croatian Defense Council officer from central Bosnia, which soon became known in Zenica and other places.

That this is not only propaganda is confirmed by the recent statement made by a high-level (British) officer, a former member of the UN Protection Force command in Zagreb, who stated for foreign media that "it could come to a recurrence of the conflict between Muslims and Croats in Bosnia, which could be set in motion by extremists on both sides, with their mutual clashes." The general atmosphere created by Croatian leaders intensifies this impression: The "protest" of the Croatian Democratic Community because of the alleged blockade of the village of Dastansko, close to Vares, which was responded to by the communications blockade of as many as five villages around Vitez; new incidents in which Muslims were beaten in Mostar; increasingly intensive special psychological activities through the media.... These are dangerous blows to the fragile Bosnian-Croatian partnership in a period when the United States of America is trying to pacify the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, impose peace, and find a package of political solutions to the problems that have developed during the war by taking intensive political and military measures. A liquidation of Bosnian officers and politicians could undoubtedly set off the avalanche of a new war. It is superfluous to ask who would profit from it. There have been so many incidents and attacks on everything that makes the Federation stronger in Herzegovina so far, that there is no question as to which forces are destructive. The statements issued by Mijo Brajkovic, the mayor of western Mostar, that everything they do is supported by Franjo Tudjman, points to the source of the problems, but this has been known for a long time already.

In the words of the above mentioned Croatian officer, the attacks on the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina officers would be carried out with the aim to make the work of the Hague tribunal a political issue, as only Serbs and Croats have been indicted so far. The Croatian side would explain the attempts as a "response by resigned Croatian officers, because only Croats have been indicted for crimes, so that justice has to be reached with revenge." Such a media campaign would doubtlessly influence international elements that control the Hague tribunal to either exert pressure with a package of indictments against the Muslims as well, or, in the opposite case, to lessen their pressure on the Croats. In both cases, the problem of guilt and sentence would be questioned, which were additional points for the Croats (and the Serbs).

Centers of Possible Conflict: Usora, Lasva, Bihac, Sarajevo...

In a recently published journal of the Institute for Strategic Studies in Washington (which is published for the Pentagon), the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was assessed from the intelligence point of view. According to the report, the most dangerous centers of possible conflict between the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council are—apart from Mostar—Usora, the Lasva Valley, Bihac, and Sarajevo. Incidents have already happened around Zepca, Tesanj, and Vitez (and proved that the assessment was correct); the unfolding of events in the other two centers has to be followed carefully now. It is clear that Bihac is not a conflict area, but this need not prevent the Croatian side from provoking an artificial conflict by making the case of General Santic a current issue again, or by "blowing it up...."

It can be expected that the situation in Sarajevo, parallel with complications in Mostar, could be affected by the problem of the "Croatian community of Stup." It has already become obvious that the Serbs and Croats from Hadzic, Ilidza, Kiseljak, and Kresevo cooperate. It has to be admitted that agreements have been made at the local level, but it can hardly be imagined that anything is done without a blessing from Grude and Zagreb. It would be in the interest of both of them to declare the whole area between Stup, Kobiljaca, and Pazaric the "Croatian community of Stup." It would be "more acceptable for the Serbs to live under Croatian rule," (as Nedjeljko Prstojevic said), and such a geographic distribution of power would enable the Croats to threaten Sarajevo with a blockade should events start unfolding in an unfavorable way. In other words, the hotbeds have been identified. The key issue is, however, whether the behavior of the Croats, including their lists for "killing," is their attempt to return the matters to the options thought to be overcome—the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three parts, and the isolation of Muslims—or whether it is part of a broad and well-prepared campaign from the West (the United States of America first of all) "against the spreading of Islamic terrorism," the centers of which have recently been "discovered" around Bosnia.

It is possible that Bosnian Croats (but more than them Franjo Tudjman) are trying to make use of the last occasion "to settle accounts" with a sovereign and unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, if it takes root now, will be difficult to destroy in the future. The moment is well chosen, as it can be expected that their attacks on Muslims will not be too much blamed by the West, as the United States of America, Great Britain, and France are waging a campaign against the Bosnian "mujahidin." Apart from that, the coordination between Zagreb and Washington could also be found in Christopher's words, addressed to Tudjman, that "it is a Croatian task to lead the Bosnian Muslims to Europe." "Crusader" actions by both of them are under way; they have as an aim to weaken the Muslim national corpus and isolate them from the rest of the world. The reason for the U.S. insistence on the breaking of relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iran is not a fear of terrorism (it is only a motive), it is rather an attempt to break up the connections that Bosnia has with its only sincere friends. After that, the Bosnian Muslims could be tamed more easily and pressed into a mold they do not like.

B-H: Commentary Says Croats To Divide State

AU1203184196 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 7 Mar 96 p 1

[Commentary by Sejad Luckin: "A Battle for the Gate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is falling into an abyss without a way out. President Kresimir Zubak has been speaking increasingly openly about a new war between Croats and Bosniaks, unless differences in opinions are settled. While he was making these ominous predictions, a Croatian police force, similar to the Federation one, was being formed on the orders of Jozo Leutar, trying to take over control of Hadzici.

The coup was this time prevented by the Implementation Force [IFOR]. However, the case of Hadzici is in many aspects indicative. In the first place, it is yet more confirmation of the theory that efforts are being made to complete the nationalization of territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, its division, and simply to place Sarajevo, as the potential core of some multiethnic state, in a semi-encirclement from which there is no way out. The link with central Bosnia would mean just a hopeless opening to the Bosniak ghetto. After all, the southern door to the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be under Croatian control. Cooperation between the Ilidza Serbs and the Kiseljak Croats throughout the war is a good precondition for the implementation of such a plan. A tollgate would probably be put up at Stup, where a Croatian municipality would be established, leaning on Kiseljak through Ilidza.

By cutting the natural connection between Sarajevo and Mostar, the Croats in this way could accomplish their domination in the Neretva valley. Thus, Bosnia-Herzegovina would be nationally parceled up, which is the first step toward division.

Obviously, Sarajevo question has become crucial for Bosnia-Herzegovina. And that means for the Federation, as well, which is the basis of the entire peace plan. Therefore, all the political disputes between the Croatian Democratic Community and the Party of Democratic Action about the capital could be interpreted solely as a product of the different concepts of the Federation partners, rather than as the effective allocation of power or the insignia and uniform color of the Federation police.

As the time is running out for the implementation of the Dayton accords, the room for maneuver used by the politically relevant forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina is undoubtedly becoming increasingly narrow. The messages sent are becoming increasingly severe, as are the moves that are being made. In this game it does not take much for this country to find itself at war again. The case of Hadzici best shows how little it takes for partners to become enemies. Luckily, a possible clash was prevented by IFOR. But, what will happen after it leaves?

B-H: Presidency Discusses International Position

AU1203155396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The 313th regular session of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was held today with Presidency member Ejup Ganic in the chair.

The session was devoted to the analysis of the current position of Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly in connection with the realization of the Dayton agreement. Also discussed was the strategy for setting priorities in establishing the bilateral and multilateral relations that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has or intends to have with other states and international institutions.

The Presidency also discussed other issues within its jurisdiction.

B-H: Economic Agreement Signed With Croatia

AU1203180396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 12 Mar 96

[Report by Mladen Bosnjak—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Bosnjak] More than 100 representatives of companies from all parts of the Republic of Croatia, a delegation from Croatia and of county chambers of commerce who are paying a one-day visit to Sarajevo, and their hosts, directors of Bosnia-Herzegovina firms and representatives of the Chamber of Commerce of Bosnia-Herzegovina are certainly turning a new page of economic cooperation between the two countries' economies. This cooperation, based on the existing interstate agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, will in the future be carried out on the basis of a concrete agreement signed today by Nadan Vidosevic, president of the Croatian Chamber of Commerce, and Mensur Smajlovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Chamber of Commerce. On this occasion, we have recorded the following statements. Mr. Vidosevic:

[Vidosevic] In Zagreb, we founded a committee for cooperation with Bosnia-Herzegovina. We expect this committee to propose today in the bilateral talks with [passage indistinct]. In my opinion, this meeting also possesses a symbolic importance as [words indistinct] an aircraft of the Croatian national air company landed here at Sarajevo airport for the first time. I think that in the coming few days—Prime Minister Matesa is coming to Sarajevo—we are going to define this framework and [words indistinct] good relations, good cooperation are then coming [words indistinct].

[Bosnjak] Mr. Mensur Smajlovic:

[Smajlovic] So far, we have had good relations [words indistinct] with the Croatian Chamber of Economy and, as regards cooperation between the partners and the economies, I think that it is very complementary. [passage omitted]

B-H: Izetbegovic Explains Outcome of Rome Summit

LD1203183396 Sarajevo Radio Hajat in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 12 Mar 96

[Letter from Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the people of Mostar—read by announcer]

[FBIS Translated Text] I know how you received the news from the Rome summit almost a month ago. My intention was to visit Mostar immediately after the summit, talk to you, and face your anger. I was prevented by my illness, so I am addressing you in this way, with a delay and from a hospital bed.

What happened in Rome could not be avoided. It is perhaps not a good solution, but every other, in my opinion, was less favorable. When we arrived to Rome the European countries were already holding a session and had opened Koschnick's package. They were looking for the so-called mutually acceptable solution. They told us this clearly.

For those who do not know, I will explain: Europe is an economic giant, but it is powerless politically. Because of the way in which issues are decided, Europe can hardly make the slightest radical decision. For instance, if 15 countries vote in favor of a decision and only one against, the decision cannot be adopted. This is, among other things, the reason why it was possible to prepare, start, and wage for four years a genocidal war in the very heart of Europe, while Europe watched powerlessly.

Of course, we could insist on Koschnick's arbitration [as heard] and leave Rome demonstratively, but what would have we achieved? It may be argued that the other side would not have triumphed, maybe a few more principled European governments would have remained on our side, but nothing was done [as heard]. The situation in Mostar would have been frozen for a long period of time, which in reality would have suited Croat extremists, because if nothing is done time is not working for undivided Mostar and the federation but against them. After several wasted months, we would have been forced to sit at the negotiating table and search for the so-called mutually acceptable solution.

I thought that if I had to do that after several months, I had better do it immediately and preserve at least the slower pace of going toward our goal. It is important that things are not standing still but moving, because if they are moving they can only go in one direction, the direction of an undivided city.

Finally, what do we lose? Do we have anything in our hands at all? This is what I thought: We must not be too impatient. The fate of our people for the next century is being determined now, and this requires less emotion and more deliberation, perseverance, and patience. Our strategic goal is clear, undivided Mostar, and on that basis a stronger federation and a preserved free and democratic republic.

We have to go toward this goal persistently, overcoming obstacles day by day and trying again. Our goal lies in the general direction of humanity and civilization and we cannot lose following such a path.

From what I have said, you will draw your own conclusions about something I was impatient to tell you: The decision on Mostar, whether right or wrong, is mine, and no one is responsible for it except me. I have believed and do believe that in the long term it will prove to be right. If that is not the case, you have to know the truth—I have made this decision and I will be held responsible for it by history and by you. No one else.

In the end, do not be upset by the triumph of some people and groups of people from the other side of the Neretva. People around Sarajevo have behaved arrogantly and violently as well and look how they ended. Law and justice are, after all, stronger than lawlessness and force, but we have to persevere.

B-H: Sarajevo Mayor Tenders Resignation

AU1203165596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] After Sarajevo Canton was constituted and its president elected, Sarajevo Mayor Tarik Kupusovic tendered his resignation from the post he has held for the last two years.

In the explanation for his resignation, Kupusovic states that the restructuring of the city of Sarajevo into a canton in compliance to the Federal Constitution and Dayton agreement will represent a decisive positive impulse for the functioning and setting up of the Federation and a beginning to the reintegration of the unified [celovita] Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Kupusovic sent his resignation to Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Edhem

Bicakcic, deputy chairman of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA]; Timor Numic, director of the SDA Central Committee; and the SDA Cantonal Committee.

B-H: Kupusovic Calls Sarajevo Canton 'Suicide'

AU1203174396 Paris AFP in English 1728 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 12 (AFP)—The Muslim mayor of Sarajevo resigned Tuesday [12 March] to protest what he called the unconstitional creation of a regional Sarajevo government, the state news agency BH PRESS said.

Tarik Kupusovic said in a letter to Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic he was resigning over the "manner of the inauguration of the Sarajevo canton Monday".

According to the 1994 constitution of Bosnia's Muslim-Croat federation, ethnic groups have a share in power in cantons—mini regions within Bosnia—equal to their proportion of population.

"A one-nation canton is not and cannot be the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the federation", Ivica Vidovic, head of the Sarajevo branch of the Croatian party said Monday.

He appealed to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and the Croatian government for support.

Croats make up just 7 percent of the population of the Sarajevo region, however, and under the federation's constitution, Sarajevo was named a "district" where ethnic groups are represented regardless of their size of population.

The Dayton peace accord, which ended the Bosnian war last year, changed the status of Sarajevo, however, designating it as a canton.

Three months after the signing of the Dayton accord, the federal parliament has still not, however, amended the federal constitution to allow the creation of a canton for Sarajevo.

Bosnian Croats Monday walked out of the Sarajevo assembly when the Muslim authorities moved to turn it into a canton.

Kupusovic said he himself disagreed with the unconstitional transformation of the Sarajevo assembly into a canton assembly Monday and tried to adjourn the assembly session after the Bosnian Croats left.

He was overuled by the other participants who constitued the canton without his presence.

Kupusovic warned the way the wishes of Croats were ignored represents "a suicide of Sarajevo".

B-H: Karadzic, Krajisnik Meet Russian Officials

AU1203175296 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 8 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bozidar Antic, the president of the chamber of commerce of the Serb Republic, has been talking to (?Yuriy Frolov), the head of the Russian Chamber of Commerce's office in the FRY, and (?Andrey Kolynov), the representative of the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, in Pale today about establishing economic cooperation between the two countries.

After the meeting Antic stated that the Russian side, despite all the difficulties in its own economy, is interested in becoming involved in raising the level of production and exports of the companies in the Serb Republic to that of before the war.

He pointed out there is a need first to activate the business that is of interest to Russia, emphasizing that it is necessary to increase the productive capacity of the thermal power stations in Gacko and Ugljevik, where a great deal of equipment installed is of Russian origin. This meeting was useful for our delegation, which is to visit Moscow on 17 March and present to the Russian Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations a list of priorities for increasing the productive capacity of the Serb Republic, said Antic.

[Name indistinct] stated that the aim of the visit of the Russian delegation was to become informed about the situation in the Serb Republic and to find ways to coordinate the interests and modalities of economic cooperation between the two countries.

President Karadzic and Prime Minister Krajisnik [title as heard] attended part of the meeting.

B-H: Kasagic Meets International Police Group

AU1203181796 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 11 Mar 96

[Report by Marinko Ucur]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] High representatives of the international police, headed by Mr. Robert Gelbard, assistant U.S. state secretary for international crime and narcotics, visited Banja Luka today. They were received by Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic. During a one-hour meeting both sides expressed satisfaction with their cooperation in the domain covered by international police forces. With regard to that, the Serb Republic has fulfilled all its obligations, and there are no hindrances to the functioning of the international police on its territory. The meeting also touched on the opening of the RS economy toward the world, especially in the wake of suspension of international sanctions. However, during the meeting it was confirmed the release of the remaining war prisoners remains the key problem in relations with the former warring parties. The Serb Republic demanded that the U.S. Administration and Mr. Gelbard personally, being a high representative of the Clinton administration for matters of international police in the former Yugoslavia, be more actively involved in the release of Serb prisoners held in Tuzla and elsewhere.

After the meeting, Mr. Kasagic and Mr. Gelbard made brief statements to the press:

[Begin Kasagic recording] They were interested in the implementation of the Dayton accord by both sides, not only by the Serb Republic but also by the Muslim-Croat Federation, and so were we. That is why we discussed unfulfilled obligations: the release of prisoners, the failure to submit police lists. We spent a good deal of time discussing the need to release prisoners held by both sides. I believe that is the key to the problem. That problem means that the Dayton accord is not being implemented, although the deadline expired. It expired on 20 January. I think we must quickly solve that problem. We also viewed the economy of the Serb Republic and its opening toward the world. We talked about the organization and development of our country, economic relations, and the establishment of new economic relations. [end recording] [passage omitted]

As announced, before leaving for Mostar the delegation of international police met with high representatives of the RS judicial branch in this part of the Serb Republic.

B-H: Kasagic Says Serb Republic Less Isolationist

LD1003165596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1447 GMT 10 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kragujevac, 10 Mar (TANJUG)—Rajko Kasagic, prime minister of the government of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, said today that the basis of the Dayton agreement lays a firm foundation for peace.

"If everyone works on and acts according to the agreement, and the Serb Republic is consistently advocating the implementation of the Dayton agreement, there will be no threats to peace on our part," Kasagic told Radio Kragujevac.

Kasagic said that he has clearly indicated this in his political and diplomatic contacts with international mediators, which has been received with satisfaction.

Taking part in the Hallmark of Time program Kasagic stressed that the invitation to take part in the work of the roundtable on human rights in Vienna is proof that the Serb Republic is shedding its isolation. He recalled the Austrian government's offer to cooperate directly with the Serb Republic.

Kasagic said that the current Serb Republic government is a peacetime one, and that it functions well, fully observing law.

B-H: Serb, FRY Delegations Hold Economic Talks

LD1103162096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1359 GMT 11 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Banja Luka, 11 Mar (TANJUG)—Economic delegations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the [Bosnian] Serb Republic held talks in Banja Luka today on concrete business projects in the framework of the implementation of the recently approved programme of economic cooperation. [passage omitted]

Bozo Antic, president of the Serb Republic Chamber of Commerce, said that the central topic of the talks was economic cooperation between the FRY and the Serb Republic, and stressed that "the Drina river must stop being an obstacle to the economy."

He believes that economic cooperation between the FRY and the Serb Republic should not be cooperation between two states, but they should in effect become a single economic zone. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serb Republic-FRY Economic Zone Proposed

LD1103185096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1338 GMT 11 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 11 Mar (SRNA)—The economies of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] are complementary in all areas, and in the post-sanctions period a single economic and political zone should be created on the territory of both Serb states.

This is one of the main conclusions reached at today's meeting in Banja Luka between the chairmen of the chambers of commerce of the Serb Republic, the FRY, Serbia, and Montenegro—Bozidar Antic, Mihajlo Milojevic, Vlajko Stoiljkovic, and Vojin Kanovic. The meeting was also attended by directors of major companies from all Serb lands.

Despite the re-establishment of financial transactions between the Serb Republic and Yugoslavia, the Banja Luka regional economy which accounts for more than 60 percent of the Serb Republic economy will not be able to take a significant step forward, even with a financial injection, unless the problem of securing power supplies for the region is solved urgently, the meeting pointed out.

In addition to power, the Serb Republic also needs credits and raw materials in order to kick start its economy which is suffering from war exhaustion. A joint consortium of banks from the Serb Republic and the FRY should be formed because it is obvious that the funds the World Bank has set aside for the Serb Republic, in line with the Dayton agreement, are far from the sum needed for its faster development.

The setting up of joint ventures was announced at the meeting. The Banja Luka-based Jelsingrad company and the Podgorica-based Radoje Dakic [tractor plant] are expected to form a joint company soon.

B-H: Serb Republic Regulates Trade With FRY

AU1203151996 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 11 Mar 96

[Report by Milos Pribic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At today's session, the government of the Serb Republic made a decision to pay compensation to families of dead soldiers and disabled veterans for January. Some 7,200,000 dinars were allocated for the purpose from the budget and cash payment is planned to take place in the next 15 days. Our report has more:

[Begin recording] [Pribic] Today's session of the Serb Republic government held in Banja Luka, chaired by Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic, adopted several bills in the domain of domestic affairs and passed them on to the National Assembly for adoption. One of the bills adopted by the government rescinds laws on domestic affairs governed by the immediate threat of war or state of war.

[Miroslav Vjestica, RS [Serb Republic] deputy prime minister for domestic affairs] In effect, this means that the police are now free of the obligations pertaining to the state of war. You know that the police were at the front lines, together with the RS armed forces, neglecting their basic function, maintenance of law and order, protecting property and the lives of citizens, etc. That is why we have received many complaints that the police are not performing their basic function.

[Pribic] The government also adopted a bill extending for another six months the deadline for legalizing and registering weapons in the possession of citizens. The first deadline expired toward the end of last month.

At today's session, the RS Government enacted regulations on trade and services with the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and the Muslim-Croat Federation.

[Mladjen Cicovic, RS deputy trade minister] These regulations basically provide for unobstructed trade and services with the FRY, except for co-financed [medjusobno finansirane] goods, for which a permit must be obtained. A permit must be obtained from the Trade Ministry for trade with the Federation until a payments system has been set up and all elements of the Dayton Accord have been implemented. [passage omitted] [end recording]

B-H: Serb Officials on Trade With FRY

AU1203155496 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 11 Mar 96

[Report by Milos Pribic, including statements by Miroslav Vjectica, Bosnian Serb deputy prime minister for domestic policy, and Mladjen Cicovic, Bosnian Serb deputy trade minister—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At today's session, the government of the Serb Republic made a decision to pay compensation to the families of dead soldiers and disabled veterans for January. The sum of 7,200,000 dinars was allocated for this purpose from the budget and the cash payment is planned within the next 15 days. Our report has more:

[Pribic] Today's session of the Serb Republic government held in Banja Luka, chaired by Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic, passed several bills on domestic politics and referred them to the people's assembly. One of these bills passed by the government is to repeal the laws on domestic policy in the immediate threat of war or state of war.

[Vjestica] This effectively means that the police are now free of the obligations emanating from the state of war. You know that the police were at the front lines, together with the Serb Republic armed forces, neglecting their basic duty, the maintenance of law and order, protecting property and lives of citizens, etc. That is why we have received many complaints that the police are not carrying out their basic function.

[Pribic] The government also passed a bill extending the deadline for legalizing and registering weapons in the possession of citizens for another six months. The first deadline expired toward the end of last month.

At today's session, the Serb Republic government passed regulations on trade and services turnover with the FRY and the Muslim-Croat federation.

[Cicovic] These regulations basically provide for unobstructed trade and service exchanges with the FRY, except for co-financed [medjusobno finansirane] goods, for which a permit must be obtained. A permit from the trade ministry must be obtained for trade exchanges with the Federation until a payment system is established and all the elements of the Dayton accord are implemented. [passage omitted]

B-H: FRY Businessmen End Visit to Serb Republic

AU1203212596 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Yugoslav businessmen have spent the last two days in the Serb Republic, where they have held talks on renewing and improving economic cooperation. Mihajlo Milojevic, head of the Yugoslav delegation and chairman of the Economic Chamber of Yugoslavia, has stated that the businessmen from Yugoslavia and the Serb Republic have confirmed their readiness to renew and improve economic cooperation. Milojevic said that the businessmen have called for the free movement of goods produced in Yugoslavia and the Serb Republic. Here is what Dnevnik's correspondent recorded during this visit:

[Correspondent] The result of the businessmen's constructive and fruitful talks are several specific business agreements. The Rudi Cajevac of Banja Luka has agreed on long-term cooperation with Zastava of Kragujevac, the Niksic steelworks, and the Neobus of Novi Sad. Thanks to the complementary nature of their production programs, the electronic products of Rudi Cajevac will in the future be built in in the products of the Yugoslav manufacturers who have been mainly importing these products from Slovenia.

Jugodrvo and the Banja Luka furniture manufacturer Vrbas have agreed to export goods worth 1 million German marks to France, Germany, and Australia.

During the two-day talks between the FRY businessmen and the Serb Republic, the two sides have concluded that the primary task is the spring sowing in the Serb Republic. [passage omitted]

B-H: Judge Details Case Against Serb Army General

LD0903233496 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 9 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] No doubt that among the ones who are torching and destroying the areas near Sarajevo are the very same extremists who have been terrorizing the residents of Sarajevo during the past three and a half years. Ten aircraft bombs and barrels filled with explosives have been found in Ilijas—one more piece of proof for The Hague.

[Begin recording] [Izet Bazdarevic, Sarajevo Higher Court judge] Today the team [word indistinct] from Sarajevo carried out an inquest here, in the steelworks of Ilijas after we had been notified that a certain quantity of ammunition had been found. At this spot, as you can see here, we found aircraft bombs, 10 altogether, filled with 250 kg of trotyl [TNT]. These aircraft bombs are not precise enough to be aimed at military targets and their only use is civilian targets and creating a psychological atmosphere among the civilian population.

Together with the aircraft bombs which are, I must stress, of Russian manufacture, we have also found barrels, each mounted on two wheels, and filled with 200 kg trotyl. It is a proof that the agressor has been here, in Ilijas, adapting and manufacturing for a long time such arms, arms for the destruction of civilian targets and civilians in the city of Sarajevo and surrounding villages.

Having in mind the fact that General Djukic was the logistics assistant to the commander of the so-called Serb Army General Mladic it is evident that he is one of the participants both in the manufacturing of such bombs and in the acquisition from Russia of such bombs with the aim of destroying civilian population and civilian targets.

Consequently, General Djukic is one of the main instigators of the acquisition of such arms. [end recording]

B-H: Serb Major General Jovo Maric Dies

LD1103173896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1548 GMT 11 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 11 Mar (SRNA)—Major General Jovo Maric of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic Army (SRA) died this morning at the military hospital [in Belgrade] from injuries received in a serious traffic accident, the press office of the Serb Army headquarters announced.

General Maric was born in 1950, in Grahovo, and had graduated from the highest military schools, the announcement said. During his service in the former Yugoslav People's Army and the Bosnian Serb Army he had held numerous senior posts.

"During the past four-year war General Maric made an exeptional contribution to the liberation struggle of the Serb Republic and because of his patriotism and courage the Serb people are sincerely grateful to him," the announcement said.

On the occasion of General Maric's sudden death, Colonel General Ratko Mladic, the commander of the headquarters of the SRA, sent a telegram of condolences to his family.

B-H: Committee Issues War Casualty Figures

AU1003173496 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Mar 96 p 5

[Report by "O.D.": "During the Aggression 175,258 Persons Were Wounded"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina, 175,258 persons were wounded. Of these, 34,712 were children. This was stated by the Republican Committee for Health and Social Security of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The same source reports that 76,624 citizens were treated in hospitals for serious wounds. Of these, 18,483 were young people. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are 12,318 registered invalids of war, of which 1,893 are children.

Among those wounded, the greatest number has suffered fractures, 10,150, or 39 percent; 3,920, or 25 percent, have suffered peripheral nerve injuries; 3,500, or 14 percent, have had amputations; 2,180 persons have experienced traumatic injuries to the brain; 680 citizens have suffered spine injuries; and 5,020, or 20 percent, have experienced other types of injuries.

B-H: Witnesses Describe Visegrad 'Carnage'

MS1103130696 London THE GUARDIAN in English 11 Mar 96 p

[Report by Ed Vulliamy: "Bloody Trail Of Butchery At The Bridge"—punctuation as received]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo—The bridge that spans the River Drina's lusty current at Visegrad is a Bosnian emblem. Bridge on the Drina is the title of a great work of literature by the country's most celebrated author, Ivo Andric, a Nobel prize winner.

In Andric's book, the bridge is at once backdrop and silent witness to Bosnia's history.

It is a mighty and glorious structure spanning the river at a point where savage, precipitous rocks briefly part, giving way to a verdant valley. The water flowing through its elegant arches is a luminous blend of turquoise and jade.

The bridge was built, as the carved inscription proudly declares, in 1571 by order of the Ottoman Grand Vezir Mehmet Pasha, of robust pumice stone hewn by Rade the Mason. "Of all the things that life drives man to shape and build," wrote Andric, "none, I think, is as precious as bridges ... They serve no arcane or evil purpose."

Andric, who died in 1975, once complained that a house newly built in Visegrad obscured the view of the bridge from his home. The picture postcard above depicts Visegrad in peace time. Had the author lived into the 1990s, he might have been grateful for the obstruction. For in the hidden history of Bosnia's war, the Bridge on the Drina was bloodily defiled.

It was turned into a slaughterhouse—a place of serial public execution-by a man we now reveal as one of the most brutal mass killers of the war. Virtually unknown not indicted by the war crimes tribunal, this monster turned the Drina red with the blood of hundreds-maybe thousands-of Muslims murdered on the bridge, whose corpses the bold current swept downriver.

A few of the bodies were rescued from the waters by a teenager, whose quiet testimony begins the unveiling of butchery at the bridge.

Jasmin R's fresh face belies what he knows. Jasmin was evacuated to Dublin last Christmas from a prison camp in Serbia, to which he had fled from the crushed Muslim enclave of Zepa, to which he had fled from Visegrad in 1992.

During his three years at Zepa, Jasmin, aged 14 on arrival, was considered too young to fight. Instead, he was assigned to a Aamlet called Slap, a lonely junction between Drina and Zepa rivers. There his job was to haul bloated corpses out of the Drina's current as it flowed from Visegrad, bring them ashore in a small boat, often under Serbian fire and give them a proper burial.

"We dug the graves," he says calmly, "and buried 180 people. Some I knew personally, they had been my neighbours in Visegrad." The Bosnian government calculates that probably about one in 20 bodies were salvaged.

Jasmin's companion in this work was Mersud C, now based in a barracks for exiled Zepa soldiers up a front-line mountain in central Bosnia.

"The bodies came," says Mersud, "almost every day. Men and women, old and young. They had been beaten and tortured, they were black and blue, and some had been decapitated. Yes, and there were children. Mostly 10 or 12, and two infants of about 18 months."

Eighty-two corpses were identified. The graves were dug for one, three or five at a time, named or numbered, and ringed by a low fence.

Before the war, Mersud had spent summer evenings with friends on the bridge. "It was the place to meet before going for coffee. I read the Andric book, it was compulsary at school."

The Serbian slaughter of Muslims in eastern Bosnia at the war's inception was largely hidden from prying eyes.

Unknown to the outside world, on August 5 1994 a Serbian soldier from Visegrad called Milomir Obradovic, held prisoner in Muslim Gorazde, told his captors the story of one man: Milan Lukic. A UN policeman, Sergeant T. Cameron, took notes.

Obradovic told how Lukic paraded around Visegrad with a megaphone, shrieking: "Brother Serbs, it's time to finish off the Muslims" and how Lukic set about achieving this goal.

Lukic, he said, locked men, women and children in houses and incinerated them. He arrived at factories, took employees out and shot them—for a while he kept the wife of one such victim, Igbala Raferovic, as a captive sexual partner.

Lukic tied a man to his car with a tow-rope and dragged him round town until he was dead. One member of Lukic's gang, "The Wolf", raped one of the girls they kept prisoner for the purpose at the Vilina Vlas spa hotel so violently that when the rest demanded their turn the girl, Jasna Ahmedspahic, jumped out of a window to her death.

There were two massacres in May 1992, said Obradovic. At a village called Prelevo, Lukic took men off buses shipping Muslims out of Visegrad, lay them face down and shot them. "There is," confessed Obradovic, "a mass grave at Prelevo."

Another convoy of refugees was stopped by Lukic at Dragomilje, the men again taken and shot. Obradovic told of mass murder on Visegrad's bridge, adding that the killing was sanctioned by the Yugoslav army.

By a cruel twist, Obradovic's captors exchanged him apparently unaware of his value. The witness was lost. Obradovic has not been heard of since, and any investigator might wonder whether he met the same fate as another Serb official who objected to Lukic's mass murder, Stanko Petcikoza. Obradovic said Lukic murdered him.

But, following the trail of Lukic's bloodlust, the Guardian has reconstructed the case, and found other witnesses to the Visegrad carnage scattered across Bosnia and Europe. Their testimonies interweave like threads in a tapestry. There is no Muslim from Visegrad who does not know what Milan Lukic did on their bridge, and there are very few who do not mourn in his wake.

Mersud the gravedigger knew the man whose victims he pulled from the river; they had been neighbours. Lukic now about 30, was born in the village of Rujiste, said Mersud, and "seemed a good guy". Another neighbour called Omer, now in Sarajevo said that Lukic's family had been "fervent Chetniks in the second world war". Lukic moved to Serbia after leaving high school to keep a cafe in Obrenovac, near Belgrade, but returned as the clouds of war gathered in spring 1992.

Lukic assembled a gang of 15 braves, including his. brother Milos, cousin Sredoje, a chum from Belgrade called Deyan Jeftic and a waiter, Mitar Vasiljevic. Before long Lukic committed the first murder in Visegrad's war.

Mirsada K. was at home when she heard a shot next door. The little girl from the household came running to Mirsada's house, saying her mother Bakha Zukic was dead, shot in the back, an her father Dzemo taken. The man who had fired the shot was Milan Lukic: he had taken a fancy to Dzemo's new red Volkswagen Passat, and had made off with both man and car.

Dzemo Zukic was never seen again, but the car became omnipresent. From that day hence—as another witness, Fehima D., said: "If the red Passat arrived at your house you knew something terrible was about to happen to you." Thus Milan Lukic sparked an orgy of violence which emptied Visegrad of 14,500 Muslims.

The bridge was not the only killing field. Women have survived to bear witness to Lukic's house-burnings. Her hands and face deformed by fire, Zehra T. was the sole survivor of an inferno an Bakovica, above the bridge on June 27, in which 71 people were incinerated.

Esma K. was herded into a stadium and thence to a house with 60 others. The Passat arrived at 5pm. Within four hours, she said: "The sky was light because the house was in flames." Esma escaped a through a window.

A man called Hasan Ajano vic survived a cull of men in the house of a waiter called Meho. Meho had worked alongside Lukic's waiter henchman Vasiljevic at the Panos restaurant. Six men including Meho and his son Ekhem, were driven to the riverbank in a convoy led by Lukic and Vasiljevic, where they were lined up and shot. Hasan jumped into the water before he was hit, and was shielded by Meho's floating corpse.

But the bloodiest arena was the bridge itself. The structure is visible from almost every balcony and window in Visegrad, which climbs both sides of the valley. Its cobble-stones are a stage at the foot of an amphitheatre, the executions were intended to be as public as possible.

From her balcony, Fehida D. watched. She saw "Lukic, in his Passat, and the trucks behind, arriving on the bridge each evening". The gang would unload their human cargo, and the killing began. "We saw them by day or by the city lights, whether they were killing men that time, women or children. It took half an hour, sometimes more."

The Serbs usually stabbed people into various states between life and death before throwing them into the water below. "Sometimes they would throw people off alive," Fehida recalled, "shooting at the same time. Sometimes they would make them swim a bit, then shoot."

One witness Admir H., recalled Lukic enjoying music from the Passat's radio while throwing two men into the river. "I can't swim!" protested one of them, Samir, as Lukic fired into the water.

At the end of June a Visegrad police inspector, Milan Josipovic, received a macabre complaint from downriver, from the management of Bajina Basta hydroelectric plant across the Serbian border. The plant director said I could whoever was responsible please slow the flow of corpses down the Drina? They were clogging up the culverts in his dam at such a rate that he could not assemble sufficient staff to remove them. The dam is well downriver from Jasmin's and Mersud's Zepa graveyard—their 180 bodies were a small fraction of the total.

Hasena M. lived in a first floor flat, 150 yards from the riverbank in Visegrad. By July 15 she had spent 12 days wondering whether her husband Nusret was alive. He had been taken by a Serbian neighbour he had known well, Dragan Tomic, and disappeared.

Hasena set off for work at 6.30, across the bridge as usual, to find Lukic already busy at that unusual hour. "Two young men with their hands tied behind their backs" were being executed to the sound of his car radio.

At lunchtime, Lukic came by Hasena's factory to promise that the time had come to "finish off the Muslims" remaining in Visegrad. Hasena and her three Muslim workmates left early, electing to take another route home. Looking upriver at the old bridge, they saw 15 men lined up and killed. Terrified, Hasena hid at home for four days with her daughters Nusreta and Nermina, aged eight and six.

In the afternoon of July 19, the red Passat pulled up outside Hasena's flat, into which her elderly parents and sister had moved. Milan and Milos Lukic, armed with machine guns, kicked the door open. Hasena's children were playing outside. Their turn had come.

"Milan Lukic said that in the next 15 minutes he would kill us all," recalled Hasena. She was sent outside to fetch the little girls, but implored her Serbian neighbours to hide them; the neighbours refused. So Hasena and her girls slipped unheard past her own front door to an empty flat on the third floor.

From there Hasena heard Lukic ask: "Where's the third woman?" She heard her mother Ramiza call for her but waited. From a window she saw Lukic march her mother and sister Asima out into the Passat, and drive towards the bridge. Hasena followed, to a vantage point near a school.

Halfway across the river the bridge widens to form a lovely overhang above the current called the Sofa, a Turkish word. Here is a bench of fine flagstones where people can sit comfortably, leaning back against the parapet, which reclines. This was where Hasena used to chat with her friends. But not on July 19.

"I watched them put my mother and sister astride the parapet, like on a horse," Hasena said. "I could hear both women screaming, until they were shot in the stomach. They fell into the water; the men laughing as they watched. The water went red."

This was the beginning of Hasena's calvary. She hid overnight in an empty house with the children, returning home at dawn to seek out her invalid father, who was unable to walk.

"My father said: 'Go, Take the girls, run away. You obviously can't take me. I'll wait here until they come for me. Go.' I looked at him, and then at my girls. I made him some breakfast and he said: 'Come here, my daughter, so I can kiss you the last time.' He kissed me and the girls, and we left him sitting there, alone."

When the Serbs caught up with Hasena, they took her and the girls to a house full of other Muslim women, where they were held captive for two months. Many women from Visegrad say they "shared a house with other women" during that summer. That is all. Some details, if spoken, can destroy any attempt to rebuild life.

On September 13, Hasena was moved. And now her story adds another, fresh name to the grisly list of Serbian concentration camps in Bosnia: Uzamnica.

Hasena was kept in a crowded hangar of this disused barracks for three years, while her daughters lost their childhood. "I used to look at them in the morning, asleep, locked in while the sun was shining outside, and cry."

Uzamnica was a forced labour camp, so that when they were outside Hasena and her girls were working, even six-year-old Nermina. It was hard labour, dawn-to-dusk, planting tomatoes or feeding cattle. The only food the Serbs provided for their Muslim prisoners was forbidden pork.

Lukic was a regular visitor to Uzamnica. "He came every day, wild, saying 'I'll kill you filthy gypsies'"—beating and abusing prisoners at will.

The screams of pain, said Hasena, came mainly from the men's quarters. Each week, convoys of male prisoners would leave the camp, heading into Serbia, never to be seen again. Last October Hasena and her girls were exchanged, and made it to Sarajevo.

Visegrad is now a baleful watchful town. It is awful to look down at the vigorous current gliding beneath the Sofa and its parapet, and to wonder that this was the last thing those terrified, mutilated people saw as they plunged.

But Visegrad is still home to the Ivo Andric library, the finest collection of his books in the world. The librarian, Stojka Mijatovic, offered us a volume, a gift. "We have taken so many books from Muslim houses we hardly know what to do with them," she said.

Mrs Mijatovic had once presented this very edition of Andric to. the library's most regular and best-loved client. Now she had it back, looted from the dead man's house.

"Would you like me to cross out this Muslim name?" she offered. "No thank you." The dedication from the library was to Emir Ajanovic, a relative of the witness to the murder of Osman's father and brother.

Would you ever want to see the bridge again? Osman and Fehida shuddered. "Never."

And Hasena? She shivered. "Never. Not if I lived a thousand . years. I wish I could drive that bridge from my mind, but I see it as though I were there now. That bridge will drive me mad."

Looking for Milan Lukic is a dangerous pastime. The bush telegraph informs us that he is now back in Obrenovac, Serbia, and a wealthy man.

It is a drab, faceless town and the glass-fronted Viski Bar he is said to have managed is a comfortless place, scantily patronised and blaring out Montenegrin folk music. An inquiry as to Mr Lukic's whereabouts is met with a stony glare charged with menace, and not sensibly challenged.

But there was one, ominous, recent sighting. A Muslim soldier from Zepa, present at the fall of the enclave in 1995, said he saw Lukic with the Serbian army patrolling the columns of Muslim fighters as they lined up to surrender. He was looking for anyone he recognised, and shouting: "Anyone from Visegrad step out of the line! Anyone from Visegrad!" Even then, it seemed, Lukic's work at the Bridge on the Drina was unfinished.

B-H: 'No New Guidelines' on War Criminals

AU0803183396 Paris AFP in English 1727 GMT 8 Mar 96

[Report by Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 8 (AFP)—NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia have no new orders to track war criminals, only the authority to assist civilian agencies on a "case by case" basis, Sergio Balanzino, deputy Secretary General of the alliance, said Friday [8 March].

"There are no new guidelines or mandate given by the North Atlantic Council (NAC)," Balanzino, told reporters in the Bosnian capital referring to the alliance's political body.

He was speaking after a high level meeting between top NATO decision-makers and senior generals who flew into Sarajevo Friday to be briefed by commanders of NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) on progress in implementing Bosnia's peace plan.

"IFOR commanders have been given the authority to judge on a case by case basis to examine how to assist (Bosnia's) High Representative (Carl Bildt) and other international organisations within the limits of their mandate and within the ability they have been given," Balanzino said.

Bildt, who is responsible for the civilian aspects of Bosnia's peace plan was also present at Friday's meeting.

He recently put in a string of requests to IFOR for technical assistance in helping him in his task which nearly three months into the peace process is taking on more significance.

Balanzino's comments follow speculation that NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia were about to recieve fresh orders to beef up their involvement in the civilian side of the Dayton peace accord.

In particular, there was speculation that IFOR troops would take a more active role in the work of the war crimes tribunal which is to begin investigating war crimes sites in the spring.

Since deploying in December, the 60,000-strong force has focused its energies on separating Bosnia's former warring factions. But now with that task almost complete, pressure is mounting for NATO's biggest ever operation to take on additional duties.

However, NATO commanders were at pains to stress there was no change in the peacekeepers mandate only a clarification of their orders.

General George Joulwan, commander of NATO forces in Europe, said IFOR had "good guidance" on working with the International (war crimes) Tribunal. "That has been the mission, it is the mission and it will continue to be the mission," he said.

IFOR officials said Friday that "international public opinion" had been behind the attemts to review the role the force should play in the coming months leading to the end of its one year tenure in the Balkan republic.

Britain's Permanent Representative to the NAC, Sir John Goulden, said that the alliance had been on a "learning curve" with the mission. "We have had to come face to face with real questions such as can we help with the war graves business," he said.

It is thought there are dozens of "mass graves" in Bosnia where it is suspected that victims of war crimes are buried. Goulden said IFOR troops would not guard the sites but would use surveilance techniques to avoid tampering with the evidence.

"Once the world outside knows that we are watching everything that moves and we are photographing everything very regularly and our patrols are going round keeping an eye on things people will be seriously deterred from tampering," Goulden said.

Earlier, an IFOR spokesman, Major Simon Haselock, said, that the North Atlantic Council, had "issued refined guidance" that "acknowledges the civil as well as military tasks".

The question of the NATO mandate is sensitive politically, particularly in the United States, which does not wish to see its troops become embroiled in Bosnia.

B-H: U.S. 'Fear' of Bosnian 'Terrorists' Noted

AU1103094396 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 6-13 Mar 96 p 8

[Article by Alosman Husejnovic: "What If the 'Bosnian Terrorists' Respond?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Pentagon's information, dated 22 February 1996 and issued by its first man, U.S. Defense Secretary Willian Perry, that "there certainly exist four further locations for the training of Bosnian terrorists," (!?) could—apart from being an announcement that political pressure from the U.S. Administration on the Bosnian Government will be stepped up during the noticeable crisis in the Dayton agreement's implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina—account for the development of tensions between IFOR [Implementation Force] and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This could result in new assaults and a search of Bosnian Army bases, similar to the recent rude demonstration of power that IFOR performed in the action at the Divokoza facility near Fojnica.

There is no doubt that the base of the 9th Muslim Liberation Brigade near Tuzla is the most "dangerous" on the Pentagon's list. It has been controlled by the helicopters of the U.S. "Orao" Operative Group, which is stationed at the Dubrave airport near Tuzla. The barracks at this Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina base, which offers good possibilities for the training of Bosnian soldiers, are foreseen for the accommodation of some of the 2d Army units after the D+90 period. The soldiers of the 9th Muslim Brigade, which was established according to the model of the 7th, have been accommodated there for a relatively long period of time now.

Although the unit consists exclusively of Muslim youngsters, who tranferred to the unit voluntarily from other 2d Corps units because they embraced the Islamic code of life offered in the brigade, its only "sin"—an outward resemblance with the mujahid [as transliterated] from Islamic countries—produced in the U.S. base near Tuzla the fear two month ago that they might be "Bosnian terrorists." They have expressed these doubts through continuous supervision of both the training and the movements of the Mujahid from the 9th.

Although a group of U.S. officers were able recently to convince themselves (as they visited the base) that the members of the unit were not foreigners, which they had heard from 2d Corps Army Commander Senaid Hadzic before, the mistrust and pressure have not yet ended. A single appearance of the unit in the field with full war equipment, in a long march northwest of Tuzla, was an attraction for several U.S. "Apaches," which continuously followed their movement for an entire day. Before that observation, their uniforms, which were being dried within the base, had been messed up because of low flights performed above the base.

The 2d Corps officers learned about the irrational fear that the U.S. troops have from Iran. Already during the first talks with U.S. generals, Bosnian officers were told: "You must know that Iran is our worst enemy," a warning similar to that received several times by President Izetbegovic because of the Bosnian-Iranian connections for the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Perry's message about "four Bosnian bases for the training of terrorists" could be understood as a sharp critique of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina General Staff for not having yet dismissed the units that look like mujahidin. At the same time there is criticism of the announcements that some of these famous Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina units—the 7th, 4th, and 9th—will form the core of the future professional contingent of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Command of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Tuzla has also discussed the possibility of an extreme unfolding of events. The 2d Corps has, to LJILJAN's knowledge, ordered the 9th Muslim Brigade Command to restrain from any response to possible new IFOR provocations, or to the possible—though not very probable—repetition of an assault. "They cannot find things there in which they are interested, or which they want to find," it is said in the 2d Corps.

Apart from raising tensions around the Bosnian barracks in Tuzla, there have also been speculations about a special U.S. military and political mission to be established in the Tuzla region, connected to the recent visit of the mayor of Tuzla, Salim Beslagic, to the White House. The secular model of life presently offered by the Tuzla authorities is preferred to the "dangerous" political attitude of Izetbegovic's Party of Democratic Action, etc. No one even thinks of what could happen if the "Bosnian terrorists" really responded!

B-H: U.S. Attitude Toward Iran's Presence Viewed

AU1103165596 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 5 Mar 96 p 3

[Commentary by Fadil Mandal: "Dollars Yes, Influence No"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The news is no longer an assumption, of both the media and the Bosnian and foreign officials, that the disproportion in the implementation of the military and civilian part of the Dayton accords is causing concern.

The promised economic aid for reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina's devastated economy is arriving slowly or not at all. True, the EU has already approved certain means, with the United States still being a step behind the EU, while both of them together are hoping that a part of the commitments they have taken on will be realized through rich Islamic countries, particularly those in the Gulf region.

Concrete Aid

In the context of such intentions of the international factors involved in the implementation of the peace agreement for Bosnia, the official visit of the republican prime minister, Hasan Muratovic, to Iran has also political dimensions, beside economic ones. Particularly if knowing that at the same time in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates a U.S. delegation is on a visit, looking in these countries for the same thing that the Bosnian prime minister looked for in Iran—concrete financial aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The United States is obviously trying to limit and isolate the Iranian presence in Bosnia. They have not concealed that intention at any moment. In the first phase the problem of the so-called mujahidin and their departure from this region was being stressed, but the background and final intentions are not in that.

In the project called the Dayton accords the Americans, rightfully deeming themselves architects of it, do not want in any case the involvement of any country they do not consider extremely friendly—either in military, or political, or, possibly, economic terms.

The Bosnian authorities are familiar with such attitudes of Uncle Sam. Superficial analyses made by the West will most probably assess Muratovic's visit to Tehran as a dangerous political challenge to the U.S. patronage over the government in Sarajevo.

Can any official visit to a friendly country be assessed in such a way? Or, perhaps in this case it is more about a demonstration of autonomous sovereignty of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its legal authorities in making decisions on what its economic priorities are in the first place, and only then the political ones, in bilateral relations with both countries.

Economic Obligations

The country such as Bosnia simply cannot disregard its Islamic dimension, particularly if interests in that field coincide with readiness (in this case Iran's) to financially support and implement good intentions. Of course, Bosnia-Herzegovina welcomes aid from other Islamic countries as well, which has so far been extended by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Malaysia and many other countries.

The West is certainly aware of these realities. Moreover, it would be very happy if its economic obligations toward Bosnia were squared by Islamic money. The problem arises with selection of possible financeers. With a little political wisdom and pragmatism on both sides, this problem is also not unsolvable.

Bosnia wants to have as its friends both Iran and America. It is not easy to accomplish this in a harmonious manner. Mutual concessions and understanding are a must. To begin with, it is enough to understand the needs for development of steady economic and political relations and sovereignty in pursuing foreign politics as a right of any country that aspires to be taken seriously in international relations.

It seems that the United States, speaking of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has something to learn about these principles precisely from Iran.

Croatia: Simonovic Hails FRY FM's Visit to Zagreb

LD1303104796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0952 GMT 13 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, March 12 (TANJUG)—First Assistant to the Foreign Minister of Croatia Ivan Simonovic assessed on Tuesday that the Yugoslav foreign minister's visit to Zagreb was a big step towards the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Zagreb.

The oil pipeline between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) will be opened on March 28 and rail and road traffic started in the latter part of April, Simonovic told Croatian Television in an interview.

On Monday, the foreign ministers of the F.R.Y. and Croatia, Milan Milutinovic and Mate Granic, signed a package of documents which regulate the transport and PTT links and consular questions.

Simonovic said that these documents were signed in the form of the minutes from the talks because Yugoslavia and Croatia, before they recognize each other, cannot conclude inter-state agreements. He added that despite this fact, the accords were binding for both sides.

Simonovic said that the 'establishment of rail, air and road traffic will enable us to be a significant communication between Western Europe and the Middle and Far East.'

Traffic on the Belgrade-Zagreb motor road through the area of Eastern Slavoni (the Srem-Baranja region), under control of the international force, would be safeguarded through accord with the transitional administrator American General Jacques Klein.

As for expanding the scope of work of the F.R.Y. office in Zagreb and the Croatian office in Belgrade to cover also consular questions, Simonovic emphasized that these offices would be issuing travel documents, passports and visas, but not citizenship certificates.

Yugoslav and Croatian citizens had hitherto regulated consular questions at diplomatic missions in third countries.

Croatia: Granic's 'Discontent' After Talks Assessed

AU1203213996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 12 Mar 96

[Report by Nada al Issa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday's talks between Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Milutinovic and Croatian Prime Minister Mate Granic lasted a whole day instead of a few hours, and nobody was satisfied at the end. Namely, official expectations in Zagreb were for Milutinovic's one-day visit to be the last step towards the complete normalization of relations and that the only thing to do then will be to put formal signature, establish diplomatic relations, and everything is solved. However, at the Zagreb talks problems of political nature were only pointed to again, recognition was left for some close or more distant future, and the Republic of Croatia had to be satisfied with the normalization of transport with Belgrade alone.

What was evident at the end was Minister Granic's discontent as he did not even sign the transport agreements with Milutinovic but only the so-called protocols [zapisnik].

It seems that the problem of Prevlaka was what complicated the Serbian-Croatian talks. This is confirmed by something that happened in the meantime. Namely, a Belgrade journalist brought from Belgrade a completed final announcement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which should have been read by the Yugoslav delegation after the end of the talks, saying what had been agreed upon.

However, the official Belgrade announcement got into the hands of other journalists. At that point, Minister Milutinovic's spokeswoman asked the journalists in panic to give the announcement back to her because, as she said, what was written in it is not meant for the public. Well, it was exactly this, which was not meant for the public, that was very interesting and probably significant as well. It was certainly the reason for, conditionally speaking, the quarrel between the two ministers.

The agreement, that is the controversial announcement, asserts that the status of Prevlaka will be solved according to principles agreed earlier. As is known, according to Belgrade's version, earlier principles mean that Tudjman and Milosevic agreed upon the exchange of Prevlaka, at which Tudjman would get a part of the Dubrovnik hinterland in exchange, albeit on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As is known, President Tudjman himself hinted at such a possibility after returning from Dayton. However, owing to the great public uproar that broke out, Tudjman's aides denied this later, saying that the president did not mean what he had said.

According to yesterday's events, one can conclude that something has nevertheless been agreed upon concerning Prevlaka, but that this should still not be revealed to the Croatian public.

However, there is one more thing in the controversial announcements which should worry Bosnia-

Herzegovina. Namely, it is claimed that the two ministers also talked about the access to the sea for the so-called Serb Republic. If the Republic of Croatia agreed to talk in such a way about the so-called Serb Republic, and to call it so, then it means that it recognizes that Serb Republic both de jure and de facto, as a state within a state. This means that the division of Bosnia is still being advocated.

As is known, all Croat-Serb agreements have so far been to the detriment of Bosnia, particularly of its completeness. Was something of the kind, God forbid, repeated in Zagreb yesterday? Only one thing is certain—the moment improvement in relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is as much as hinted, links between Zagreb and Bosnia begin to break. Here is an example. The moment the Belgrade minister arrived in Zagreb, links between Zagreb and Sarajevo broke down. If only this were the only thing to break down between Zagreb and Sarajevo.

Croatia: Zagreb-Belgrade Air, Road Traffic To Resume

AU1303132096 Paris AFP in English 1237 GMT 13 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, March 14 (AFP)—Air and road traffic between Zagreb and Belgrade will resume on April 11, nearly five years after being cut when Croatia declared independence from former Yugoslavia, the Croatian press said Wednesday.

Agreements to re-open the road and air links between the Croatian and Serbian capitals were signed Monday at a meeting between Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic and the foreign minister of rump Yugoslavia Milan Milutinovic.

The dates for the resumption of links were not then given.

The three agreements signed Monday, covering road and air links and economic issues "should be ratified by the Yugoslav authorities within eight days of the signing of the accords," the NOVI LIST daily said Wednesday.

An oil pipeline crossing Serb-held territory between Croatia and and Serbia should reopen on March 28, the paper said.

Speaking in Zagreb Monday, Milutinovic called the signing of the agreements a "great step toward normalising relations," shattered in 1991 when Zagreb declared its independence from Belgrade and Serbia gave its backing to a bloody Serb rebellion.

The full normalisation of relations is not complete and has been blocked by questions of recognition, use of a peninsula in southern Croatia and other bilateral issues.

Croatia: Tudjman Receives U.S. Delegation

LD1203160096 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We begin with a statement from the president's office:

The president of the Republic today received John Kornblum, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, who was accompanied by Peter Galbraith, the U.S. ambassador to Croatia; John Shattuck, assistant secretary of state for democracy and human rights; (Rudolph Perina), deputy assistant secretary of state; William Montgomery, deputy state secretary and special advisor on implementation of the agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina; Thomas Longstreth, the U.S. secretary of state envoy; Robert Owen, mediator in charge of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation affairs; Colonel (?Lewed), member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces; (Henry Kelley), director of the Balkan Action Team group; and Mr. [as received] (Finney), member of the National Security Council.

At the start of the talks, the president of the Republic congratulated John Kornblum on his appointment and wished him and his aides success for the sake of peace in this part of Europe and the deepening of friendly and partnership relations between the United States and the Republic of Croatia. On this occasion, President Tudjman said that John Kornblum and his aides can count on full support and cooperation by the Croatian authorities in implementing the peace agreements in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

During the meeting the delegations discussed all topical issues of relevance for the peace process. The president of the Republic stressed the great importance that Croatia attaches to the speedy and peaceful reintegration of the occupied areas of the Croatian Danubian region. This would have a positive effect on the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina and especially on the efforts to breathe life into the Croat-Bosniak Federation.

President Tudjman went on to express his firm belief that the peace process can be completed within the existing deadlines, but that understanding and solid support by the international community and the United States, in particular, is needed to achieve it.

Reference was also made to the missing and detained persons, to the return of the refugees to their homes, and cooperation with the international war tribunal in The Hague. In this context, the president said that the tribunal can count on Croatian authorities' full cooperation, but that it is necessary to secure the tribunal's total objectivity.

In addition to the president of the Republic, the talks were also attended by Dr. Ivo Sanader, head of the president's office; Dr. Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs; Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Ivica Kostovic; General Zvonimir Cervenko, the Croatian army's Chief of General Staff; the president's foreign policy adviser, Dr. Zeljko Matic; General Kresimir Kaspar, the president's aides-de-camp; and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Hido Biscevic.

Croatia: Tudjman Receives Belgium's Derycke

LD1203211196 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We have just received a statement from the President's Office saying that the Croatian President Franjo Tudjman received today Erik Derycke, foreign minister of the Kingdom of Belgium. [passage omitted]

At the beginning of talks the president of the republic thanked the Belgian minister for the positive role and the active contribution of the Belgian forces within the UN Confidence Restoration Operation [UNCRO] or the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia [UNTAES].

President Tudjman also informed Minister Derycke about the Croatian state authorities' position on central issues of the peace process in Croatia and in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Stressing the importance of peaceful reintegration of the occupied territories of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem as soon as possible, the president expressed his conviction that the implementation of the Basic agreement will contribute not only to normalizing overall Croat-Serb relations but also to successfully solving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In spite of all the difficulties, implementation of the Washington and Dayton peace agreements, the Croat-Bosniak Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, is our choice not only because it is in the interest of the Croat and the Bosniak people but also because it is a guarantee for the establishment of a new stable international order, the president of the republic said.

Minister Derycke said that Belgium also wants a speedy peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Podunavlje in order to avoid possible difficulties and to conclude the UNTAES mission by the end of 1996. During the meeting, the entry of Croatia into the world and European mainstream was discussed, something in which Croatia will have Belgium's support.

In connection with bilateral relations, it was said that they are on the rise and that within several months Belgian companies will start active cooperation with Croatian partners. [passage omitted]

Croatia: FM Granic Meets Belgian Counterpart

LD1203203196 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of the Republic of Croatia, met Erik Derycke, foreign minister of the Kingdom of Belgium, who is on a two-day official visit to our country.

After the talks the two ministers signed an interstate agreement on air traffic and made statements to the press. Vera Tomasek reports.

[Tomasek] We had very substantial talks, Minister Granic informed the press. We talked on strengthening of bilateral relations between Croatia and Belgium and we paid great attention to the situation in our region and the reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem.

[Begin Granic recording] I informed my colleague, Minister Derycke, on the situation in the eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem, especially after yesterday's talks with Minister Milutinovic and on results of yesterday's talks on the process of peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem.

We expect this process to be peaceful... [pauses] that there will be voluntary demilitarization and that this process will be concluded on time. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Croatia: Tudjman Reshuffles Top Military Officers

LD1303131296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 13 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On the basis of Paragraph 100, Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and Paragraphs 131 and 159, Article 1 of the Law on Service in the Croatian Army, and as part of the transition to the peacetime organization of armed forces, the president of the Republic and supreme commander of the Croatian Army, Dr Franjo Tudjman, adopted the following decisions on 12 March:

1. Admiral Sveto Letica was promoted to the rank of Staff Admiral. Major-Generals Kresimir Cosic, Pavao Miljevac and Miljenko Crnjac were promoted to the

rank of Colonel General. Rear Admiral Vid Stipetic was promoted to Vice Admiral.

2. Colonel General Kresimir Cosic was appointed Deputy Defense Minister of the Republic of Croatia. Colonel General Pavao Miljevac was appointed Deputy Chief of the Croatian Army's Main Staff. Colonel General Ante Gotovina was appointed Chief Inspector of the Croatian Army. Colonel General Miljenko Crnjac was appointed Head of the Military Department in the Office of the President of the Republic. Colonel General Josip Lucic was appointed Commander of the Croatian Military Academy. Vice Admiral Davorin Kajic was appointed Assistant Chief of the Croatian Army's Main Staff for the Croatian Navy. Colonel General Imre Agotic was appointed Assistant Chief of the Croatian Army's Main Staff for the Croatian Air Force and Air Defence. Vice Admiral Vid Stipetic was appointed Commander of the Croatian Navy from 1st June 1996. Major General Josip Cujetic was appointed Commander of the Croatian Air Force and Air Defence.

3. Staff Admiral Sveto Letica was released from his duty as Croatian Navy Commander and retired from 1 June 1996. Corps General Anton Tus was released from his duty as Head of the Office for International Military cooperation and retired. Admiral Bozidar Grubisic was released from his duty as the Croatian Army's Deputy Chief Inspector and retired. Major General Luka Djanko was released from his duty as Bjelovar Corps District Commander and retired. Major General Vinko Vrbanjac was released from his duty as Chief of the Operational Command of the Croatian Army's Main Staff and retired.

4. Colonel General Djuro Decak was appointed Commander of Djakovo Corps District. Major General Mirko Noras was appointed Commander of the Knin Corps District. Major General Damir Krsticevic was appointed Commander of the Pazin Corps District. Major General Milivoje Petkovic was appointed Commander of the Ston Corps Distric. Major General Ivan Korade was appointed Commander of the Varazdin Corps District. All decisions take effect immediately.

Croatia: Policemen Turned Back in Sarajevo Suburb

LD1203193896 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo municipality of Ilidza became part of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina today. Although it had been agreed that nine policemen from Kiseljak police force would be part of the federal police in order to satisfy the principle of national representation and that they would take equal part in the takeover of Ilidza, they were nevertheless turned back today. The reason were their blue uniforms—Bosniak federal policemen wear green uniforms.

Bosniak police, led by Minister of Interior Avdo Hebib, entered Ilidza from the direction of Sarajevo with almost an hour's delay. This is another proof that federal police consisting of representatives of one nation only are taking over Sarajevo suburbs until recently under Serb control, which is contrary to the federal law on interior affairs and which is certainly slowing down proper functioning of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Begin Jozo Leutar, deputy minister of interior in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina recording] As far as turning Croat policemen back from Ilidza is concerned, this only shows... [pauses] The Bosniak-Muslim side gave a clear sign to the world of what it wanted; it showed that it was actually violating the law on internal affairs. It had violated all agreements concerning Vogosca, and Ilidza in particular, and this was mentioned in the statements of Mr Steiner and chief of the police for Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

Croatia: SK Refugee Union Head Condemns Croatian Laws

AU1203141296 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 8 Mar 96

[Interview with Milan Vucetic, president of the Union of Serb Refugees in Baranja, by Aleksandra Jaksic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Jaksic] Judging from its official statements and its conduct on the ground, Croatia is emerging as an unreliable and insincere partner when it comes to solving such an important and sensitive problem as the return of refugees. Of course, what is meant by that is the return of Serb refugees to Croatia, while Croatia exerts a lot pressure to promote the return of Croats to Baranja, western Srijem, and eastern Slavonia. At yesterday's meeting for the coordination of the peaceful reintegration of those areas, Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Kostovic made it clear that the Serbs have a right to return, but that the right must not be linked to the return of the Croats to Baranja, western Srijem, and eastern Slavonia, on which the international community insists through transition administrator General Klein. Under the circumstances, it is hard to imagine that Croatian refugees will be able to return to their homes in Baranja, western Srijem, and eastern Slavonia without problems, without giving the same right to Serb refugees, which Administrator Klein noticed right away. Serb refugees from the Republic of

Croatia and western parts of Krajina formed a union that has been active in Baranja for some time now.

[Vucetic] Our union on the territory of Baranja—I can only speak about this area—has been active for the past two and a half years. I must admit that our activities were recently at a standstill for a while, not without good reason altogether, but also due to some of our weaknesses. In the past couple of months, especially in the wake of the Erdut Agreement, our activities have intensified. Our primary objective is, in the implementation of those agreements, and following an analysis of the signed peace agreements—and we welcome peace and believe Serb refugees and displaced persons and other refugees, regardless of their nationality, want peace more than anyone else—to talk to our people on the ground, and simply find out what our people think about the implementation, what they want to achieve. In a word, we are gathering information from our people on the ground for our actions in the period that follows, to see what we are able to do to spare the long-suffering people first of all from further suffering, further torture and harassment, and to give them some prospects for a normal life in the next period.

[Jaksic] As president of the Union of Serb Refugees, where do you stand on the peace agreements signed in Erdut, Dayton, and Paris?

[Vucetic] Our municipal committee analyzed those agreements, made objections, and accepted them. We really do accept them. However, we believe that in mapping out those agreements, in their concretization, we must always bear in mind that those agreements—regardless of the fact that they are not very beneficial to us—pave the way for solving problems of refugees and displaced persons in general. This is the first time that a high-level agreement—like the Dayton accord, which was preceded by the Erdut Agreement, UN Security Council resolutions, and Butrus-Ghali's report—treat Serb and Croatian refugees the same. This sets the scene for us to solve our status in this period, and we must solve that problem. The implementation of those agreements as regards the equal treatment of both sides—and one must bear in mind that we are just a part of an enormous number of Serb refugees. [sentence as heard] Refugees accommodated in Baranja are just a fraction of more than half a million refugees from the former Socialist Republic of Croatia.

Trying to solve the problems of refugees and displaced persons, one must take into account the fact that there are ten times more of us than Croatian refugees from this area. In mapping out those documents and in future contacts with international representatives, especially with the international administration that will be established in the region in the transition period, we do not believe the period is the time for peaceful reintegration into Croatia, but a transition period leading to the final solution of our status. [sentence as heard] In that period we must achieve certain results that will satisfy that enormous number of refugees, and they can be satisfied only if they return home.

Some interpretations suggest—and we here are not uninformed, as we have our media, and follow the Croatian media as well—the return of 10 Croats in exchange for the return of 10 Serbs. That is out of the question. There are 10 times more of us! One cannot talk about some kind of pilot program that actually stands for the return of the Croats, without saying that we accept the pilot program. But in this situation—we have the information, and we know what we want, and that is why we do research in the field, talk to our people—out of about 28,000 Zadar inhabitants who were exiled from Zadar, 24,000 want to return. If the Croats want to return to Bilje, those 24,000 Serbs must return to Zadar. That would be a righteous pilot program. Not to mention other towns that had an almost 100 percent Serb population, like Knin, and the Knin Krajina, Korenica, Donja Lika [lower Lika], Kordun, Banija, western Slavonia. Serbs had absolute majorities in a number of places. In mapping out the Dayton accord and the Erdut Agreement, nobody has a right not to consider the masses of Serbs that were forced to leave their homes.

[Jaksic] Could you comment on the host of new laws passed by the Croatian Parliament and designed to prevent the return of Serbs to their homes?

[Vucetic] I was born in Croatia and lived there all my life. I survived World War II, lost 17 members of my family in that war, and I stayed in Croatia, which means that I put all the bad things behind me. The hatred the Croatians feel toward the Serbs scares me. That hatred will sooner or later recoil on the Croatian people. Although we suffered so much—twice in the past 50 years—in visiting our people I do not encounter such hatred in them. I believe that our nation has a completely different quality. A nation that has suffered so much in two wars does not feel such hatred. Those who were destroying us in the two wars instilled such hatred, even among the young, and that is bound to have dire repercussions. The laws they pass are all practically aimed against the Serbs. They discriminate against the Serbs. They are passing them to prevent us from returning, but we will come back. Perhaps all of half a million people will not come back, but 400,000 will. We will not allow any Croatian laws to select who will come back. We will not allow Croatia to accept only the old who will die soon. There is no return without the young, because only they can keep the nation alive. In order for us to return to our homes and for the Croats to return to theirs—for they, too, have a right to return—Croatia will have to abolish all their discriminating laws. They cannot live, we cannot live under such laws, nor can we enjoy our rights. The world must realize that we have the same rights as the Croats, that we are just a part of one nation, a European nation, and that we have a right to enjoy in Croatia all the rights enjoyed by the citizens of Europe. Those requirements must be met before we return. Until we can go back, and are given the guarantees of the international community for our safety and equal treatment, full safety and absolute equality on the territory of Croatia, it is clear that the Croats will not be able to return to this area.

[Jaksic] Thank you, Mr. Vucetic.

Croatia: Details of Charges Against Alleged Spy

LD1203220396 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zenit, an action carried out by the Croatian intelligence services, in which a Serb intelligence service network was discovered in the wake of the Oluja [Storm] action, has again come into the focus of our media. Those charged with espionage have been sent to the dock in the military court in Zagreb.

[Correspondent Silvana Mendjusic] According to the charges, Nikola Ivancevic in February 1994 joined the 101st intelligence center under the code name of Kobac [hawk]. He is a former employee of the Croatian Assembly support services, the fourth defendant in a trial of 18 people who were charged with setting up an intelligence service in Croatia for a foreign state organization. The spy network was discovered in the Zenit action of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The eighteen defenders are being defended by 23 lawyers. The council of judges of the Zagreb military court is presided over by Ratko Scekic. Three defendants are on the run. Nikola Ivancevic, according to the charges, sent reports to Innsbruck and Serbia which he obtained while working as the assembly employee. Ivancevic decided to defend himself by silence.

Court proceedings are continuing tomorrow with the defense of Mile Cika, a former member of the special units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

FYROM: Frckovski on Relations With Neighbors

AU1303094896 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1430 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [Studio announcer] Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckovski has said that the process of mutual recognition with neighboring Yugoslavia is under way and that some issues are being discussed, such as the issue of succession.

[Frckovski] The agreement with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on mutual recognition and continuation of the state fulfills our requests in full. The only outstanding point is the formulation of the question of succession, that is, whether it will represent part of the agreement, or will be regulated separately.

[Studio announcer] Minister Frckovski also reviewed relations with Albania and emphasized that the announced visit of Albanian Prime Minister Mecsi will take place soon. As for cooperation with Bulgaria in trade and communications, he said that it is positive, but the problem is the change in Sofia's position regarding the language.

Regarding relations with Greece, Minister Frckovski said that they are developing in the spirit of a positive bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and he expressed the wish to meet his Greek counterpart, Pangalos, with the aim of having open and direct talks on all questions.

FYROM: Cokrevski Receives UNPREDEP Head

AU1203213696 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1430 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Interior Minister Tomislav Cokrevski today received Henryk Sokalsky, head of the UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment] mission in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. Sokalsky acquainted Cokrevski with the joint efforts by the United Nations and [Macedonian] ministries and experts to prevent crime and drug abuse in Macedonia.

The current political situation was also discussed, and Minister Cokrevski assessed it as quite stable in spite of some political structures trying to depict it as unstable in the mass media. Cokrevski also emphasized that the recent events in our country and the breakup of the government coalition are normal processes in parliamentary democracies.

FYROM: Albanian Teachers Day Ceremony in Tetovo

AU1203153296 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 12 Mar 96 p 3

[Commentary by S. Colakovski: "'Educational' Provocation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As matters now stand, the state holiday calendar has added another date for celebration—7 March, "Day of the Educational Workers of Albania!" To make things clear, this is the Republic of Albania, the country right across the border. Is it possible, then, that the holiday of another state can be so pompously celebrated here, when it is known that the educational workers in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] have their own holiday? Particularly if this is taking place in Tetovo, a municipality in which parastate activities are no longer experienced as a surprise! In relation to this ethnically disrupted region, in a part of Macedonia that we usually refer to as Western, as a rule the state continues to act inertly, thereby making room for the escalation of the situation in general. The possible consequences, if matters get out of state control, can be supposed with great probability. Undoubtedly some people are aiming at precisely the consequences!

The celebration of the "Day of the Educational Workers of Albania"—and those who celebrate it say that the tendency is to make it traditional (that is to say, it will be celebrated every year)—passed with a large number of festivities, all under the patronage of the local Tetovo assembly, which gave the "fiesta" an official character. A meeting of the first teachers in Albanian language in Tetovo was held, and a scientific round table was organized with guests from a number of towns from Albania, and of course Pristina, with the purpose of giving it all the character of a formal academy. Everything would not have been so formal and pompous had the self-proclaimed president Fadil Sulejmani not spoken about the "achievements of the [phantom] university in Mala Recica!" The festivities were even ornamented by the presence of educational workers and representatives from the educational institutions of this town.

Parliamentary representatives Dzeladin Murati from the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] and Rufi Osmani from the PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians] did their best to make this educational provocation more dignified by giving it a political connotation. This was probably the first "consensus" between the two parties, considering that the mutually unconcealed animosity dates back to the formation of the latter [PDPA] as a political subject. (If there is a logical explanation for Osmani's presence because of the known views of the parliamentary opposition PDPA about the "university," the "federalization," and so on, how can the presence of Murati, a man from the top leadership of the PDP, a party which is a coalition partner in the government, be explained?). Thus at last week's parliamentary session, both members of parliament used the floor to give a reminder that "it has been 109 years since the formation of the first primary school in the Albanian language," and congratulated all teacher-Albanians on their holiday!? Since when has one of the most noble professions, of universal character, a teacher, been divided into teacher-Albanian, teacher-Macedonian, or teacher-Eskimo, teacher-Latin? As if the teachers that Murati mentioned were teaching in Albania and not in Macedonia!

The parties of the Albanians in Macedonia constantly reiterate that the human, educational, and all other rights of the Albanian ethnic group in our state are not fulfilled, and that the minimum quantity that is required for coexistence and interethnic tolerance is not satisfied.... Throughout this period, parallel activities to the state are being held outside the institutions of the system, like the "referendum for Ilirida [name that the Albanian radicals are using for a part of Macedonia that they wish to be annexed to Albania]," the case or the scandal about the "paramilitary army," the "university in the Albanian language in Tetovo," and so on.... This mode, which leads to coexistence and interethnic tolerance, with a glance cast toward our country's western border, is exactly the point at which mutual confidence is put under suspicion. Mutual mistrust, you will agree, does not create an atmosphere in which the problems can be discussed, let alone resolved.

Poland: Suspected Spy for 'Western' Country Arrested

LD1303115296 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1830 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the EXPRESS WIECZORNY newspaper, the State Protection Office [UOP] has apprehended a man suspected of spying for a Western country. The UOP Press Department has refused to comment on the case.

[Correspondent Bogdan Ulka] According to our information, four weeks ago metropolitan policemen from the Operational Intelligence Department apprehended a thief and discovered that he had several documents stamped "Secret" and suspicious electronic equipment. During the investigation, he indicated an apartment where he had carried out a burglary. The police then handed the case over to counterintelligence, which apprehended the tenant of the apartment.

The police deny these reports. Krystyna Boral from UOP said that there would be no comment on the case.

At the Prosecutor's Office of the Warsaw Military District, which officially handles espionage cases, I was told that so far they had received no report. One of the prosecutors said the Prosecutor's Office learns of arrests of suspects very late in the proceedings because the counterintelligence service first of all tries to persuade the spy to collaborate with it.

Since 1989, four persons have been convicted in Poland of espionage. One was a German agent, two worked for Ukraine, and one worked for Moscow.

Poland: Daily Praises U.S. Actions in Taiwan Strait

WS1203151596 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 12 Mar 96 p 1

[Commentary by Bronislaw Wildstein: "Rights and Interests"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Taiwan is an example of one of the major achievements in the world economy in recent years. Over two decades, it turned from a poor Third World country into an economic superpower that outshines the Chinese giant in many respects.

After the war, China and Taiwan stood on the same level of civilizational development. The difference was that communism was introduced in China. Only recently did Taiwan become democratic, proving the theory that economic freedom not only is indispensable for economic growth, but also that it ultimately leads to democracy. [passage omitted]

To retain the gigantic market that China has turned out to be and to avoid tension, the U.S. defenders of democracy cast a blind eye on the violation of human rights in the central state. It does them credit that, in the face of an open conflict, they have decided to take action even though a huge risk is involved.

Poland: Ministry Denies Government Violated Embargo on Iraq

LD1203143496 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1400 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Polish Embassy in Jordan will be contacting the authorities in that country with a request to explain and correct a false statement alleging that Poland sold parts for fighter aircraft to Iraq, Foreign Ministry spokesman Pawel Dobrowolski has said. The spokesman gave assurances that the transport from Poland stopped 7 March by Jordanian customs officials was an agricultural equipment consignment and did not constitute a violation of the UN embargo or of customs regulations. Dobrowolski explained that the consignment contained, among other things, hydraulic parts for the agricultural Mi-2 helicopter. So this was not a consignment destined for military use, as the authorities in Amman had claimed, and the parts that the Jordanian authorities said were in the consignment are not manufactured at all in Poland.

Poland: URM Inspectors Examine Kaliningrad Corridor Issue

WS1203135896 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 12 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Ma.S.: "URM's Inspection in the Suwalki Voivodship; The Issue of the Corridor Does Not Exist"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The issue of building a corridor through Suwalki Voivodship (from Kaliningrad to Belarus) did not and does not exist. That was the conclusion employees of the Inspection Bureau of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM] came to after visiting the Voivodship Office in Suwalki. Nonetheless, as bureau Director Jedrzej Wysocki disclosed, the inspectors expressed criticism on the "excessive activeness of high-ranking officials, including the voivode, in international contacts."*

Director Wysocki added that they meant international contacts "in general" with various countries. As far as trips abroad are concerned, the Voivodship Office in Suwalki makes a pretty "frequent number." "Perhaps while being so active in international contacts, the voivode or his subordinates make promises that are not confirmed by state-level agreements? Were those trips useful and necessary, especially if they were paid for by taxpayers' money?" Wysocki wondered in front of journalists. He would not give any more details.

explaining that the postinspection reports drawn up by his bureau are classified information.

The person who will make the decision on the consequences of these irregularities will be URM head Leszek Miller.

It is worth recalling that a week ago, the URM head ordered the URM Inspection Bureau to examine whether the Suwalki voivode and his subordinates had not exceeded their powers while dealing with the so-called Suwalki corridor issue. According to the bureau, "the words 'extraterritorial' and 'corridor' were not used" in any of the documents analyzed: agreements, official memorandums, protocols, and land-use plans. However, the inspectors did find a memo, signed by Kaliningrad administration representatives, that presented the expectations of the Russian side. As Director Wysocki pointed out, the Russian proposals envision transit on already existing roads. Wishes of the other side include considerable modernization projects, such as widening the roads from the current three meters to seven meters, broadening the roadsides, and constructing bypass roads near Suwalki, Goldap, and Augustow. A few hundred vehicles a day would use the road as a transit route. The cost of this venture and the possible source of financing it are unknown.

Poland: Daily Reports on Primakov Statement on Security

WS1303112896 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 13 Mar 96 p 6

[Article by W.D. and "PIL": "Before Primakov's Visit to Poland; The Problem of the Corridor Does Not Exist"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] *The Russian authorities did not submit any proposals regarding the extraterritorial corridor from Kaliningrad Oblast through Poland. Moscow realizes that such a corridor is associated in Poland with the "Gdansk corridor" [a route the Third Reich wanted to use in Poland before World War II]. It is true, though, that for a long time now talks have been held on projects that would facilitate transit that would be favorable to both sides. However, such transit facilitation projects are not possible without Warsaw's consent. Such a stand was presented in Moscow by Yevgeniy Primakov in a statement for Polish journalists.*

Primakov said that Moscow had not prepared a draft of a new European security system. According to the minister, such a concept should be discussed in the international arena. Primakov hinted that Moscow might resign itself to political expansion of NATO on the condition that the military infrastructure of the alliance remain on its present territories. Unless a compromise on NATO expansion is reached, Moscow reserves the right to "concentrate" and take adequate measures to defend its interests. The "concentration" term refers to a statement by Aleksander Gorchakov, Russian foreign minister at the end of the 19th century, which should be interpreted as an announcement of the partial isolation of Russia.

Poland: Deputy Foreign Minister Previews Primakov Visit

WS1303120196 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 13 Mar 96 p 2

[Report by "KRZEM": "Russian Foreign Minister Visits Poland Tomorrow; Primakov's Visions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"We have a chance of developing good relations with Russia, even though we differ in our views on NATO," said Deputy Foreign Minister Stefan Meller when asked about Yevgeniy Primakov's visit.*

"Minister Primakov's visit is very important for us," Deputy Minister Meller said yesterday. He stressed that Poland is anxious to hear Primakov's views on bilateral relations, Russian foreign policies, and European security.

"We have grounds to believe that Russia wants very good bilateral relations, even though fundamental differences remain in opinions on NATO enlargement," said Meller.

He went on to add that the arguments Russia uses against NATO enlargement are widely known: "Our task is to present an assessment of the current situation in Europe and European institutions, backed by arguments that would show our Russian partners the reasons that NATO membership remains our priority."

Poland does not want this issue to "traumatize bilateral relations," which were revived last year. Our prime ministers visited each other, the foreign ministers met in Gdansk, [former] Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski visited Moscow. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Krylov visited Warsaw this year. Bilateral trade is developing. In 1994 the trade volume between our two countries was $2.5 billion, and in the first half of last year alone it was $1.5 billion.

During the talks with Primakov, Poland wants to take up the issue of visa-free tourist travel, a topic that has been discussed for some time now. The problem is that Russians do not want to combine this with a readmission agreement (obliging Russia to readmit people who left its territory to go to another country and committed a criminal offense there). We have already signed similar agreements with all of the EU states and with nearly all of our neighbors, including Ukraine. According to Director Jerzy Bahr of the Foreign Ministry, given a political stimulus, the whole case could be settled in a matter of weeks. It might even be signed during the visit President Kwasniewski is scheduled to pay to Moscow in April.

Among problems that still remain to be settled, Meller listed unrestricted ship traffic through the Pilawa Strait to the Vistula Bay. Poland also wants to take up the issue of reparations for Poles deported to labor camps during the war.

Journalists inquired about the "corridor" to Kaliningrad. Meller said the Foreign Ministry does not expect anyone to approach Poland on this subject. "This is not an issue."

Poland: Kwasniewski Visit to Minsk Not Confirmed

WS1303124296 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 13 Mar 96 p 6

[Article by Cezary Golinski in Minsk and "DOM": "Aleksander Kwasniewski To Visit Belarus. A Meeting in the Forest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Polish president will visit Belarus in March. This is what the Minsk press reports. The Belarusian Foreign Ministry and the Polish Embassy do not know anything about this.

The Presidential Chancellery in Warsaw unofficially confirms that Aleksander Kwasniewski's trip is planned for 30 March. Aleksander Kwasniewski allegedly announced his visit to Minsk during his recent meeting with President Algirdas Brazauskas in Lithuania. This was reported on the first page of the Tuesday edition of SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA, the official organ of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka's Administration.

According to the Belarusian press agency BELTA, Kwasniewski "favorably assessed the economic initiatives of the Belarusian authorities." The Polish president "also emphasized that, as early as March, before his official visit to Moscow, he hopes to come on a working visit to Belarus and meet with President Alyaksandr Lukashenka," SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA reports, quoting the press agency.

Despite the fact that it is less than three weeks until the end of March, no information about Kwasniewski's visit is available in Minsk. The Polish Embassy learned about it from a GAZETA WYBORCZA correspondent, and the Belarusian Foreign Ministry from SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA.

Both presidents are allegedly to meet not in Minsk but in Viskuli in the Belavezha Forest, where in 1991 the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus liquidated the USSR and created CIS in its place.

Kwasniewski would be the second president received by Lukashenka from "far abroad"—that is, from outside the former Soviet Union. Last week the president of Yugoslavia, Zoran Lilic, was on a visit here. He was received as the leader of a brotherly state, with greatest honors, by the Belarusian leader, who promulgated slogans of Slavic unity. It is different with Poland, which, although a Slavic country, is less brotherly and prefers to integrate into European structures, including NATO, a fact of particular concern for Minsk. "Nobody needs us in the West. Nobody expect us there," Lukashenka announced many times, while explaining his unambiguously pro-Moscow foreign policy and his plans for integration with Russia. It is not ruled out that President Kwasniewski's visit will convince the Belarusian leader that "Belarus is nonetheless needed by someone"—for instance, in Poland.

Poland: Security Office on Prospects of Joining NATO, EU

LD1203141896 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1300 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Jerzy Milewski, head of the National Security Office [BBN], has made assurances at a news conference that the so-called Oleksy affair is not having an impact on the process of Poland being admitted to NATO and the European Union. In his opinion, only two factors can slow down this process: Russian opposition and Poland adapting too slowly to NATO and EU standards.

Asked how work was progressing on the appointment of a National Security Council, Milewski said that talks on this subject were only in their early stages and that the council could not be appointed for at least another several months. The head of the BBN added that the council should have members representing various political options. However, President Kwasniewski had not yet invited anyone to work in the council, said Milewski.

Poland: Ministry To Set Up Body for Integration With NATO

WS1303111296 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 12 Mar 96 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Eugeniusz Mleczak, Polish Defense Ministry spokesman: "Top MON Officials Have Met"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Top MON [Ministry of National Defense] officials met under the leadership of National

Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski on 11 March 1996.

The MON officials heard reports by Andrzej Zalucki, deputy minister for social and parliamentary issues, and General of Brigade Konstanty Malejczyk, chief of the Military Information Services Inspectorate, on the principal problems influencing the feelings of officers, servicemen, and their families. Minister Dobrzanski recommended that the MON members orient their activities toward the fast resolution of urgent issues, while remaining ones should be included on the agenda in the immediate future.

The MON members also discussed creating a new organizational structure within MON—the Department for Cooperation With NATO and the Western European Union [WEU] (also called the Integration Department). The new body was presented by Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka.

The creation of this structure will make it possible to accelerate organizational work connected with Polish aspirations to join NATO and the WEU, as well as meet the new challenges faced by our state, Defense Ministry, and Armed Forces. The aforementioned department's tasks would include: forecasting and planning integration activities; analyzing and estimating the state of integration; coordinating and exercising control over MON institutions during the integration period; and training the staff for the implementation of tasks connected with Poland's membership in NATO and the WEU. The MON officials accepted the creation of the new department and proposed that it should be manned by specialists from existing MON institutions that are interested in and specialize in that field.

Minister Andrzej Karkoszka also reported to the MON members on the conditions and functioning of the Polish military contingent in Bosnia.

The MON officials also determined their stance on the results of the inspection conducted by the Supreme Chamber of Control in 1995, which regarded the issue of the purchase of Tarpan and Mercedes cars as well as the sale of BMP-2 armored personnel carriers. Their stance on these issues will be presented to the Sejm National Defense Commission.

Poland: Comment on Withdrawal From Sejm of Walesa Draft Laws

WS1203154396 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 12 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Dominika Wielowiejska: "Why Were the Former President's Draft Laws Withdrawn From the Sejm? Cleaning Up After Walesa"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Aleksander Kwasniewski wants good relations with the church. He has withdrawn draft laws connected with the Concordat but is participating in preparations for the Eucharistic Congress. This is what the president's ministers say:*

The chief of the Presidential Chancellery, Danuta Waniek, explained yesterday the reasons for withdrawing all of the legislative initiatives submitted by Lech Walesa.

SLD First, Concordat Next

President Kwasniewski withdrew draft laws on the Concordat—which were meant to speed up its ratification and which contained some unclear issues—among other things on contracting marriages.

Minister Waniek stated yesterday that the initiatives submitted by Lech Walesa were part of his election campaign. "There was no mention of the financial consequences connected with bringing the Concordat into force," Ms. Minister said. She emphasized that the initiative with regard to the Concordat belongs to the Sejm and that the government should prepare a whole set of draft laws connected with this agreement. Danuta Waniek added that the ratification of the agreement between the Apostolic See and our country is not urgent.

"The president will maintain self-restraint, patience, and tactfulness in this matter," Marek Siwiec, a minister in the Presidential Chancellery, declared. Another presidential minister, Krzysztof Janik, added that the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] is attempting to convince its electorate to accept the Concordat because SLD deputies "would like to be elected for one more term."

Siwiec assured journalists, however, that Aleksander Kwasniewski is intent on maintaining good relations with the Church. "The president is involved in preparing next year's Eucharistic Congress in Wroclaw. The arrival of John Paul II is also expected at that time," Siwiec said.

Election Moves With Electoral Law

Minister Waniek also justified the withdrawal of a draft law introducing amendments to the Sejm Electoral Law. The draft, which was submitted by Walesa on behalf of the Christian National Union [ZChN], touched on only part of the problems connected with the Electoral Law. According to Waniek, submitting the draft to the Sejm was an element of the election campaign. "The draft was intended to give hope for small parties outside the parliament that the election threshold would be lowered and that, because of this, they could join the Sejm," the presidential ministers said.

Let us recall that the ZChN proposed to lower the election threshold from 8 percent to 7 percent for coalitions, in the event that, following a division of seats, if 20 percent of the voters remained without parliamentary representation, the election threshold for a party would be lowered from 5 percent to 3 percent.

The current Presidential Chancellery is considering the preparation of an electoral code that would clarify the regulations of the presidential, Sejm, and Senate electoral laws, as well as those on holding a referendum.

Poland: Papal Nuncio, Kwasniewski Concordat Talks Optimistic

LD1303174996 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1500 GMT 13 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The meeting between President Aleksander Kwasniewski, Polish Primate Jozef Glemp, and the Sejm speaker dealt with ratification of the Concordat, state-church relations within the constitution, and next year's visit to Poland by Pope John Paul II. After the meeting, Archbishop Jozef Kowalczyk, the apostolic nuncio to Poland, expressed satisfaction that the president did not think ratification of the Concordat is threatened.

[Begin Kowalczyk recording] I think the Concordat presents a great opportunity for Poland and is a great gift from John Paul II to Poland. Unfortunately, Poland has furnished much evidence throughout its history that it does not always know how to take advantage of historical opportunities. Sometimes it squanders them. I am happy that the president understands these matters in a somewhat different way. And, if there are some people who can see a trap or something dangerous for Poland in the Concordat, the Holy Father does not offer such dangerous presents to Poland. [end recording]

President Aleksander Kwasniewski said that, despite the difficulties, dialogue is needed in the matter of the concordat.

[Begin Kwasniewski recording] We do not pretend that difficulties do not exist. The concepts have been defined and the dialogue continues. There are chances that agreement and compromise between Poles should be as visible and firm as possible. [end recording]

Poland: Jaruzelski Tours U.S. With Lectures on Martial Law

WS1203154696 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 12 Mar 96 p 3

[Report by "GAC,TW,SZW": "Wiatr and Jaruzelski Are Talking About Martial Law in the United States"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Jerzy Wiatr, Democratic Left Alliance deputy and education minister, and General Wojciech Jaruzelski set off on an unofficial visit to the United States on Saturday [9 March].

At a news conference at the Ministry of National Education, Wiatr announced that, together with the head of the former Military Council for National Salvation, he was attending a meeting with "eminent politicians from various countries" organized by "a university." Wiatr did not disclose the name of the host university, but he did make it clear that the visit was not being financed by his ministry.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY found out that the host is Kansas State University, where Jaruzelski is scheduled to give a lecture on...the reasons behind the introduction of martial law in Poland in 1981. Jaruzelski's lecture was organized by Wiatr and his friend Professor Daile [as published] Harspring, from the aforesaid university.

A brochure published for the occasion presents Jaruzelski as a savior who rescued Poland from a Soviet invasion and who countered the communists who wanted to resort to force in their fight with Solidarity.

Before taking over as minister of education, Jerzy Wiatr chaired the Sejm Commission of Constitutional Responsibility, which investigated the responsibility of the authors of martial law (primarily Jaruzelski). The commission dropped all charges.

Poland: Ministry Justifies Aircraft Deal With Czechs

WS1203131496 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 11 Mar 96 pp 1-2

[Statement by Lieutenant Colonel Eugeniusz Mleczak, spokesman of the Polish Ministry of National Defense; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Reports questioning the economic and technical justification of the contract on exchanging helicopters for fighter planes that was concluded with the Czech Republic in December have recently appeared in the domestic media. Taking into account the need to inform the public as comprehensively as possible about decisions made in the area of defense and the reasons by which the decisionmakers are guided, I hereby inform that:*

—Before concluding the contract envisioning a barter exchange of W-3 Sokol helicopters for MiG-29 planes with the Czech Republic, the Polish Air Force had 12 MiG-29 planes (nine combat and three training-combat planes).

—The planes purchased from the Czechs include nine MiG-29 planes of the 9.12.A variant and one MiG-29UB training-combat plane of the 9.51 variant. The planes were manufactured in 1989 and belong to the same edition as the planes owned by Poland. However, they have flown far fewer hours than the Polish aircraft.

—In June 1994, the Czechs mothballed the planes and started attempts to sell them. For example, they tried to arouse the interest of Slovakia, Hungary, Syria, and even the United States in the planes. Finally, Poland, which proposed exchanging 11 W-3 Sokol helicopters for 10 MiG-29 planes, was deemed the most favorable customer.

—The Polish side has acknowledged that this contract will make it possible to fully rearm one air fighter regiment with MiG-29 planes, which has proved to be quite inexpensive, given the already existing infrastructure of the regiment. Moreover, the goal of this decision is to maintain sufficient combat readiness of the Polish Air Force during its period of transformation and while it is searching for a new type of multipurpose plane. Therefore, this transaction must be viewed not as an attempt to become further dependent on the deliverer from the east [Russia], but as a part of the process of preventing further degradation of the Polish Air Force's combat worth.

—It also has been acknowledged that, in a situation in which many of the oldest—25 years old—MiG-21's have to be decomissioned this year, it is all the more desirable to acquire the 10 MiG-29's. —The total cost of the undertaking is approximately $35 million (provided that one W-3 Sokol costs $3 million). At the same time, the producer—Russia—offers us new MiG-29 planes (the 9.12.SE variant), though manufactured a few years ago, for $18 million each (without spare parts and weapons). Thus, the price of one "Czech" plane is approximately $3.5 million. Adding another $2 million to this sum (because this is how much it will cost to prepare a plane for further service), we will receive approximately $6 million for a relatively new and little used combat plane with parameters adequate for the state of aviation technology at the end of the 20th century. According to experts' estimates, these planes may be used for another 20 years.

The contract also opens new possibilities for the producer of Sokol helicopters by introducing them in the Czech market. On the sidelines of the entire affair, it can be stated that commentaries in the Polish press, which boil down to the conclusion that the Polish side has suffered losses in this deal, dovetail with commentaries in the Czech press. Some Czech commentators believe it was the Czechs who suffered losses as a result of this exchange. However, the contract is beneficial to both sides.

Poland: Cabinet Committee on Repatriation Issues, Demography

WS1203155496 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 7 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by A.F.T.: "Sociopolitical Committee of the Council of Ministers; Repatriation of Poles From Kazakhstan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Approximately 100 Polish families from Kazakhstan will most probably come to settle in Poland this year. They will come not as one group, but individually. As many as 500 gmina [smallest administrative unit] self-governments offered their assistance in the settling of the families. The Sociopolitical Committee of the Council of Ministers recommended to the Council of Ministers a document entitled "The Principles of the State's Policy Regarding Repatriation Issues," including the draft amendment to the instruction concerning the procedure that Polish diplomatic posts use to grant visas. Members of the committee also became familiar with a report on last year's demographic situation in our country.*

Deputy Prime Minister Miroslaw Pietrewicz said that the government would create legal-organizational conditions to facilitate the repatriation of Poles from Kazakhstan. He stressed that there is a moral-ethical aspect of these returns: "Poles were driven out of Poland and sent to Kazakhstan; they did not take part in the repatriation carried out in the 1950's, and then they were ignored. Their return to Poland should be an issue of all Poles."

The repatriation will be a "long process." It will not be a mass repatriation. The return of those Poles depends on initiatives launched by local self-governments. So far, 500 gminas have expressed a readiness to receive Poles from Kazakhstan. Approximately 100,000 Poles live in that country. Miroslaw Pietrewicz said that there should be some money earmarked for this purpose in next year's state budget. At the moment, Poles from Kazakhstan are receiving some help from the Senate's funds and donations from local self-governments. A draft amendment has been prepared instructing on the procedures that Polish diplomatic posts and consular offices use to grant visas. Thanks to new legal solutions, Poles from Kazakhstan who obtain the status of repatriated people will acquire Polish citizenship by virtue of the law.

In line with data included in the "1995 Report—The Demographic Situation in Poland," drawn up by the Government Population Commission, last year the birthrate was the lowest since the end of World War II. It amounted to fewer than 46,000.

The decrease in the number of new marriages was halted. Approximately 210,000 couples married last year; however, the number of first-time marriages is still not growing. Demographic experts say this is because of the difficult economic situation in which the young generation has found itself (unemployment, low incomes, and difficult housing conditions). More people die of cancer than of circulatory diseases.

Romania: Funar Criticizes U.S. Envoy, Hungarians

AU1203130196 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 1 Mar 96 pp 16-17

[Interview with Gheorghe Funar, president of the Romanian National Unity Party and mayor of the municipality of Cluj-Napoca, by Sabin Gagiu; place and date not given: "On 22 December 1989, a Coup Took Place in Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Gagiu] Mr. Mayor, how would you comment on the assertion by Alfred Rosen [name as published], U.S. ambassador in Bucharest, according to which the extremist parties' absence from the future government would ease the way for Romania's joining NATO?

[Funar] We regret very much that Ambassador Alfred Rosen behaved like this, downright strangely, in Cluj-Napoca, and that he made statements that are unworthy of any diplomat, especially a representative of the United States in Romania, in his capacity as ambassador. Considering that he is a career diplomat, this was behavior that cannot be accounted for. What is even more serious is that the labeling he did, including that with respect to the Romanian National Unity Party [Romanian National Unity Party, PUNR], lacks any grounds. By labeling the PUNR, the PRM [Greater Romania Party], and the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor] in this way [as extremist parties], what he actually did was label one part of the population, which under the circumstances of a law-governed state, now sees itself labeled without any grounds just because it exerted its right to vote. It is regrettable that Mr. Alfred Rosen behaved in this way, in a way that is not normal for representatives of the United States in our country. Unfortunately, with this labeling, as well as with other statements that he made in Cluj-Napoca—such as the one calling for all political forces to unite to dethrone Mayor Funar, or that representatives from any other party should win the local elections rather than those from the PUNR—Alfred Rosen also interfered in our local affairs, here in this municipality, trying and hoping to deceive Cluj citizens into believing that all the political parties existing in Cluj-Napoca, with the exception of the PUNR, enjoy American support. Well, he is naive, and forgets the fact that in Cluj-Napoca, as in the entire country, those who will vote are the Romanians, not Alfred Rosen, and we regret that he remains U.S. ambassador in our country. In my opinion, Mr. Alfred Rosen deeply thwarts U.S. diplomacy, and we hope that the White House will recall him as soon as possible. [passage omitted]

[Gagiu] As president of the PUNR, what do you believe: Has your party been strengthened or weakened during all these years of participation in the government?

[Funar] In my opinion, the PUNR has consolidated its position on the Romanian political scene. It is visibly growing, as far as the number of its members and their quality is concerned, and, besides, we also have very many sympathizers. We thus expect the coming elections, all of which will hopefully be held this year, to confirm this beautiful ascent of the PUNR.

[Gagiu] Will you participate on your own in the elections, or will you seek alliances instead?

[Funar] In principle, as far as the local elections are concerned, but also generally speaking, the PUNR will have its own slates, and only in the runoff, and just in certain localities, individually—depending on the parties they are representing, as well as their personal quality—we are ready to support some of the candidates who made it to the second ballot.

[Gagiu] Mr. Funar, according to ill-intended rumors, your wife can be regarded as Cabinet Two [reference to the power held by Elena Ceausescu during the past totalitarian regime].

[Funar] We have neither a Cabinet One nor a Cabinet Two in the PUNR. These are strange things and ideas, which, as I see, still persist in the minds of certain people, who forget that on 22 December 1989 a coup took place in Romania, and that is when both Cabinet One and Cabinet Two of the PCR [Romanian Communist Party] ceased their activity. We, the people in the PUNR, do not have such cabinets; we do not hold on to our chairs, so this idea is downright absurd. I am surprised that these people, who are still nostalgic about Cabinets One and Two, never dare to write anything against the wife of the U.S. President, who seconds him, as is only natural for any wife, during very many of his activities, and who represents the U.S. President in numerous corners of the world and in various bodies. I am amazed by the fact that some of the journalists do not have the courage to pick on President Clinton and his wife, saying they have a Cabinet One and a Cabinet Two, in which case the difference would be an obvious one, if one tries to compare it with what we experienced here before 1989. [passage omitted]

[Gagiu] The UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] has recommended to its members, and not just to his members, that this year they should celebrate "the 1100th anniversary of their settlement in the Carpathian-Danubian basin."

[Funar] Let me correct that. Actually, let me make two amendments. The first is that there are no Hungarians in

Romania. The Hungarians, or the Magyars, as you call them, exist solely in Hungary, our neighbor and a unfriendly [neprietena] country over the past 1,000 years. And the second one: The arrival of the Hungarians in Europe and their settlement around the lake of Balaton did not happen 1,100 years ago, but rather somewhat later, so that fewer than 1,000 years have elapsed since they arrived in Europe. Their figure has been falsified by Hungarian history writers because, as you might know, falsifying things is the official policy of the Hungarian Government, and it is being practiced everywhere, including the establishment of this date. In Cluj, the Romanians, including those having a Hungarian ethnic origin, are happy to celebrate the day of 1 December, the national day of Romania, the country in which they live and the bread of which they are eating. For us Romanians, the day of 15 March represents the somber commemoration of the over 40,000 Romanians killed during the 1848-49 revolution, as well as that of the 230 Romanian villages set on fire by the Hungarian occupiers, the descendants of the hordes, which came to Europe 1,000 years ago. On 15 March, we will also honor the memory of two Romanian revolutionaries, Nicolae Balcescu and George Baritiu. On that day, we will place a commemorative plaque on the walls of the building at 20 Avram Iancu Street, where in 1848 there used to be a hotel—the Biasini Hotel, as it was called in those days—and where Balcescu and Baritiu stayed overnight.

[Gagiu] Mr. Mayor, do you know the joke about the fellow who asks: Is it true that Funar has some Hungarian blood? The reply is: Of course he does! On the front bumper of his car! Please, tell me, do you have any Hungarian friends?

[Funar] I have very many acquaintances who are Romanian citizens of Hungarian ethnic origin, with whom I get along very well both at the mayoralty and at home, in the block of apartments where I live. Also at the university and in very many other places, so I do not discriminate among Roman citizens. [passage omitted]

Romania: Daily Criticizes U.S. Envoy's Speech

AU1203165496 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 6 Mar 96 p 1

[Editorial by Ion Cristoiu: "The Bizarre Outburst by the U.S. Ambassador to Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Cluj speech of U.S. Ambassador Alfred Moses [on 22 February] has caused ripples in our political puddle, which some insist on presenting as an ocean. Depending on their reflexes, various public figures have reacted quickly or more slowly to this speech through various public statements. Some of them applauded the speech until their hands became red from clapping. Others stuck two fingers in their mouths and began whistling at it and booing it from the top of their folklore-filled lungs. The enthusiasm belonged to the representatives of certain parties situated to the right of our political landscape. The curses came from the nationalist-extremists. Ioan Gavra [vice president of the Romanian National Unity Party, PUNR] and Gheorghe Funar [PUNR president] were struck by a terrible agitation, more typical of people suffering from hemorrhoids than of true politicians. Corneliu Vadim Tudor [president of the Greater Romania Party] did not miss the opportunity to become more vulgar than a pissoir in a public toilet from the slums. In between these extreme stands came the statements of certain personalities of various power bodies: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the presidency, and the ruling party. The defining feature of these stands has been the halfhearted disapproval, which attests to the embarrassment of the respective people for having to make such statements. I do not believe that the reactions of certain rightwing figures, as well as those coming from certain representatives of the nationalist extremism deserve any comment. Since they do not have the responsibility of governing, these public figures can afford to say anything they want. Unlike the people in power, they are like spectators at a soccer game: While the players on the field cannot afford to either kiss or spit on the referee, those in the stands can applaud or boo him as they wish or deem fit. However, the stands of the representatives of the power must make the subject of analytical persevering, if for no other reason than for the fact that their gestures and statements are committing not only for them, as politicians, but also for the country as a whole. Far be it from me to have any sympathy with the nationalist-extremist trend. I believe that in all I have written so far, I displayed enough hostility toward extreme nationalism. I rejected and will reject any manifestation of carnival patriotism, suburban nationalism, and pure Romanism. I truly believe that you can be a patriot without using the word fatherland as a kind of political condom. This reputation as a lucid man, which I hope to have earned after so many years of writing, entitles me to express my bewilderment at the fact that the U.S. ambassador's speech has not received a firmer reply from the various representatives of power. As everyone knows, in a recent speech in Cluj, Alfred Moses made a few statements about the political and economic situation in today's Romania. Moreover, he went beyond the stage of observations and gave a lot of advice to the Romanian people. Maybe one could overlook the fact that the representative of a foreign country deems it fit to speak his mind about what we Romanians are doing and should be doing. After all, we have been living in a democratic environment since December 1989 and in this environment—thanks to the prevailing freedom of thought—anybody can publicly express his opinions. This is a privilege that we Romanians, hospitable as we are, can also grant to the foreigners. However, one cannot ignore the overall tone of the ambassador's speech. A characteristic feature of diplomacy is to use delicate and polite talk in order to say certain things. It is not for nothing that the expression "diplomatic attitude" has entered the current vocabulary to define a roundabout way of stating one's opinions, while keeping appearances intact. Nevertheless, what immediately strikes the eye on reading the speech made by the U.S. ambassador at the Cluj University is its brutality; a brutality deriving both from its peremptory tone—like the knocking of a fist on a table—and from the precise and categorical guidelines given to the government and presidency on a number of concrete issues. If we did not know that the former secretary general of the Romanian Communist Party [Nicolae Ceausescu] had died in Targoviste, one might believe after reading that speech that it was not the U.S. ambassador to Romania who held it at Cluj University, but Nicolae Ceausescu himself. Such an attitude violates the most elementary rules of how an ambassador of one country to another should conduct himself. What is the meaning of this bizarre breach of diplomatic protocol by Alfred Moses? Does it express a peculiarity of the ambassador's personality? Does it indicate that the United States has reached the conclusion that Romania should be treated like a banana republic? Until we find some answers, one thing is fairly clear: Faced with such a comportment, typical to that of a former Sublime Porte envoy to a pashalik, the Bucharest authorities should have taken a much firmer stance. Such outbursts by the U.S. ambassador risk further feeding local extremist-nationalism, which has been busy presenting post-December 1989 Romania as a country that has replaced its master from the East with the one in the West.

Romania: Hungarians Offended by New Plaque in Cluj

AU1303101496 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 2 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Cristian Mihai Chis: "Funar Is Putting Up Another Plaque—The Hungarians Consider This Act a New Offense to Their Entire Nation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a press communique distributed to journalists at the 1 March meeting of the local council in Cluj, Mayor Funar announced his intention to put up another commemorative plaque in memory of George Baritiu and Nicolae Balcescu. The mayor of Cluj announced this event for 15 March as an event devoted to the memory of the leaders of the 1848 revolution. The plaque will be placed on the building located at 20 Avram Iancu Street, the former Biazzini Hotel (in 1849), where Balcescu and Baritiu lived during their stay in Cluj. The text to be inscribed on the plaque is: "George Baritiu and Nicolae Balcescu, great figures of the Romanian Revolution, stayed here in 1848-49, during the activities of organizing the struggle for freedom and national unity. The assertion of the Romanians' sacred ideals triggered bloody reprisals by Hungarian noblemen, during which over 40,000 Romanians were killed and over 230 villages were set on fire and destroyed."

Referring to this new plaque of Mayor Funar, the president of the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] Cluj branch, Lajos Molnos said: "The first time I heard about Funar's intention I said that finally the mayor understood what the 1848-49 Revolution meant. But I see that Funar understood nothing of the history of the Romanian and the Hungarian people. I do not know who gave him the approval to place the plaque. As a matter of fact, the plaque on the Matthias Corvinus's house was also placed without the approval of the local council. This is an offense to the Hungarian people. It is not normal to say that during a war people were killed. They fell because there were two camps. Thus, probably 40,000 people fell, and nobody knows who killed them. If we are talking about what happened then, we can also come up with some data that have not been mentioned by either Romanian history or Funar. Avram Iancu's people attacked the peaceful citizens of the town of Aiud. Thousands of elderly people, women, and children were killed by the Moti [Romanians from the western Carpathians]."

Romania: PDSR Accused of Planning Electoral Fraud

AU1203163996 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 6 Mar 96 p 1

[Article by Bogdan Tiberiu Iacob: "Hundreds of Thousands of Stamped Votes in Favor of the Social Democracy Party of Romania and Ion Iliescu Were Printed at the Press House in 1992"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Continuing its series of attacks against the ruling party and Ion Iliescu, the latest issue of Corneliu Vadim Tudor's weekly ROMANIA LIBERA launches a sensational accusation, claiming that hundreds of thousands of votes in favor of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] were printed and stamped at the Press House in 1992.

The falsified voting papers were loaded in several microbuses during the night. The fraud was later perpetuated by replacing the real voting boxes, filled at the ballot stations in the elections of the fall of 1992, with the boxes containing the aforementioned votes.

ROMANIA MARE also reveals another trick for falsifying the elections, which has yet to be used, according to the aforementioned publication, in this year's elections, by changing the programs of the Central Electoral Bureau's computer, "whereby, with a simple comma, a million extra votes can be stolen from one party and added to another."

Romania: PUR Rules Out Alliance With Extremists

AU1303093796 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 2 Mar 96 p 7

[Article by Aura Tirica: "The Humanist Party Will Not Form an Alliance With Extremist or Incorrect Parties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the opinion of the Humanist Party of Romania [PUR], the fact that the opposition has endorsed the motion [against the government's energy policy] is a "natural situation" although "it is a delayed act." Nevertheless, from this party's position as center-oriented party, the PUR is also criticizing the initiators of the motion, saying that to resort to a simple motion instead of a censure motion shows "their hesitation and the domination of political calculations."

Approaching the current political context, the PUR president, Sergiu Andon, said that the PUR, as a extraparliamentary party, has kept its distance from the political scene "because of feelings of decency and dignity." "Given the fact that in the upcoming period it has to assert itself, the PUR will descend with greater determination into the political arena," said Sergiu Andon in conclusion. As regards preparations for the elections, the PUR has not yet announced its lists of candidates because, even if it has the respective lists, the PUR is waiting for the electoral campaign to start officially. This political formation will run alone in the local elections, but it is possible that it will form an alliance with other parties for the general elections, but not with "extremist or incorrect parties."

Romania: Subway Strikers Ignore Deadline

AU1203113896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0500 GMT 13 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bucharest subway is not running this morning either. Our correspondents report that, during last night, the striking employees organized pickets in Piata Unirii [Union Square], refusing to leave it and resume work. The deadline set by the government for the strikers to resume work expired at midnight last night. The employees ready to resume work were asked to sign an individual commitment to this extent, while those refusing this offer would be the subject of legal measures and their labor contracts would be canceled.

The deadline set for the strikers to leave the subway stations also expired at midnight last night. A government communique mentions that all necessary measures will be taken to implement these decisions of the cabinet's Executive Bureau and reiterates the readiness to resume talks between the representatives of the administration and the employees.

The Bucharest Subway Management Board [METROREX] announced last night that the signing of individual pledges to resume work was in progress, with 275 employees having signed them until 2000 hours [1800 GMT]. At 2130 hours [1930 GMT], more than 500 employees had signed the commitments. The Board reiterated its call on the employees to observe the law and reopen the subway traffic, so as to facilitate the resumption of negotiations on solving the labor conflict. In a statement made to our radio station, METROREX General Manager Radu Farmus estimated that 850 employees signed the pledge to resume work last night.

The REUTER agency cites a statement by a striker according to which more than 3,000 employees, that is approximately half of the 6,200 subway employees, signed collective resignations in protest against the company's inability to pay the staff's wages and against the firing threats.

Romania: Cabinet Decides To Dismiss Subway Strikers

AU1203184596 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news conference at Victoria Palace, State Minister Dan Mircea Popescu announced that a meeting of the enlarged executive bureau had been held in the morning to discuss the Bucharest subway situation. The following decisions were made:

Yesterday's decision by the executive bureau should be implemented—namely, that the collective labor contracts of those people who did not sign individual pledges to return to work immediately should be terminated. As a consequence, the Bucharest subway will remain closed for a period of time, during which the METROREX [subway] public corporation will perform all the necessary cleaning, cleansing, and repair work.

They also decided to hire new personnel from SNCFR [Romanian National Railway Company] employees who were laid off, as well as other unemployed people who will be sent for training.

They also decided to supplement the number of RATB [Bucharest Public Transportation Public Corporation] buses by bringing in vehicles of the Defense and Interior Ministries within a radius of 100-185 kilometers. The latter are to begin running tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow at the latest.

State Minister Dan Mircea Popescu pointed out that the cabinet cannot negotiate with people who have placed themselves outside the law.

Romania: Bucharest Subway Employees Continue Strike

AU1303104596 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0500 GMT 13 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Bucharest subway is still not running this morning. A section of the employees continue to organize pickets in subway stations. The president of the Union of Subway Free Trade Unions Ion Radoi said that today the necessary measures will be taken so that a delegation including striking employees and trade union leaders can resume negotiations with representatives of the executive. A meeting with Minister of Labor and Social Protection Dan Mircea Popescu will also be suggested.

Our reporter Catalin Trandafir also informed us that according to the trade union leader the decision to interrupt or to continue the strike will be taken only after the result of these meetings is made public.

A communique received from the government announces that the executive is firmly determined not to give in to the strikers' pressure and does not accept any compromise. Premier Nicolae Vacaroiu stressed at the government meeting held yesterday that the executive wishes to have the subway activity normalized and is ready to support the resumption of negotiations as soon as employees submit to the court verdict.

During a news conference, Minister of Labor and Social Protection Dan Mircea Popescu announced that as a result of the decision taken by the Executive Bureau of the Government, the action to terminate the labor contract of those employees who had refused to sign the individual agreement to resume activity has begun. The presented data shows that the agreement had been signed by 850 out of the total of 6,000 employees. The METROREX [Subway] public corporation director Radu Farmos told our correspondent Ion Marinescu yesterday that 125 individual labor contracts have been terminated and this action will continue.

On the other hand, the Permanent Bureau of the Union of Subway Free Trade Unions assesses in a communique that the decision of the enlarged Executive Bureau of the government regarding the termination of individual labor contracts of those persons who have not signed the commitment to immediately start activity is a flagrant violation of human rights and the subway employees' right to better working and living conditions.

In order to be able to cope with transportation difficulties faced by Bucharest citizens as a result of the subway strike, the Executive Bureau of the Government decided to supplement the number of RATB [Bucharest Public Transportation Corporation] buses by bringing to Bucharest the buses that can be spared by the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of the Interior within a 100-185 kilometer radius around Bucharest. These buses will start running today or tomorrow at the latest. Likewise, it has been decided that new personnel will be employed in the subway from among people who can be spared by the SNCFR [Romanian Railway Corporation] and from among unemployed people. Training courses will be organized for these people and payment will be made by unemployment benefit for an adequate period of time. [passage omitted]

The PDSR [Party of Social Democracy of Romania] supports the government's actions to observe the laws regarding ways to solve the subway labor conflict, said the vice president of that party Virgil Popa at a news conference held yesterday. He said that this strike that has been declared illegal was not clearly motivated and its hasty start might hide some other interested forces.

On the other hand, the leader of the Liberal Party '93, Dinu Patriciu said that the subway strike could be solved by satisfying the employees' claims correlated with an increase in labor productivity. During the news conference he held yesterday, Patriciu also mentioned that this strike could have been avoided if the METROREX had been privatized. We remind our listeners that currently the subway is not running.

Romania: Vacaroiu: Subway Workers Ready To Work

AU1303155796 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 13 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In an interview with our radio station, Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu said that, so far, 4,200 out of some 6,000 employees have signed individual pledges immediately to resume work at the Bucharest subway. The prime minister expressed the hope that this action will be concluded very shortly. The necessary subway checks will be carried out, after which the trains will start running. Immediately after traffic is resumed, the prime minister said, talks bewteen the METROREX [Subway Public Company] management board and the representatives of the employees will also be resumed. In a communique received by fax, the Democratic Party [PD] calls on the government immediately to engage in negotiations with the representatives of the subway employees. The government's steps to replace the employees with pensioners and to supplement the number of RATB [Bucharest Public Transportation Corporation] buses with those of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of National Defense denote ignorance for the simple reason that the security of this means of transportation cannot be ensured by medically incompetent pensioners, while the few buses of these ministries cannot replace the subway's transport capacity. According to the communique, the legal cause of the conflict is the two additional protocols to the collective labor contract signed by Transportation Minister Aurel Novac, which were not observed. Consequently, the PD demands the minister's immediate dismissal.

Slovenia: 19,000 Refugees From Bosnia Ordered To Leave

LD1203210296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1706 GMT 12 Mar 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ljubljana, March 12 (TANJUG)—Around 19,000 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) will have to leave Slovenia by the end of June, when all their refugee rights expire—the authorities in Ljubljana have ruled.

According to this decision, the predominantly Muslim (80 per cent) refugees would have either to find some other shelter or go back to their homes in Bosnia.

The Ljubljana authorities have become more strict towards Bosnian Muslims, especially after the recent Sarajevo visit by Slovenian President Milan Kucan.

During his visit, as was learned from Slovenian delegation sources, Kucan failed to win the expected support by the Bosnian Muslim leadership as regards engaging Slovenian enterprises for major projects under the internationally-financed plan on Bosnia's reconstruction.

The same sources said that the Muslim political top had then urged Slovenia to return money it received for the too high-priced arms that have been supplied since 1991 to the armed forces of Alija Izetbegovic.

Sarajevo government representatives also on that occasion demanded that the Bank of Ljubljana should pay out more than 270 million marks to its savers in the territory of what is now the Muslim-Croat Federation.

This bank, following Slovenia's secession from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 'nationalized' the deposits of its savers from the areas of the other five republics of the former Yugoslav union.

Slovenia: Shortage of Capital May Devalue Vouchers

AU1203123196

[FBIS Summary] Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovene in its 27 February edition on pages 23 and 24 carries a 1,000-word report by Stanislav Kovac entitled the Privatization Hole, which examines the rumors about the alleged 129 billion tolar privatization deficit. The deficit comes as a result of the discrepancy between the estimated value of the social capital earmarked for the privatization through the Authorized Investment Funds (Pooblascene Investicijske Druzbe—PID) and the value of vouchers collected by these funds.

As Kovac explains, "PIDs calculated the value of the privatization deficit on the basis of the data on the number and the value of the two-thirds of already privatized companies. According to the Privatization Agency's information 1,497 companies will undergo property transformation. Out of these 1,023 companies have already started transformation since 17 February. Their actual value is 467 billion tolars and with the vouchers collected PIDs on average have a 20-percent share in them. On the basis of this data PIDs calculated that all in all only 144 billion tolars would be available to them for privatization, while they collected 273 billion tolars worth of vouchers from the citizens. If they were to exchange one voucher tolar for one tolar of the social assets at the Development Fund auctions, PIDs would require the social assets in the value of the vouchers collected, namely, 273 billion tolars. However, this will not happen because PIDs have established that only 144 billion tolars worth of social capital was made available to them. The difference is 129 billion tolars, which represents the privatization deficit."

As Kovac writes further, former Privatization State Secretary Rop admits the existence of the privatization deficit, although the deficit is somewhat smaller according to his calculations, namely, 105 billion tolars. Enumerating the factors that caused this deficit, the author quotes Rop as saying that "the value of the social capital that was initially earmarked for the privatization in the process of the property transformation 'diminished as a result of the exclusion of farmland and forests, denationalization, state infrastructure, the assets already privatized according to Markovic's model, and ecological considerations.' According to Rop the value of the social enterprises designated for privatization diminished primarily because of the difference between the envisaged value of enterprises based on the opening statement of accounts and the value of enterprises subsequently ascertained by the valuators." On average the value of enterprises was some 10 to 15 percent lower than the opening statement of accounts.

As this deficit puts the citizens who invested their vouchers with PIDs at a disadvantage in comparision with those who invested in companies directly, the article also examines possible ways of covering this deficit. One way, according to Kovac, would be to raise the value of shares, so that the exchange ratio between the voucher and actual share value would be 2 to 1, which would halve the value of the vouchers. Another possibility, reportedly advocated by PIDs, is that the state covers up the deficit with the additional capital. This would allow a 1 to 1 ratio in the exchange of vouchers for shares and the vouchers would thus maintain their original value.

In conclusion Kovac anticipates that due to differences in views between PIDs and the Privatization State Secretary as to whether the shares are being exchanged for or purchased by vouchers, the final ruling on this issue will probably have to come from the Constitutional Court.

Slovenia: Trade With Russia Increases

AU1203165696 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
5 Mar 96 p 10

[Article by Darijan Kosir: "Large Trade Increase and Noticeable Surplus for Us"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In 1995 Slovene exports to Russia amounted to $304.9 million and were 15 percent higher than the previous year. Imports reached $235.1 million and were 59.5 percent higher than in 1994. Overall trade volume amounted to exactly $540 million and was 32.7 percent higher than the previous year (which amounted to $406.9 million). The foreign trade surplus with Russia therefore amounted to $69.8 million, which is less than the record-breaking $123 million surplus of 1994. This, however, is enough to include Russia among the few important Slovene partners—excluding former Yugoslavia—to which we sell more than we buy, such as Germany and Britain. This is of great importance in view of the increase in the Slovene trade deficit ($1.68 billion on convertible markets in 1995, of which $800 million are due to Italy and Austria).

This makes Russia the sixth most important convertible market by extent of trade, fifth by extent of imports, and second (non-Yugoslav; from the former Yugoslav markets only Croatia surpasses Russia) by amount of surplus. This is an even greater achievement considering the geographical distance. Another $110 million worth of construction work in Russia (amounting to approximately 45 percent of all Slovene construction abroad) has to be added to the amount of $540 million of trade exchange, as well as another $45 million earned through tourism. That is, with almost 85,000 Russian overnight stays in Slovenia (there were around 50,000 Russian visitors, ranking fifth by number of overnight stays). This brings the direct exchange of goods and services between Russia and Slovenia to $700 million.

There have been no changes in the structure of Slovene trade exchange with Russia compared with previous years. We export mainly medicines ($50 million), telephone equipment ($40.5 million), building joinery and other building material ($25.2 million), furniture and interior equipment ($21.5 million), paints and varnish ($19,7 million), and electric equipment for cars ($14,9 million). These six merchandise groups cover 56 percent of the entire exports, which in turn are very varied and diversified.

The most prominent exporters to the Russian market are Krka and Iskratel. According to Janez Zagorc, Krka's head representative in Moscow, Krka exported $37.5 million ($42.25 million, if we include Kazakhstan and Belarus) worth of goods to Russia in 1995. Iskratel's representative Franc Jurjevcic stated that they (together with their company in Yekatarinburg) sold $34.5 million worth of goods.

The import side is one-sided since natural gas, crude oil and oil derivative imports (imported by Petrol Trgovina) amount to $137 million, approximately 58 percent of overall Slovene imports from Russia. Apart from this, we also buy cellulose (about 15 percent of all imports), cars (amounting to $9.9 million), iron and steel, rubber, aluminum, and nickel. [passage omitted]

Federal

FRY: Milosevic Discusses Issues With U.S. Team

LD1203181496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1657 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 12 Mar (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received members of a U.S. team led by Assistant Secretary of State, Ambassador John Kornblum, President Milosevic's office has announced.

The U.S. delegation included Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck; Rudolf Perina, U.S. charge d'affaires in Belgrade and assistant head of the U.S. team; Ambassador William Montgomery; Roberts Owen, and representatives of the National Security Council, the Pentagon, and of the chiefs of staff. They exchanged views on the course of the implementation of the peace plan in Bosnia and concluded that positive results have been realized, the main characteristic of which is that peace has finally been restored and the life of ordinary citizens is getting back to normal.

Particular emphasis was laid on the need to push ahead with the implementation of the civilian part of the agreement. In this regard, the central place ought to be given to preparations for the forthcoming elections of new legal institutions, whose establishment undoubtedly represents the most important step toward the strengthening of peace and the global regulation of all problems, both in the [Bosnian] Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation.

A number of other issues important for the successful realization of the peace agreement were raised at the session.

Both sides displayed inclination toward normalizing relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United States.

The talks were also attended by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic.

FRY: Agani Raises Kosovo Secession Issue in Belgrade

AU1303112896 Tirana ATA in English 1656 GMT 12 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, March 12 (ATA)—A three-day conference started in Belgrade today under auspices of the British Embassy, on the topic "National Question and Borders." Attending the conference is also an Albanian delegation led by Fehmi Agani, deputy chairman of the Democratic League of Kosova.

The conference was opened by the charge d'affaires of Great Britain, Haivor Roberts. He stressed that their aim was not to draw conclusions but to exchange opinions on contestable questions. Present in the conference are also experts from Great Britain, Kosova, and Serbia. From the Albanian party participating are Fehmi Agani, Azem Vllasi, Anton Berisha, Veton Surroi, and Ylber Hysa.

In his address, Mr. Agani pointed out that the autonomy of Kosova was not created in Serbia and it was not Serbia that created the former autonomy for Kosova. He reminded those present that the violent unification of Kosova with Serbia was made in 1925 and that now, after the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, the Albanian people have the right to raise the question of secession.

Mr. Agani said that the rump Yugoslavia has made nothing to be able to contribute to the Albanians' integration in the political life. "With its acts, Belgrade is ever more convincing the Albanians of their demands," said Agani.

The conference will continue until March 13 and the main question to be discussed will be that of Kosova.

FRY: Takeover of Studio B by Belgrade Government

96BA0204A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 96 pp 10-13

[Article by Batic Bacevic: "The State Against the Media—The Example of Studio B: SOS, Channels"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Immediately before the news broadcast, the new director says to the announcer, Olivera Bojovic: "Dry your tears, put on your makeup, and smile. Everything will be all right."*

"I am selling a new, preserved, and unused goal." Many people in the country of Serbia wanted to answer the ad sometime around the end of February that Matija Beckovic and Dusko Radovic gave more than a quarter of a century ago. The two hundred enthusiasts, who expressed their protest in front of the City Assembly because of the strangulation of the most popular Belgrade television station, Studio B, would probably want to answer, if they knew that new, unused goals existed. The gloomy protests, the speed with which Studio B surrendered, the indifference of its faithful viewers speak not only about yet another victory of the self-confident and omnipotent government, but also about the opening of a new chapter in the simulation of a democratic society in the Balkans.

One well-known intellectual remarked with resignation at the same meeting that, after the "liberation" of Studio B in Serbia, nothing would be the same again. The "liberation" of other, still uncontrolled media is a preelection goal of the government. If the government succeeds in this, even if the opposition carries off victory at the coming elections, there wont' be anyone to report about this. And something that is not noted in the media has not happened.

"One of the rare flags of democracy that the West has recognized in these parts has been killed. What will exist in the future should be called Studio C, because it is no longer what it was," stated the former director and editor in chief of NTV [National TV] Studio B, Milorad Roganovic, a day after this media organization, in a joint action of judicial organs of Serbia and Belgrade authorities, was declared nonexistent. If the socialist government could somehow be criticized for fairly meager results in carrying out national, economic, or social policy, then its actions with attractive goals, such as the strangulation of independent media or reducing democratic freedoms, cannot be criticized for absolutely anything. Everything has been done irreproachably.

The match against Studio B could not have been played better even by the new member of the Socialist Party of Serbia, Anatolij Karpov. The city authorities have shown anthological effectiveness: on the same day a verdict was reached according to which Studio B returned to the year 1972; committee members in the city Assembly succeeded in "studying in detail" the same verdict and appointing a new administrative committee, which then began to work and produce a program in which the "culture of the dialogue" would be affirmed and "the opposition would get more space of higher quality."

Persons who devote certain attention to legal nuances find it strange that the first man of Studio B was informed about the court decision a half hour after they appointed the new members of the old enterprise in the Belgrade Assembly. Of special interest is the "visionary" decision of the new president of the Administration Committee (the secretary of the City Assembly), Ljuba Milic, on increased security in the premises of Studio B, which, according to the story of the employees, Milic signed a day before he was appointed president of the Administrative Committee. The events that followed could become an instruction for mastering a lesson: how to control the media.

After Roganovic's statement about "lowering the flag of democracy," spots were scheduled all afternoon on Studio B television. The news was not broadcast at 5. At that time a meeting was being held in the editorial offices with reporters and the newly elected leadership at which, in addition to a variety of promises that "Studio B would remain Studio B" and warnings that the word, work, and discipline were to be respected, promises about improving the material position of workers were noticed. In the quiet and difficult discussion with the new leadership, only a few reporters expressed dissatisfaciton with the way the organization had been taken over. One of its most reputable reporters invited the employees to visit the homes and employees of the three men who had directed Studio B in the past six years (Kojadinovic, Roganovic, and Kovacevic), in order to convince themselves of their material status. The meeting ended about 20 minutes before 1900 hours, when the newly appointed editors Dragisa Kovacevic, Deca Cavic, and Vesna Vojvodic began to think about the broadcast of the main informational program, news at 7.

At that time, in the premises of the editorial offices, there were present a number of members of the security component of the City Assembly, the "Beogradjanka," and some private agencies. However, there were also reporters, cameramen, and film editors. In the tragicomical preparations of the first news broadcast of the new management, Kovacevic attempted to come to the amendments, which were hidden somewhere, that the content of the broadcast be agreed on and who of the employees could be counted on be clarified. Directly before the news broadcast that will be recorded in the history of Studio B, Kovacevic said to the newscaster, Olivera Bojovic: "Dry your tears, put on your makeup, and everything will be all right."

However, everything was not all right. After the change in Dragisa's concept of the news and the broadcast of Roganovic's statement, the program was cut off. The persons who had been deemed responsible for the incident descended down the stairway from the 21st floor. In the coming news broadcasts, the new star announced that such a incident would not be repeated and thanked viewers for their patience. Everything ended without a mistake. The new TV station began its work and reporters cynically evaluated the content of the news, which represented the result of efforts by the new editors to convince viewers and the public that "everything is staying the same only a little different."

On the same day large state firms ended their three-year blockade and broadcast advertising spots on Studio B, the City Assembly paid about 700,000 dinars into the theretofore empty account, and reporters received two salaries in the next few days. There was no reason for dissatisfaction.

Although the whole action of the "moderate socialists" led by mayor Nebojsa Covic lasted as long as a football game, the fall of Studio B was quite long. After a delay of two years, the democratic public and opposition parties will now remember that a group of reporters left the television station then who were its protective trademark. After the departure of Lila Radonjic, Zoran Ostojic, and Olja Beckovic, new groups of reporters, cameramen, and film editors left the organization with various explanations. In addition to internal disagreements, the state waged quiet and obvious economic war against Independent Television. The enthusiasm of reporters, who had by far the lowest wages in the city, slowly disappeared. It seemed the government would be satisfied to grant Studio B the fate of a sick person who is suffering from a serious illness and leave him to expire alone.

In the organization itself, the editorial staffs of the sports and morning programs, whose reporters spoke with ever increasing enthusiasm about the image and activities of our mayor and did not have so difficult a material position as that of reporters of the informational editorial staff, distinguished themselves first. Although it sounds unusual, a love toward Covic was indicated in sports programs. In this way, the presentation of the game of veterans of Yugoslav basketball in which, in addition to Slavnic, Varajic, and Kapicic, Covic himself also participated, stood out as an anthological supplement. Trivial questions like who was announced as a player in the game and whom the Studio B camera followed most should not be answered. But for the consideration of serious clashes on the editorial staff itself, the testimony of one of the former reporters of this station can serve: "In Studio B there was good, professional, informative programming, which certainly played a great role in the democratization of the country. What is forgotten, however, is that our television station, faced with economic pressures, has made compromises that it was not supposed to make. No one remembers now that people like Jezda, Davina, Arkan, or Cleopatra were promoted on our television station, who paid well for ads because they knew that we had attained an image of a television station that is believed. I tell that, because there always existed another, pragmatic side in Studio B in which there were people of weak progressional and strong commercial abilities. These people have won today."

After two years of pressure from the government, large state firms, and private "experienced" corporations, Studio B was at the end of its strength. The decision for it to be placed under control sounds quite irrational. The government decided "to kill the man who is prone to suicide anyway," because it believed that Studio B would hold out too long and probably survive the coming elections. Although much criticism can be directed at the programming, which was increasingly reduced to informational programming, Studio B succeeded in surviving as a channel that informs about everything that regime media suppress. And there was too much of this. There were pictures of misery and poverty, and the exodus of the Serbian people from the Republic of Serbian Krajina, as well as of people who found themselves on the wrong side of the peace agreement on Bosnia and who were leaving their homes, on the Studio B screens at the end of 1993. Such television programming was simply too unsuitable a witness for a government that, again, is neither so secure nor so powerful as is thought.

The statement of the republic minister for information, Ratomir Vic, given to the Deutsche Welle radio-TV station, according to which frequencies, as state property, can be given only to stations that love the state and the government, indicated clearly that any electronic medium that is not under the control of the state or private firms that are in turn under the control of the state can survive with difficulty in our country. In this resistance it has been futile to expect help from the domestic opposition. In addition, international society and the democratic world have not had the intention, with the Bosnian problems unsolved, to become involved in trivial questions on freedom of the media or on democratic rules in Serbia. In the case of Studio B, the fact that this station, as the most important and strongest medium, has not been the favorite of numerous and abundant international foundations is also important. Due to the peacemaking messages from Belgrade, which the socialists have dispatched, as have the recipients of international aid, the "liberation" of the Studio B television station, on which nationalists and warmongers are appearing, has not disturbed the democratic countries in the least. Colleagues in the West have found countless interesting themes, but a story on the only independent station in Serbia has seldom been found among them and European television has refused to accept a supplement on Studio B into programming for international exchange. However, this does not mean that the question of independent media will not be included on the daily agenda of one of the diplomatic summits devoted to the situation in the turbulent Balkans.

"The most that we can do for independent media that are threatened in all former communist countries is to generate as much publicity about them as possible. The European Federation of Journalists has sent a letter to all Western governments and, as far as I know, the commissioner of the European Union for Foreign Policy, Hans van den Broek, has protested to the state organs of Yugoslavia. Although the situation does not inspire too much optimism now, I think that policies will change to the benefit of media freedom. In contrast to the media in our area that listen carefully to what the government says, in normal countries the government listens carefully to what the media say. And it seems to me that colleagues from influential Western media are certainly interested in a story on free democratic dissemination of information," says coordinator of the European federation and reporter Bojana Humar.

According to the assessment of Western diplomats in Belgrade, European countries will not be too interested in matters that are not written in the Dayton agreement in the next two years. A dilemma between a stable nondemocratic system and an unstable democracy does not exist. Everything must be resolved, nevertheless, at home.

The decision of the Economic Court on returning the status of Studio B to 1972 will have far deeper consequences than can be seen today. With the placing under control of the last independent television station, the opposition parties are also returning to the past. But their activities must be adapted to 1990. The circle of testing for multiparty democratic life has closed. Other rules will be in effect in a new party of the political game, and reporters will have a significantly smaller role. Those who do not watch television and do not read newspapers, but have serious, existential needs, will decide on the results of a party. h3}[Box, p 10]

[Interview with Dragisa Kovacevic, director of Studio B, by Violeta Marcetic; place and date not given: "Unsuitable Viewers: 'No One Has Instructed Me Yet That the Government Cannot Be Criticized'"]

[Marcetic] How do you assess the current situation in Studio B? After everything that has happened, has programming begun to function normally?

[Kovacevic] The situation is completely normal and programming is running its course; we are slowly returning individual programs while some of them will not exist anymore. We will not have "Utisak nedelje" [Impression of the Week] in that form and under that name for the simple reason that we believe this program, which was initiated by Olja Beckovic, was given a special stamp by her and everything was mediocre after that. There will be something similar. "Intervju gledalaca" [Interview of Viewers] will be called "Intervju nedelje" [Interview of the Week] and there will be a somewhat different formula, but otherwise everything will remain the same in the studio, host and guest, in that so many viewers will not be included. I think that those viewers who had a special interest called in. There was quite a bit of misuse of late in those callins by viewers. People who had moderate comments did not call in.

[Marcetic] Will programming change in general, particularly its informational part?

[Kovacevic] I held a meeting of the editorial staff today. Programming will change only in the sense that there will be no primitive misuse of the media. We will exclude jargon words from use, words from houses of correction, with which it is desired to degrade and offend someone. It is logical that there will be party reactions in which the work of the president of the state, the government, the National Bank, and so on will quite certainly be criticized.

[Marcetic] This means some more moderate variation.

[Kovacevic] I wouldn't say more moderate, but criticism in another manner. One shouldn't expect that the opposition won't criticize the government any more, but I won't allow them to swear at the government. I won't allow parties to besmirch each other in the manner that they have done this up to now. I will only insist on the dictionary and the parties will observe it. Therefore, the parties that will send such reports can already test me, and if what I talked about happens, they won't get into the programming. No one has instructed me yet that the government cannot be criticized. At the moment when someone orders that there will be no criticism, from that moment I won't be the director any more.

[Marcetic] What do think about the charges against those people who have left?

[Kovacevic] Those are completely minor and irrelevant people for Studio B. They have been misused in this whole story. Everyone's playing with them and they'll end up on the street for the most part. Those who have tried to play with them will open private firms and enterprises. Naturally, parties will use this to gain a little publicity for themselves. Some of them have also had a personal interest. Quite a few of them have followed individual parties and now there's no place to represent them anymore. Therefore, I have put an end to their personal interests. I am happy about that because this editorial staff that has remained has accepted my concept. Vjestica also spoke today and said that what happened with the news at 7 has never happened on the planet so far. Such obstruction and vandalism in one's own organization are unexemplary for professionals. I would like to see the director who would accept such a man, since this, naturally, can also be repeated very easily in some other situation.

[Marcetic] What is your motive in accepting your current function?

[Kovacevic] That is courage and anger and my stupidity that I am just now seeing. I am a man who has burst in from the sports staff and I am completely unexperienced politically. That this is so was shown by my naivete of the first day. Now I could err with difficulty in the same matter. I have seen that there is no one else in the organization who could carry out these duties, and I accepted it only when Djoko Vjestica declined.

Moreover, since I'm a man from sports, I will insist that this is a commercial station and that we follow some rules of sports, i.e., fair play on both sides.

[Box, p 11]

[Interview with Dragan Kojadinovic, former president of the Administrative Committee, by V. M. (presumably Violeta Marcetic); place and date not given: "Unavoidable Defeat"]

[Kojadinovic] Our battle for survival lasted six years. It can't be expected from a Kojadin [presumably his nickname] that he defend himself from those who have the army and the police.

Something happened that had to happen. We had to be aware of it and realize afterwards where we live. Our whole battle against this kind of system had to end in defeat. Our battle for survival lasted six years; there were fear and pressure from all sides. Today no one even remembers what kinds of problems there were six years ago regarding the obtaining of permits for broadcasting. I think that we withstood a lot.

[Marcetic] To what extent are you responsible for what happened?

[Kojadinovic] Colleagues who attacked us from other editorial staffs, who are not independent, sold themselves to just those editorial boards for trivial sums, for 100 or 200 marks. In their attacks they often fell into contradictions so that they attacked precisely me without any reason and claimed that I am a hidden member of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia]. I am not in contact with those who left several years ago, since I think that they published the thing according to an assignment.

[Marcetic] How do you feel now?

[Kojadinovic] I now feel unburdened since I hope that Studio B will recover financially fairly well. I think that one can't expect from a Kojadin that he defend himself from the state, from those who have the army and the police.

[Marcetic] What is Studio B's relationship with the opposition?

[Kojadinovic] Every assistance must be repaid, if you are alluding to that. We didn't get any help from either the government or the opposition, so on this basis we don't have any obligations to either one of them.

[Marcetic] Will Studio B now become the city television station or something else?

[Kojadinovic] I'm not thinking about that now. It is most important that this station not be turned off. I think that one shouldn't judge people who remained to work. Whoever asked Rogan and me whether to stay, we told him to stay. This television station must continue to live, but I'm afraid they'll move against other independent media.

[Box, p 12]

[Interview with Zoran Djindjic, president of the Democratic Party, by Srboljub Bogdanovic; place and date not given: "Effective Unassisted Goal"]

[Djindic] The elections for the Belgrade Assembly are in December. The goal of the opposition should be the return of independence to Studio B.

[Bogdanovic] Did the DS [Democratic Party] expect that something could happen in this way with Studio B? Were you surprised?

[Djindjic] In principle we expected it, but I did not have a clear concept of when this attack would be undertaken. In any case, it was clear that the SPS would attempt to extinguish all free media.

[Bogdanovic] How much harm was thereby inflicted on the opposition?

[Djindjic] In the symbolic sense, the damage was great. Studio B is an organization that grew up together with the opposition.

However, as far as our future results are concerned, there's not much connection. The political public is already definitively divided, and it can be considered generally that those who were viewers of Studio B are also sympathizers with the opposition. Opposition voters cannot be won over with this move to the side of the SPS, but they can only be revolted.

[Bogdanovic] Now that there's no free Studio B any more, will you try to increase the pressure in order to win your natural right to a place in the state media?

[Djindjic] By the end of the week we will propose to other parties of the opposition a definitive relinquishment and rejection of the mandate in the republic assembly, as a reaction to the seizure of Studio B. In addition, elections for the Belgrade Assembly should be in December. The opposition should certainly list the return of independence to Studio B as its election goal.

[Bogdanovic] What do you think, did Milosevic judge the moment well to liquidate NTV Studio B?

[Djindjic] A good moment for something like that doesn't exist. Since TV policy was put under control, Studio B is important because it has remained a symbol of fairly good media freedom. You can't destroy a symbol without consequences. With this great international harm was done to us, which is not resulting in someone's sending NATO to defend Studio B, but Milosevic will be treated as a foreign body, which he is, in all dealings with the civilized world. This move is one of Milosevic's effective unassisted goals.

[Bogdanovic] What is your view on the demand for a special television channel for the opposition?

[Djindjic] We are against the political division of channels.

[Box, p 13]

[Interview with Vojislav Kostunica, president of the Democratic Party of Serbia, by B. B. (presumably Batic Bacevic); place and date not given: "Hidden Dissatisfaction"]

[Bacevic] After the "liberation of Studio B," will the opposition have to carry out serious changes in its activities?

[Kostunica] The events around Studio B naturally warrant the serious condemnation of all democratic forces in the country, and similar cases can probably be expected. However, the opposition shouldn't fail to see the forest for the trees and should, among its leading goals, place the battle for television coverage of assembly meetings and the defense of independent media. Instead of this, the opposition would have to become involved, in a mature and organized manner, in the realization of basic democratic rights and to seek not only the defense of independent media but also the free and objective dissemination of information by state television and POLITIKA.

[Bacevic] How do you explain the weak reactions of the public?

[Kostunica] If great national dissatisfaction was not manifested at the end of 1993, when people had barely survived hyperinflation, and if it didn't happen last year, which will be remembered for a great national tragedy, then it is fairly difficult to expect that such a thing would happen now. I think that this kind of energy has been spent to a great degree. That does not mean that dissatisfaction among the people does not exist. We think that this dissatisfaction and the results of our activities will be shown at the coming elections.

[Bacevic] Do you think that international society will seek to have the president of Serbia respect some of the playing rules that obtain in the West?

[Kostunica] The viewpoint of the West has changed significantly since 1989. Then they insisted on respect for human rights, the democratization of society, and creation of conditions for the fair organization of political parties. In the meantime the USSR has ceased to exist, and war has begun in the area of the former Yugoslavia. I think that their criteria have significantly dropped and can be compressed into one formal viewpoint: there are democracies where there is more than one party and where these parties participate in elections. In this phase Slobodan Milosevic is necessary to them and they won't seek more from him, but he will perhaps become superfluous in the next phase.

Another angle for viewing the situation also exists, according to which Milosevic will be necessary to Western countries until he prevents the creation of a modern and democratic Serbian state. The Serbian opposition, nevertheless, must rely on its own forces; this does not mean that it should wage war with the West.

[Box, p 13]

[Interview with Milan Bozic, adviser to Vuk Draskovic, by S. B. (presumably Srboljub Bogdanovic); place and date not given: "Ideological Terror"]

[Bogdanovic] What could the opposition have done so that what happened with Studio B several days ago would not have happened?

[Bozic] The only thing it could have done was help financially, to invest money in a timely fashion and buy part of the ownership of Studio B.

[Bogdanovic] How could that have helped—the court has contested the whole concept of change in ownership?! All the money that would have been invested in Studio B would have been lost.

[Bozic] True, but it would have helped financially and prevented the outflow of personnel that has lasted for years at this television station. What contributed a lot to the seizure of Studio B by the government was its failure as an enterprise. The financially drained organization was easy prey.

[Bogdanovic] Are you worried about this?

[Bozic] I am worried because what is happening reminds me of the postrevolutionary period after World War II. At first the communist powers cooperated with inherited democratic institutions, and then, when they became stronger, they began with ideological terror. Milosevic is doing something similar now, figuring that there will not be radical reactions from the West, since they need him because of the peace plan.

What is worst of all is that democratic institutions do not exist in our country. When the government applies force, you do not have a means of responding, except to apply force too—to reject mandates, organize protests, and the like.

[Bogdanovic] When we are rejecting mandates, what do you think about that?

[Bozic] I will answer in one sentence: if you reject mandates, they will fill the Assembly and change the Constitution as they wish. In order for me to be for rejecting mandates, you would have to convince me that it would provoke such a constitutional crisis that elections would immediately have to be held after that.

Serbia

Serbia: Daily Interviews Radical Party Leader

AU1303092296 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Mar 96 p 13

[Interview with Vojislav Seselj, leader of the Serbian Radical Party, by Vera Didanovic; place and date not given: "I Am the Most Tolerant Politician"] [FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Didanovic] The Serbian Radical Party [SRS] has decided to face the elections independently. At the meeting of the executive board you stated that the goal of the SRS is not to bring down the socialists, but to gain control over the government. Can you do that alone, or how do you plan to do it?

[Seselj] We probably cannot gain control over the government alone. It will be necessary to join into a coalition after the elections, but there exists a certain gradation according to which we are ready to do so. We can easily join into a coalition with the DSS [Democratic Party of Serbia], under certain conditions also with Djindjic's DS [Democratic Party], but with great difficulty with the SPO [Serbian Renewal Party].

[Didanovic] The supporters of the joint list of candidates claim that it is necessary to overthrow the socialists and then organize a "fair match" in order to see the real power of each party.

[Seselj] If those who unite have no common program nor a common or identical goal, then their government has failed from the start. What would a governmental meeting look like, where would the parties clash? The people would then quickly oust us from the government. That would be the ideal solution for the socialists—to step down from power for six months, show the people that the current opposition parties are unable to cope with the situation, for the people to say "better you than them," and so return to power. [passage omitted]

[Didanovic] How can the SRS now realize national interests in the way you see them, without causing new bloodshed?

[Seselj] Nothing can be changed at the moment. However, the current status can be maintained, if only eastern Slavonia and Baranja are retained, as well as the Serb Republic, brought down to 49 percent of the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. The radicals would know how to retain it, unlike the socialists, who will even sacrifice that. However, we will wait for a change in the international situation in order to attain that, which belongs to the Serb people—the western parts of Serb Krajina and some additional parts of the Serb Republic, where Serbs constituted over 90 percent of the population, and were transferred to the Moslems and the Croats after the NATO attacks. Moreover, we expect that Russian diplomacy will soon come forth with the notion of revising the borders to the state before the NATO bombings.

[Didanovic] One often hears that Milosevic is using you as a kind of argument in discussions with the international community. It is even argued that Studio B [local Belgrade television station] suffered because of you. How do you think the world would be able to accept a SRS government?

[Seselj] There are many indicators pointing toward the fact that U.S. Secretary of State Christopher personally gave Milosevic the support he needed to crush Studio B. Milosevic had not complained so much about SRS appearances on Studio B, but about the station creating publicity for the government in Pale and about it giving a lot of publicity to the front rejecting the Dayton agreement. Christopher then said that Milosevic had the right to crush Studio B. It is no coincidence that Christopher is now reacting strongly to the crushing of the Soros Fund, but not talking about Studio B. However, Studio B is far more important for democracy in Serbia.

We will participate in the Serbian elections. It is important to us that the Serbian people accept us, and not whether foreign countries accept us or not.

We would offer all countries a relationship based on the principle of equality and noninvolvement in internal matters. However, we would wait for the shift in power in Europe and the world to attain what we lost under Milosevic's rule and would not have lost had he not capitulated. The Serb Republic is now under NATO occupation only because Milosevic agreed to it. Had he rejected the plan, NATO would never have come to Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it was not ready to take part in this Balkan war. [passage omitted]

[Didanovic] You announced that the party's new program has been drafted. Will there be any qualitative changes?

[Seselj] The program was not altered but worked out. It will include everything the program had until now, but will be more extensive, detailed, and, we hope, more attractive to the people. This will be a program comprising a hundred points: national, economical, political, social, and cultural. The program is based on Serb national interests, as defined and understood by the SRS. It is furthermore based on the most positive achievements of European parliamentary democracy, the principles of the legal system, the multiparty system, civil freedom and rights, the principles of liberal capitalism in the economic area, the principles of citizens' social security, and a most liberal and democratic cultural program. [passage omitted]

[Didanovic] Many see you as a violent person.

[Seselj] There have never been any acts of violence. You must keep the circumstances in mind. I reserve the right always to pass through any crowd anywhere. If someone attacks me, I defend myself. There are some things that we cannot change. We do not have control over the media. Remember 1990—the entire media demonized us. They branded me an alcoholic, a criminal, a madman, and so on. It only took me one hour on national television to efficiently refute all this. Therefore, the media do not portray a real picture of us. I assure you that you cannot find a more tolerant politician on the Serbian political scene than a SRS politician. [passage omitted]

[Didanovic] Is the SRS planning any demonstrations?

[Seselj] Until the election campaign begins, we plan to visit smaller towns, and during the campaign we will visit the larger towns and cities. We have been to Idvor, Bajina Basta, Ivanjica, and Futog, and we held public gatherings. These are towns in which 300-400 people gather together, and that is more convenient for the winter period, as the gatherings are held indoors.

[Didanovic] Do you have any advice for the organizers of the 9 March demonstration?

[Seselj] Why should I offer them any advice? They are mature enough; they have enough experience to know how do something and how not to. We view 9 March as any other manifestation of another party. It does not excite us, it does not get on our nerves, it does not attract us, nor anything else. The fact that some people have pretentious titles and images is their own business; that is their own way of attracting voters or warding them off. What I can give you as a kind of forecast is that the current love between Djindjic and Draskovic [SPO leader] will not last long. The consequences of love and hate showing themselves on the political scene are very bad. [passage omitted]

[Didanovic] There is an opinion that your attempt to go to The Hague was for publicity.

[Seselj] There was no publicity intended. I wanted to offer myself to them, to subject myself to the court, if they had anything against me. There is false information stating that I offered myself as a witness against Milosevic. I did offer myself as a defense witness for Karadzic. Whether Karadzic's defense would be dangerous for Milosevic is another matter.

[Didanovic] If the Hague War Tribunal were to demand that Milosevic be turned over, would you support that?

[Seselj] I am in principle against turning over anyone. However, if the Hague Tribunal should decide to put Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic on trial together, I would agree to turn him over. Only in this case would they convince me that they are doing their work on principle.

[Box, p 13]

The Reason for Existence

The reason for our existence is to gain control of the government and to carry out our program. It is unnatural for parties to unite on a joint list of candidates. If our four serious parliamentary parties are each counting on 5 percent of the vote to fulfill the requirement to be represented in the parliament, what is the purpose of the joint list?

Which SRS member would vote for a list including someone from the SPO? And how many SPO supporters would not vote for a list including radicals?

Draskovic and Djindjic approve of the joint list, first, because they cannot, under any condition, repeat the results of 1993 and would like to secure themselves for a certain period of time. It seems that the SPO is falling apart in the provinces, that it is deteriorating, losing strength. Vuk Draskovic especially discredited himself in the last two years by dealing with the socialists on various questions, unprincipled, in a concealed manner. Djindjic had an innerparty split. This time at least those who voted for Micunovic will not vote for the DS.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Daily Views Privatization Process

*AU1303091896 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene
5 Mar 96 p 10*

[Article by Branko Jokic: "The Montenegrin Model Does (Not) Exist"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The process of privatization in Montenegro is full of contradictions. The main contradiction is a statement that this member of the joint country [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—FRY], has created a special model designed to fully privatize the entire economy as well as some state-owned companies by using their own original method. This could lead to a dispute between Montenegro and big brother Serbia. Many see these efforts as Lovcen [mountain in Montenegro] separatism.

The situation is actually very different. The differences between Serbia and Montenegro might only be in the percentages of privatized companies: The percentage in Montenegro is higher than in Serbia, but not the actual number of privatized companies. The different manner in which this process is taking place in Montenegro points toward the fact that FRY lacks a unified method of privatization, that a kind of Montenegrin distinction exists. Therefore, two different economic systems officially exist within the FRY—last year, Montenegro even passed a law eliminating state ownership—and their achievements so far have been moderate, even though one would often hear various success stories. The part of the economy that has had its ownership changed to a certain extent, has also not yet accomplished any visible alterations (nor results), in comparison with previous work methods.

Basically, most privatized companies have been bought by the state, by some of its funds, particularly the development fund and the social security fund. The state owned portion is usually greater than 50 percent, which means that the control over these companies has, through the executive boards, moved from the workers (and the previous bodies of self-management) to a group of people, mostly members of the Montenegrin state leadership. The international sanctions left some of these companies without work, and some of the workers were sent on "indefinite holidays" and later never returned to work. The workers that were still employed in the privatized companies received shares with the help of favorable loans, sometimes even free of charge, or with a 30 percent discount and an additional percentage point for each year of employment. These shareholders seldom hold the power in their own hands, that is, the majority of shares or board members is never under their control. State representatives dominate [the boards], and it often happens that one person (from the social security fund, for example) is a board member or chairman of over 50 such privatized companies. He naturally receives a considerable income, which is often much greater than the average salary.

According to experienced economists, such a movement of capital into state funds can apparently help acquire social peace, and form a kind of control over the employees. This is really a direct nationalization of the economy, which is becoming the property of the new political caste. Some cynically call this an original model, and go on to explain that organizing the state in such a way actually enables the state to exist as a form of organized crime.

The opposition's and the independent unions' suggestions regarding privatization by distributing stocks free of charge were not accepted. Nor were their suggestions to change or amend the laws that regulate the rights of the state. The arguments included that a change in the law would guarantee an influx of foreign capital, which is currently absent. At the same time, initiative and entrepreneurship would increase. Citizens would be able to become the real owners, and there would be no need to talk about a pseudoprivatization.

Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic declared this year to be the year of total privatization. The restructuring agency claims that the process of privatization has begun in over 80 percent of Montenegrin companies (there are 15,000 companies in Montenegro, and more than 200,000 in Serbia). A few days ago Djukanovic reiterated that privatization was the most important task of his government and the ruling DPS [Democratic Party of Socialists], and announced that the process would soon include the largest companies and systems: the electric industry, the railways, the Niksic steelworks, the aluminum processing plant, etc. Only the aluminum processing plant in Podgorica has undergone the process so far, and the workers were able to obtain 51 percent of the stock, thanks to their purchase of foreign debt. Prospective wealthier, and mostly local, buyers and business groups are mainly interested in companies that are not entirely industrial; for example hotels and wood-processing companies, as well as smaller business properties, restaurants, warehouses and suchlike. The law also permits the sale of certain sections of a business, which are sometimes sold for only symbolic prices.

The evaluation method of companies, especially the smaller and obscure ones, as well as the sale of shares, actually cause dissatisfaction amongst the public. The law regulates that the executives are given priority to carry out this evaluation if they are interested in doing so, which they usually are. Moreover, they estimate ridiculously low values with the help of administrative methods. Such comments are heard from the ranks of unions and, mostly, procommunist parties. The government, however, does not concern itself with these complaints. This can also be proved by the amount of money that is at the disposal of, for example, the development fund (which receives 60 percent of a sold company), and exceeds 1 billion German Marks. The capital of industrial companies lies just over 30 percent.

The more serious analysts believe that something needs to be changed in Montenegro. They also claim that without the influx of foreign capital the process will last much longer than five years. All the state owned property will be sold by then. Montenegro will therefore still have to wait a while until it really turns into a neocapitalistic state, which does not depend on it alone, but also on the status of its rule of law. The Montenegrin experts and the majority of the public believe that all this could be realistic if Montenegro were an independent state. It would have no reason to portray itself to foreign partners and potential investors as a country very different from Serbia in these respects. This, however, is far from the truth.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. ***Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.***

- Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.
- Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.
- Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

U.S. Government Customers

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-6042

Non-Government Customers

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.